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High Decoration: Sonia Delaunay, Blaise Cendrars,
arid the Poem as Fashion Design
Carrie Noland

Carrie Noland, an

1.

Assistant Professor at

the University of Cali
fornia, Irvine, is the

author of Poetry at

Stake: Lyric Aes

thetics and the Chal
lenge of Technology

(forthcomingfrom

Princeton UP, 1999).
She is currently work

ing on a project explor
ing graffiti both as a
loadedfigure in French

aesthetics and

a

temporary practice

interrogating the dis
tinction between mat
ter and signification.

Among the many ghostly exchanges that take place
between Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno in
the latters Aesthetic Theory, a central one concerns the
nature of fashion and its relation to aesthetic behav
ior. As Susan Buck-Morss makes clear in her pre
sentation of the Passagen-Werk materials in The
Dialectics of Seeing, Benjamins assessment of the
fashion phenomenon specific to monopoly capitalism
is primarily negative (see 97-101). Intended to intro
duce the new, fashion only generates “hellish repeti
tion” (108), “[f]or fashion,” writes Benjamin, “was
never anything but the parody of the gaily deckedout corpse, the provocation of death through the
woman” (quoted in Buck-Morss 101). Instead of
seeing fashion as a reflection of historicized under
standings of the organic body — as Adorno might
have done — Benjamin views fashion as pure reifica
tion, transforming the organic body into a commod
ity whose value is extinguished every season.
Indirectly taking up Benjamins appraisal of fash
ion, Adorno argues in Aesthetic Theory that the
rhythms of fashion in fact play a visible and necessary
role in the field of aesthetic production. For Adorno,
as for his model in this context, Charles Baudelaire,
fashion constitutes the “temporal nucleus of art”
(192). Fashion
heteronomous principle relating
arts various apparitions back to the particular histor
ical conditions in which they were wrought. In
painting as well as poetry, fashion is the figure of the
contingent, “la vie triviale” [the trivial in Efe],1 “la
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métamorphose journalière des choses extérieures” [the daily metamorphosis of
the external world] (Baudelaire 1155). Without this contingent element, the
artistic monument lacks its alluring detail, its sensual image, and thus fails to
address the individual in the hollow universalism of its transcendent claims.
Adornos treatment of fashion would at first seem to be in direct conflict
with Benjamins, but this conflict at bottom a semantic rather than ideolog
ical one. Whereas Adorno adopts the word “fashion” as a synonym for “het
eronomy,” indicating thereby the art works implication in the conditions of
production peculiar to its historical period, Benjamin uses the word to desig
nate commercial determination, evoking the more pejorative sense that the
word “fashion” had acquired during the first quarter of the twentieth century.
Because it is temporally specific, the connotative ambiguity of the word as it is
used by both Adorno and Benjamin can be seen as symptomatic of a larger
modernist dilemma concerning the nature of art’s relation to history. I want to
study this dilemma with particular reference to the twentieth-century poet
Blaise Cendrars, whose work implicitly questions whether art can have a “tem
poral nucleus” without yielding to the dictates of fashion. Cendrars’ entire
oeuvre generated from the paradoxes produced when the capitalist fashion
system infiltrates the field of high culture. Cendrars asks whether literature in
the twentieth century can confess to its association with fashion, avow its sub
mission to heteronomy, without abdicating entirely its claim to cultural dis
tinction.
Fashion not an abstract concept in Cendrars’ work. From early on in his
career, Cendrars exhibits fascination with the phenomenon of fashion, espe
cially as it pertains to dress. His first poetic volume, Dix-neufpoèmes élastiques
[Nineteen Elastic Poems], was inspired in part by the “simultaneous” dress
designs of the painter and decorative artist, Sonia Delaunay, whose efforts to
ally fashion with art raised for Cendrars the question of art’s cultural status in
a modern world increasingly governed by the laws of the passing fad. When
Cendrars drew an analogy between poetry and Delaunay’s “robe simultanée” in
“Sur la robe elle a un corps” [“On Her Dress She Has A Body”] of 1913 (col
lected in Dix-neuf poèmes élastiques), he in effect presented himself as the
Baudelaire of his own day. He presented himself, that is, a poet dedicated to
locating in the visual appearance of a generation the “élément éternel, invari
able [et] poétique” [eternal, invariable, and poetic element] that ultimately pre
sides over an aesthetic universe (Baudelaire 1154). But the effect of Cendrars’
hymn to Delaunay was not the same as that produced by Baudelaire’s medita
tions on Constantin Guy. By emphasizing the parallels between poetry and “la
mode,” fashion, Cendrars came close to endangering the values by which poet
ry has traditionally been distinguished from more popular or commercial forms.
For Cendrars did not live in Baudelaire’s universe; the lingering aristocratic val
ues that in Baudelaire’s day might have ensured an abiding belief in such a thing
as an “élément éternel” — religious values, or simply widely recognized stan
dards of virtue and taste — were for the most part eroded by the time Cendrars
arrived on the scene. Cultural production in early twentieth-century France
was no longer divided as it had been during the nineteenth century between
artisanal and industrial modes of production.2 By the end of the Third Repub
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lie, industrial manufacture was rapidly replacing small workshop, craft-based
production modes in a number of domains, from the decorative arts to the
domain of film production.3 Cendrars’ world, in other words, was becoming
that of monopoly” or industrial capitalism, one in which “la mode” would come
to reflect less the complexion of a particular historical moment — its “morale”
or “passion” in Baudelairean terms — than the directives of increasingly power
ful entertainment and industrial monopolies. The realm of haute couture may
have been somewhat protected from standardizing processes that were inex
orably modifying the appearance of the everyday; however, by the early teens,
even this elite field of cultural production was succumbing to the demands of
large-scale industrial manufacture. The general democratization of access to
elite culture, the increasingly dependent relation between film stars and fashion
trends, and the emergence of a middle-class “knock-off” market (a market that
accelerated the alternation of models in response to a larger and more diversi
fied clientele) were all factors that contributed to the standardization of haute
couture fashion design.
Thus, the analogy Cendrars established between fashion and poetry in
1913 functioned somewhat differently from the association evoked by Baude
laire in “Le Peintre de la vie moderne” of 1859-60. Even though Cendrars was
careful to compare poetry to a dress made by a high modernist painter, he could
not avoid evoking certain parallels between lyric composition and industrial
manufacture. The analogy he presented in “Sur la robe elle a un corps” drew
poetry inevitably into relation not with the “temporal nucleus” of art but rather
with the infernal repetition that, according to Benjamin, fashion had become.
Apollinaires 1913 depiction of fashion as “le masque de la mort,” the mask of
death (7), clearly indicates that by the early twentieth century, the word “la
mode” resonated quite differently than it had in Baudelaire’s day. To be the
Baudelaire of the early twentieth century meant, then, not only to avow the
heteronomous, fashionable element immanent to poetry and the other high arts
but also to place at risk the very distinctions between craft and standardization,
authorship and imitation, upon which the high arts had, since the Romantic
period, been founded.

2.
Cendrars belonged to a group of European artists who were attempting at the
dawn of the century to import the techniques, iconographies, and discourses of
popular culture into the domain of high art. What differentiates Cendrars from
his contemporaries, however, and what makes his contribution to modernism
so extraordinary, that he experimented with the boundaries of high art not
within the domain of painting or sculpture but rather within one of the most
conservative and convention-bound spheres of cultural production, that of
French lyric poetry. Whereas recent critics have familiarized us with the exis
tence of pre-postmodern forms in avant-garde art, such as the readymade and
the pastiche, very little attention has been paid to Cendrars’ poetic readymades
and pastiche compositions, his own peculiar experimentation with the limits of

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jx/vol2/iss2/8

6

Editors: Vol. 2, No. 2 (1998): Full issue

136

Journal x

concepts such as authorship, work, and style. Cendrars’ willingness to associ
ate and even at times to equate poetry with decorative and commercial forms
threatened the epistemological claims of poetic “connaissance” in a way that
even the Dadaists — who continued to associate poetry with “primitive” chant
and mimetic ritual — had not yet dared to attempt. Cendrars was already ask
ing in 1913 whether poetry might not, after all, be nothing more than “sheer
decoration,”4 a play of linguistic surfaces eliciting pleasure but no deeper or
more metaphysical response. If, as Cendrars would declare in 1926, “Il n’y a pas
d’absolu,” [there no absolute], then poetry could boast of providing no greater
access to an eternal absolute, a higher epistemological order, than could, say, the
haute-couture dress (Aujourd'hui 26). But Cendrars went further in “Sur la robe
elle a un corps,” where he declared that the poem was comparable not just to
any dress but more specifically to dress constructed along the lines of a patch
work quilt or pastiche. Cendrars implied in this way that poetry, like Delau
nay's “robe simultanée,” could be reconceived
a play of surfaces, a texture of
citations, that the author only “signed” in the guise of an ingenious assembleur.
Although critics have exerted much effort in attempting to clarify Cen
drars’ debt to Apollinaire and, conversely, Apollinaire’s debt to Cendrars, the
influence of Robert and Sonia Delaunay’s simultaneous contrast technique
upon Cendrars’ work has never been properly explored. It is clear, however, that
the remarkable stylistic modifications that Cendrars’ poetry underwent during
the year 1913 can be attributed primarily to his frequent visits to the Delaunay
home. Robert Delaunay’s theory of simultaneous contrast was responsible for
the pastiche compositional technique of Sonia Delaunay’s “robe simultanée”
and, I will argue, for the pastiche quality of the poems of Dix-neufpoèmes élas
tiques. Introduced by Robert Delaunay and elaborated on by his wife, the tech
nique was based on Michel-Eugène Chevreul’s theory that the perception of
color values determined by the contrast of juxtaposed tones. The Delaunays
transformed Chevreul’s theory into a technique of “simultanéité” roughly
defined by Cendrars in 1914 as the process by which one entity gains its iden
tity through contrast with another (Aujourd'hui 71-2). Anticipating the post
modern fascination with surface juxtapositions, the Delaunays reinterpreted
pictorial depth or “profondeur” as an illusion produced by surface planes of
color rather than by vanishing-point perspective. It was this reconception of
depth as a function of surface design that stimulated Cendrars’ interest in citational pastiche.
While the simultaneous contrast theory that Robert Delaunay devised in
the realm of high art clearly had a significant impact on the young Cendrars,
the decorative objects Sonia Delaunay created during the same era were per
haps an even more decisive influence on the development of Cendrars’ literary
practice. For it was specifically Sonia Delaunay’s experiments with assemblage
technique in the realm of the decorative arts that compelled Cendrars to revise
his approach to verbal construction. Encouraged (or compelled) by her domes
tic situation during the war, Delaunay began to transfer the modernist iconog
raphy associated with her husband’s canvasses onto a variety of decorative
objects: curtains, upholstery, lamp-shades, book bindings, scarves, and dress
es.5 In this way, “simultanéité” evolved from a theory of color contrast into a
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Sonia Delaunay, “Couverture” [“Blanket”]. Applied fabrics. 1911
© &M Services BV Amsterdam 980402.

Figure 1.

Figure 2.

-

—
—
Sonia Delaunay, endpapers and binding for Blaise Cendrars,
à New York” [“Easter in New York”], c. 1912.
© L & M Services BV Amsterdam 980402.
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Sonia Delaunay, “Bal Bullier” [“The Bullier Ball”]. 1913.
© L & M Services BV Amsterdam 980402.
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practice of cultural production. The goal of her visual experiments was no
longer to discover how one tone affected the perception of another; Delaunay
was now interested in bestowing upon every available surface what had become
an eminently reproducible “simultanéiste” iconography that, in fact, sold quite
well. The implication of her specific version of “simultanéité” was that a visual
identity between objects situated in different institutional contexts could
potentially erase the traditional cultural distinctions between them. Impressed
by Delaunay’s approach to everyday objects, Cendrars began to apply the
assemblage or “patchwork” technique to the composition of poems, novels,
screenplays, and radioplays; only in his case, the boundary between elite and
commercial realms was crossed by integrating discourses drawn from paraliterary and commercial sources. The assemblage practices of Sonia Delaunay were
thus directly responsible for what Jean-Carlo Flückiger has aptly named the
“patchwork” technique of Dix-neufpoèmes élastiques and other works (176).6
Cendrars’ verbal “patchworks” were a poetic response to Delaunay’s “objets
simultanés.”
Delaunay’s first attempt to elide the decorative arts with simultaneous con
trast technique produced “Couverture” [“Blanket”], a patchwork quilt or assem
blage of various fabrics and furs that she stitched together for her infant son in
1911 (see figure 1). Drawing from the folk tradition of her native Russia,
Delaunay joined fur scraps with patches of “found” fabrics in order to recreate
the effect she and her husband had achieved elsewhere with variegated planes
of pigment. The patchwork quilt already combined three elements of the aes
thetic Delaunay would develop more fully in her fashion designs and book
bindings: the quilt suggested visually the genre of pastiche; it juxtaposed
diverse elements without creating a hierarchy of value among them; and it cre
ated an impression of depth through the contiguity of contrasting surfaces.
Cendrars would draw attention to these three elements in his own poem on
Delaunay’s “robe simultanée,” “Sur la robe elle a un corps,” only in his version,
the implications of Delaunay’s tripartite aesthetics for the future of poetry
would be more fully explored.
Soon after designing the quilt, Delaunay made a series of appliqué collage
bookbindings, most notably for Cendrars’ Pâques à New York (see figure 2).
Similar in this respect to the quilt, the bookbindings play with the effects of
juxtaposed surfaces. Appearing frequently are the Russian folk art motifs, the
rainbow and the arc, as well as the triangles and trapezoids of patchwork con
struction that Delaunay was using in her paintings during the same period (“Bal
Bullier,” 1913, is one example; see figure 3). These motifs serve as building
blocks that can be detached and reassembled in each subsequent design.
Delaunay’s procedure accentuates the autonomy of the unit or building block;
each shape remains distinct even while participating in a larger composition.
The detachable quality of the building blocks reminds the viewer of the initial
gesture of the simultaneous craft, that of assembling rather than inventing,
selecting rather than originating.
Delaunay was working with the principle of simultaneous constrast on a
variety of levels when she designed the “robe simultanée” in the summer of
1913. An habituée of the Bal Bullier, a popular modernist hot spot on the
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Avenue de 1’Observatoire, Delaunay
arrived one evening wearing a dress that
would effectively launch her new career as
a fashion designer (see figure 4)7 In her
“robe simultanée” Delaunay reiterated the
motifs employed in her paintings, book
bindings, lampshades and upholstery of
the same period, such as the rainbow arc
and the solar disc. The dress was formed
on the principle of the quilt, sewn, in
Delaunay’s own words, “with small pieces
of fabric that formed patches of color”
(“The Poem” 198).
Apparently, Cendrars was at the Bal
Bullier on the night during the summer of
1913 when Delaunay stepped out in the
first model of her patchwork “robe simul
tanée.” Although not a costume (Delau
nay’s costume designs for the Ballets
Russes were far more outrageous), the
dress was designed to draw attention away
from the spectacle on the stage to the
spectacle performed by the audience itself.
In a compte rendu of the evening at the
dance hall Guillaume Apollinaire noted
that Delaunay most intentionally did not
dance (see Goldenstein 54). Her goal,
according to Apollinaire, was to draw
attention to the “corps sur la robe,” the
limbs dancing on the dress — as the title
of Cendrars’ poem indicates — and not to
the woman’s body beneath. In his poem,
Sur la robe elle a un corps,” Cendrars also
confuses the distinction between surface
and depth, decoration and anatomy,
extending a critique of ontology that the Figure 4. Sonia Delaunay, “Robe
simultanée” [“The Simultaneous
poet finds implicit in Delaunay’s practice.
Dress
”]. 1913. ©L&M
The first element of Delaunay’s aesthetic
Services
BV Amsterdam 980402.
that Cendrars chooses to thematize in his
poem, then, is her tendency to destabilize
the hierarchical relation between truth and appearance, eternal form and
ephemeral ornamentation. Appropriately, Cendrars opens his poem with an
attack on phrenology, the nineteenth-century positivist science that insists,
unlike the dress, on a one-to-one referential correspondence between surface
and depth. Instead of positing an absolute correspondence between the shape
of the cranium and the individual personality, Cendrars, following Delaunay,
recasts the identity (here, of the woman) as an imaginative reconstruction
dependent upon the printed surfaces traditionally considered diversionary.
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SUR LA ROBE ELLE A UN CORPS

Le corps de la femme est aussi bosselé que mon crane
Glorieuse
Si tu t’incarnes avec esprit
Les couturiers font un sot métier
Autant que la phrénologie
Mes yeux sont des kilos qui pèsent la sensualité des femmes
Tout ce qui fuit, saille avance dans la profondeur
Les étoiles creusent le ciel
Les couleurs déshabillent
“Sur la robe elle a un corps”
Sous les bras des bruyères mains lunules et pistils quand
les eaux se déversent dans le dos avec les omoplates
glauques
Le ventre un disque qui bouge
La double coque des seins passe sous le pont des arcsen-ciel
Ventre
Disque
Soleil
Les cris perpendiculaires des couleurs tombent sur les
cuisses

5

10

15

EPEE DE SAINT-MICHEL

Il y a des mains qui
tendent
Il y a dans la traine la bête tous les yeux toutes les
fanfares tous les habitués du bal Bullier
Et sur la hanche
La signature du poète
(Biaise Cendrars, Du monde entier 83-4; © by Editions Denoël)

20

[ON HER DRESS SHE HAS A BODY

A woman’s body is as modelled as my skull
Glorious
If you are incarnated with spirit
Couturiers have an idiotic job
As idiotic as phrenology
My eyes are kilos that weigh the sensuality of women
All that flees, stands out moves forward into depth
Stars hollow out the sky
Colors undress
“On her dress she has a body”
Under the arms heathers hands lunules pistills when
waters flow over the back with its blue-green shoulder
blades
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Belly
Disk
Sun
The perpendicular cries of the colors fall on thighs
SWORD OF SAINT MICHAEL
There are hands that reach
There are in the train the beast all the eyes all the fanfares
all the regulars of the Bal Bullier
And on the hip
The poet’s signature]

Significantly, Cendrars begins “Sur la robe elle a un corps” by mocking pos
itivist science and its tendency to locate truth — psychic or spiritual — in the
order of the organic. The pun between “sot” (“idiotic”) and “sew” in line 4 —
“Les couturiers font un sot métier” — does little to dampen the blow of the
accusation against traditional “couturiers” who, like the phrenologists, treat the
body as privileged signified, the truth that the contours of the dress must
reflect.8 In contrast, Delaunay dissociates the dress from the body it covers.
The dress recreates the body not only through its abstract patterns but also
through the images these patterns evoke. That is why “la femme” of line 1 is
only “Glorieuse” insofar as she “incarnates” herself in dress, or “avec esprit”
(line 3). Nude and unconstructed, “la femme” as “bosselé(e)” as the “crâne,”
a word in French often associated with death, as “skull” in English. The skull
and the body of the woman are humped or modelled, differentiated surfaces,
but they signify nothing — bear neither a spiritual nor an aesthetic truth —
without incarnation in fabric or text.
If we follow Cendrars’ logic, it would seem that the modern couturière must
be freed of the obligation to follow physical contours, since these contours are
not, in themselves, the source of woman’s “sensuality.”9 In “Sur la robe elle a un
corps,” Cendrars reconceives “sensuality” as a product of the impressions or
images that the woman’s reinvented (textile) body evokes. The eyes that scan
the dress are, accordingly, “des kilos qui pèsent la sensualité des femmes” (and
here the verb “peser,” “to weigh,” parodies the scientific discourse of the phre
nologists). The organic body has been displaced as a source of sexual excite
ment; it now the colors that seduce the viewer: “Les couleurs déshabillent”
[The colors undress] (line 9). Desire is stimulated by the contrast of artificial
and organic shapes, rather than by the organic feminine curves alone. These
curves are rivaled as a three-dimensional construct by the depth and volume
created by the colors on the dress. Line 7, “Tout ce qui fuit, saille avance dans
la profondeur” [All that recedes, stands out comes forward into depth], refers
to the colors, the contrasts of which produce the illusion of movement forward
and away from the surface plane. The traditional surface-depth relation is
undermined by the principle of composition by simultaneous color contrast:
Delaunay’s technique of juxtaposed surfaces creates the illusion — and rivals
the physical reality — of three-dimensional depth.
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Cendrars’ hermeneutics of the dress shifts the location of meaning from the
physical body to the surfaces that adorn it, from anatomy to the body’s spec
tacular performance or masquerade. The remainder of the poem plays with the
tension between organic and textile bodies. However, as lines 14-16 indicate,
there are really three bodies evoked by the dress, each one belonging to a sep
arate order: the organic, the textile, or the poetic. For instance, “Ventre”
[Belly] of line 14 represents metonymically the order of the organic nude body
(although it does not necessarily signify this body; the “ventre” could also be
the dress’s body, an ambiguity upon which the poem depends). “Disque” [Disk]
of line 15 represents metonymically the de-anthropomorphized or geometric
order of the designs on the fabric. And Soleil” [Sun] of line
is a synecdoche
for the order of the imagined body, that which the poet makes, poetically, of
what he sees. These three orders are emphatically intermingled in lines 11-13.
“[B]ras” [arms], “mains” [hands], “dos” [back], "omoplates” [shoulder blades],
"ventre” and ""seins” [breasts] all belong to the order of the organic body;
""disque” and ""arcs-en-ciel” [rainbow] refer us back to the abstract motifs print
ed on the dress (the primary motifs of Delaunay’s paintings), while ""bruyères”
[heathers],
” ""pistils, ""les eaux” [waters], ""La double coque” [The dou
ble-bottomed hull] and ""le pont” [the bridge] all belong to the order of the
poetic or imaginative discourse inspired by the abstract motifs. Meanwhile,
line 11 reveals a high degree of phonetic rather than visual motivation; the /o/
of ""les eaux” motivates the /o/ sounds of ""dos” and ""omoplates glau/ques” [blue
green shoulder blades]. To attenuate even further the relation between the
phenomenological truth of the body and the incarnated ""spirit” in the dress,
Cendrars allows the poetry of the line, the sound values of the words, to gov
ern the longest descriptive sequence of the poem. Although it is the eyes, the
poet tells us, that ""weigh” the dress, in this case his tongue seems to be gener
ating the descriptive discourse of the imaginative order. The synesthesia
implied by the overlap between seeing and speaking, the visual and the poetic,
is fully realized in line 17: ""Les cris perpendiculaires des couleurs tombent sur
les cuisses”
perpendicular cries of the colors fall on her thighs]. This move
from the eyes to the mouth as the primary organ realizing the (woman’s) "glory”
or ""sensualité”
highly suggestive. The semiotic activity that defines poetic
writing seems to work not in the service of unveiling the human mannequin but
rather in the service of veiling her yet again. And here, the familiar etymolog
ical association of text and textile receives a new twist. Poetry’s own artifice,
the operations of paranomasia, assonance and internal rhyme, come to resem
ble fashion as a method of covering the body with another body. And this
imaginative poetic body, like the textile one, no longer accessorizes the organ
ic but rather ""incarnates” it. Incarnation, then, not a matter of respecting the
contours of the ontic original; rather, incarnation involves pursuing the direc
tives of the medium concerned, ceding the ""initiative” to words or, in the case
of the dress, to surfaces of contrasting color.
Fashion critic Diana Vreeland has commented that Delaunay’s ""robes
simultanées,” or ‘"chromatic cocoons,” were ""wrapped around the body like a
second skin or a mad tattoo” (10). Vreeland’s allusion to the tattoo evocative
in this context, for it suggests that for Delaunay dressing akin to a kind of
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writing on the body. The simultaneous dress reinvents anatomy as inscription,
and the job of the couturière becomes one of covering the skin with a text.
Delaunay in fact attempted to realize her conception of the dress as tattoo when
she began in 1921 to compose designs for what she called the “robe-poème.”
This “robe poème” was conceived as a garment stencilled with poetic verses as
well as various lines and planes of color (see figure 5). Although none of
Delaunay’s designs for the “robe-poème” was ever produced, the project itself
indicates a desire on her part to reconceive fashion as a means of incarnating
female “glory” as language. A direct link can be drawn between Delaunays
approach to fashion as inscription and the avant-garde conviction that the artist
must alter the organic body in order to perform an aesthetic (or aestheticopolitical) project. When Rimbaud writes in 1871 of planting warts on his face,
or when he imagines a “nouveau corps amoureux” [new amorous body] in
“Being Beauteous” (181), he exhibits an impulse similar to that realized in
Delaunays designs. His portrait of “un homme s’implantant et cultivant des
verrues sur le visage” [a man implanting and cultivating warts on his face] offers
the possibility that one might make manifest or visible (“se faire voyant”) a hid
den or simply abstract state of consciousness (270). To tattoo the body is, in
this context, to force “profondeur” to the surface, to make the deeper self visi
ble, readable, and, in consequence, a subject of exhibition and performance.
This visually exhibited or linguistically exteriorized self may remain a function
of the self’s truth; it
more likely, however, that the exteriorized self, as it
enters into the pure play of surfaces, will subordinate its truth to the dynamic
interaction between, in one case, the colors of the dress, and in the other, the
phonetic and graphemic textures of words.

3.

To return to Cendrars’ poem, it is now clear why Delaunay’s “robe simultanée”
comes to serve Cendrars as model for an aesthetic that no longer privileges
organic “profondeur” over articulated surface. Delaunay’s designs play with the
lines of the body, treating them nonhierarchically as just another surface enter
ing into play with the surfaces of applied and thus artificial elements. True,
Delaunay — at least according to Cendrars — retains the order of the organic
body, as opposed to the Futurists, who demanded in 1909 “the total suppression
of the nude” (Boccioni et al. 31). However, the demotion of this nude body to
pure surface design threatens to eclipse its ontological priority and even its sig
nificance. As Cendrars’ ambiguous allusions to “ventre,” “dos,” and so on indi
cate, there is no way to preserve the distinction either in language or in visual
spectacle between a surface that refers to an anatomical feature and one that
merely serves a function in an illusionist design. Immanent in Delaunay’s and
Cendrars’ approach, then, the possibility that all surfaces, all texts, behave in
the manner of citations: the “ventre,” for instance, refers simultaneously to the
body under the “robe simultanée” and to the visual text on the “robe simultanée.”
There no way to tell, the poem implies, which “ventre” is which.

Published by eGrove, 2020

15
se



Journal X, Vol. 2 [2020], No. 2, Art. 8

Carrie Noland

Figure 5. Sonia Delaunay with Tristan Tzara, “Robe-poème” [“Poem-dress”].
1923. © L & M Services BV Amsterdam 980402.
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Delaunay and Cendrars could have found no better way to signal this prob
lem than to have visually associated the “robe simultanée” with the traditional
practice of quilt-making. The patchwork technique Delaunay applies in the
“robe simultanée” suggests that each element put into play — the “dos,” the
“disque,” the “soleil” — exists as a kind of citation, a fragment drawn from a
larger fabric or discourse. While the elements may appear to form a whole —
a dress, a poem, a body — they are nevertheless scraps of preexisting discours
es, fabrics or anatomies stitched together into an assemblage. In “Sur la robe
elle a un corps,” Cendrars explicitly draws attention to the fact that the incar
nation of the woman’s glory requires the cutting of fabrics, their separation as
well as their union. The repetition of the title in line 10 — “'Sur la robe elle a
un corps’” — provides a kind of mise en abyme suggesting the immediate citational, and thus detachable or fragmented, quality of all lyric utterances. The
lines of a poem or a dress may claim at one point to “incarnate” the glory of the
ideal, but they, too, are merely surfaces that can be cut out and inserted into the
next arrangement. Cendrars’ habit of recycling citations from his own works as
well as from works by others also adds to the impression that lyric discourse,
just like the discourses of newsprint, popular fiction and advertising, can serve
as building blocks for assemblage. In an assemblage no single discourse, no sin
gle element, refers in univocal fashion; rather, each element is continually
reimmersed in a flow of attributes exchanged — phonic and graphemic in the
case of poetry, chromatic and textural in the case of the dress.
The concluding lines of the poem — Et sur la hanche / La signature du
poète” [And on her hip / The poet’s signature] — finalize the analogy between
poet and fashion designer, “poème élastique” and “robe simultanée.” In the
original manuscript version of the poem Cendrars follows these lines with his
own signature, rendering even more explicit the parallel between the fashion
designer who “signs” at the hip, and the poet who imaginatively reconstructs
and recovers the woman’s body (Goldenstein 52). But if the poem is composed
merely of a set of clippings rearranged and reassembled, then in what ways can
it be said to deserve a signature? Like the designer, Cendrars suggests, the poet
can also sign because the recreated body, the incarnated ideal, depends upon the
eye or the ear of a good assembleur. The word “assembleur” is itself derived
from textile manufacture, referring to the person who sews together the various
parts of garment.
Further, the poet implies in “Sur la robe elle a un corps” that assemblage —
whether in fashion or poetry — necessarily entails violence. Cendrars refers to
the violent gesture involved in assemblage in line 18, the detached and typo
graphically emphasized “ÉPÉE DE SAINT MICHEL.” This line alludes
most directly to the annunciation and the imminent incarnation of the spirit in
the “glorious” flesh of Christ. But Cendrars reminds us here that in tradition
al iconography, when Saint Michael descends to announce the incarnation he
often depicted as bearing the glinting sword with which he vanquished the
dragon. To incarnate, the allusion to Saint Michael’s sword suggests, one must
also exert violence. In the case of Delaunay’s “robe simultanée,” violence is
manifested in the cutting and reassembling of swatches of fabric; on another
level, however, this violence is exerted specifically on the woman’s body, a body
which is recut and reimagined according to the superimposed contours of arti
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fice. Liberating the spirit, or the "profondeur sensuelle” of the woman from the
chains of her anatomy is, in Cendrars’ own terms, a violent as well as an imag
inative gesture. The simultaneity of violence and creation consistently fore
grounded throughout the poem. We hear the victims of this violence crying in
line 17: "Les cris perpendiculaires des couleurs tombent sur les cuisses”; and
we see the hands objectified in the act of cutting in line 19: ""Il y a des mains
qui se tendent” [There are hands that reach out]. If we consider that ""mains”
is a term employed by the fashion industry to refer to the second-rank seam
stresses responsible for cutting the dress form, then the line gains significance.
Cendrars seems to be implying that Delaunay, as fashion designer, applies
(violent) hands, cutting up not only fabrics but also the natural lines of the
female body in order to incarnate the glory of this body in ""robe simultanée.”
But if ""tous les yeux” figuratively extend their hands, then all present — ‘"tous
les habitués du bal Bullier” [All the regulars at the Bal Bullier] — are imagi
natively resurrecting (re-cutting) the body of the woman. Cendrars depicts the
violence implicated in the reconstructive gesture in the apocalyptic terms of the
annunciation. And yet here it not God who incarnated in the flesh, but
the ""glory” of the woman’s sensuality that incarnated in a dress. Once again,
the order of the spiritual vacated to make way for the play of sensual surfaces.
These surfaces must provide an experience of depth formally ensured by allu
sions to a more profound (religious) order of experience.
In the manuscript of a 1945 preface composed for a volume of Baudelaire’s
collected poems, Cendrars indicates to what a great extent the poet’s relation to
the spiritual has been altered since Baudelaire’s time. ""Comme le monde mod
erne a perdu la foi, mais n’a pas pu se dépouiller de la sentimentalité chréti
enne,” begins Cendrars, ""de même j’ai n’ai [sic] plus l’amour des beaux vers et
des rimes riches, mais reste tout pétri de la sensibilité baudelairienne” [Just as
the modern world has lost faith, but hasn’t been able to strip itself of Christian
sentiment, [so] I no longer care for pretty verses and full rhymes but remain
awed by Baudelaire’s sensibility] (“Baudelaire”).10 Here Cendrars suggests that
“faith” in divinity (“la foi”) can be replaced by “feeling” (“sentimentalité chréti
enne”), while poetic conventions (“les beaux vers et les rimes riches”) can be
replaced by a generalized poetic “sensibilité” — without a consequent loss of
aesthetic force or value. Cendrars’ wager is that a feeling for the transcendent
can in fact subsist even when unsupported by any formalized or institutional
ized vision of a higher order. By extension, Cendrars’ post-Baudelairean poet
ics implies that surface decoration and its sensual appeal may take the place of
a system of beliefs. This feeling without faith (“sentimentalité” sans “foi”) is
like a Hegelian aesthetics without Spirit, an art without aura, or, more accu
rately, an art that redefines aura (“glory”) as a democratized experience available
without initiation to “tous les yeux . . . tous les habitués du bal Bullier.”
In sense, Cendrars’ privileged figure of the poem as dress merely renders
literal Baudelaire’s more metaphorical association of “la mode” with art’s
ephemeral, “modern,” and contingent aspect. For Baudelaire, fashion poet
ry’s “élément relatif, circonstanciel” [relative, circumstantial element], the
""enveloppe amusante, titillante, apéritive, du divin gâteau” [amusing, titillating,
appetizing element of the divine confection] without which “le premier élément

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jx/vol2/iss2/8

18

Editors: Vol. 2, No. 2 (1998): Full issue
146

Journal x

serait indigestible, inappréciable, non adapté et non approprié à la nature
humaine” [the first element would be indigestible, inappreciable, unadaptable
and inappropriate to human nature] (1154). But what in Baudelaire appears to
be a simple “enveloppe” rendering more palatable the suprahuman truth
becomes in Cendrars’ hands the very source of this truth. If for Baudelaire
appearance (the “enveloppe” of the contingent) present only to introduce that
which not present (the divine), for Cendrars the divine turns out to be the
very function of its appearances (the “enveloppes”). The poets task, according
to Cendrars, is not to “dégager de la mode ce qu’elle peut contenir de poétique”
[detach from the fashionable whatever poetry is in it]; neither is it to “tirer
l’éternel du transitoire” [extract the eternal from the transitory] (Baudelaire
1163). “Dégager” and “tirer” are verbs that suggest an act of separation, a ges
ture of discernment that would cast aside the shell to reveal the kernel (“l’élé
ment éternel”) inside. But for Cendrars, shells, envelopes, and appearances are
precisely the locus of an experience of cosmic proportions.
The concept of depth implied in Baudelaire’s poetics is far more consistent
with a traditional epistemology of poetic “connaissance,” one that Jean-Pierre
Richard, for instance, associates with an experience of an immeasurable, inhu
man depth. “L’aventure poétique,” states the author of Poésie et profondeur, con
sists in “une certaine expérience de l’abîme” [a certain experience of the abyss],
an experience of precisely that which is “inappréciable, non adapté et non
approprié à la nature humaine” (10). It not accidental that Richard associates
the end of a certain understanding of “profondeur” with the work of Rimbaud,
a poet who wishes to “nier la profondeur,” negate depth; “il tente d’édifier un
monde sans en-dessous, un univers délivré de l’origine et de la nostalgie” [he
attempts to construct a world without foundations, universe freed from any
origin or sense of nostalgia] (11). In continuity with Rimbaud, Cendrars
recasts “profondeur” as a “profondeur sensuelle,” a depth located in the way the
eye or ear functions, a sensual experience of the surface as origin and limit of
meaning. However, as in Rimbaud’s work, it is not the physiology of percep
tion that underwrites aesthetic truth but rather perception’s “dérèglement.” The
eyes in “Sur la robe” are like “des kilos qui pèsent la sensualité des femmes”
because they respond viscerally, deliriously, to a wealth of surface designs and
inscriptions (to a mélange of “Ventre,” “Disque,” and Soleil”). In response to
these three distinct orders of phenomenal reality, the eyes “edify,” to borrow
Richard’s verb, a world without depth (“sans en-dessous”), a world created
entirely from a superfluity of non-hierarchicized visual impressions. In Sur la
robe elle a un corps,” the “ventre” becomes “un disque qui bouge," a moving disk
on a two-dimensional surface. The woman’s “glory” is not, then, a materializa
tion of her spiritual truth or even an unveiling of her physical contours.
Instead, her “esprit” is fully incarnated in a designer dress.
By drawing poetry into a closer relation with apparel, Cendrars not only
realizes a potential inherent in Baudelaire’s aesthetics of the modern; he also
completes a gesture sketched out implicitly by Rimbaud. Rimbaud, even more
dramatically than Baudelaire, suppresses the concept of origin and detaches
appearance from necessity. “Oh! nos os sont revêtus d’un nouveau corps
amoureux” [Oh! our bones are clothed again in a new amorous body], writes
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Rimbaud ecstatically in “Being Beauteous” (181), thereby intimating that the
new world he envisions will involve, above all, a change of costume. And Rim
baud’s Illuminations is, in fact, full of references to costume: in “Les Ponts” the
speaker glimpses “une veste rouge, peut-être d’autres costumes” [a red jacket,
perhaps other costumes] (187), while in “Parade” he is the witness of a perfor
mance in which a series of “Mâitres jongleurs ... transforment le lieu et les per
sonnes” in “des costumes improvisés” [Master jugglers .. . transform places and
people in improvised costumes] (180). The volume seems to suggest at times
that the realization of Spirit, the satisfaction of the “promesse surhumaine faite
à notre corps et à notre âme créés” [the superhuman promise made to our cre
ated body and soul], can occur entirely on the level of visual spectacle (184).
“Quant au monde,” Rimbaud reflects, “que sera-t-il devenu? En tout cas, rien
des apparences actuelles” [As for the world, what will it have become? In any
case, nothing like it appears now] (208).
In a strikingly similar manner, Cendrars also views the ultimate incarnation
of glory as a matter of wardrobe. Consistent with the aesthetics of “simul
tanéité,” Cendrars transforms “l’esprit,” the incarnated glory, and even the
woman’s sensuality, into a function of the surfaces presented to the eye.
Because these surfaces do not need to correspond to any specific anatomy (nor
do they answer to any eternal ideal) they always run the risk of falling subject
to the manipulations of contingent third party. In the case of Delaunay’s
“robe simultanée,” the surfaces of the dress are determined and their patterns
administrated by a modern artist, not an industrial designer. Yet even an artist’s
rendering of a fashion design is still constrained by exigencies usually consid
ered foreign to lyric composition. The author of a garment, no matter how
greatly informed by a high art aesthetic, still depends extensively on available
technologies of fabric production, on contemporary modes of cutting and
assembling, and on the types of accessorization and color schemes privileged
during a certain period. Although Delaunay belongs to a generation of artists
who believed that function and fashion are not necessarily anathema to craft
and aesthetic force, she herself had to admit that in the end the decorative arts
walk a thin line between “vital, unconscious, visual sensuality on the one hand,”
and the “lowering [of] the costs of production . . . and the expansion of sales”
on the other (“Survey” 208). The fashion designer or decorator has to accept
material contingencies that a lyric poet would, by definition, resist.
But if Cendrars’ analogy holds, that is, if the poet authors a poem just as a
designer authors a dress, then the implication is that poetry, too, “edifies” a
world influenced by — perhaps even conditioned by — the contingent.
“[D]élivré de 1’origine” [freed from any origin], the poet hallucinates a new
landscape of the body, but this body also, like the dress, a functional object,
a product circulating in a market for which new bodies are always sought.
Thus, because the poet relinquishes an ideal of permanence, he can only drop
anchor in the shallow waters of a “profond aujourd’hui.” Profound today, gone
tomorrow. Cendrars is aware of this fundamental instability, this “sans endessous,” when he describes his Dix-neufpoèmes élastiques as “poésies de cir
constance,” “[n]és à l’occasion d’une rencontre, d’une amitié, d’un tableau,
d’une polémique ou d’une lecture” [born of the occasion of meeting, a friend-
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ship, a painting, a polemic or a reading] (Poésies 106). Cendrars’ "poésies de cir
constance” still locate the center of insight in the speaking subject ("Mes yeux
sont des kilos qui pèsent . . ”), but they simultaneously displace this center by
admitting that the subject can be touched, redefined by “1’occasion.” In “Sur la
robe elle a un corps,” Cendrars takes this poetics of the occasion to its logical
extreme. The accidental occasion — “un tableau,” “une lecture” — is replaced
by contingencies of an entirely different order, such as the availability of mate
rials, the influence of fashionable cuts, and the development of new composi
tional or reproductive techniques. These contingencies provide the “occasion”
which touches, and therefore alters, both the subject and his or her imaginative
“creations.” In “Sur la robe,” the “je” thus no longer an autonomous creator
but instead an assembleur; he belongs to that ambiguous class of artisans who
must work with the given while conceding to the tastes of the contingent
“other” that markets create. Rimbaud’s infamous “Je est un autre” can be reread
in this light as the motto of the modern poet as fashion designer. It is the con
fessional cry of a lyric subject who knows its creations — and even its self-cre
ations — to be heteronomous products conceived through a dialogue with “la
mode.”
To the extent that Cendrars seeks a modern subject capable of recreating
itself through a “nouveau corps amoureux,” his works provide an early image of
the postmodern subject as the product of masquerade.11 And to the extent that
Cendrars deflates Romantic conceptions of originality and authorship he
engages us in a meditation on the nature of a lyric subject deprived of its auton
omy. In sum, Cendrars raises the question whether a modernist aesthetics can
indeed assert and maintain its value without relying upon an all-encompassing
spiritual or institutional support (or an equally forceful ideology of the
autonomous subject). Yet in his prescient manner, Cendrars goes even further.
He also hints at the naiveté of a project that aims to stitch together a pastiche
of identities without reference to an ethical body capable of suffering. He does
this in “Sur la robe elle a un corps” by continually reminding his readers of the
violence inflicted — not incidentally, upon a woman — by a poetics of pastiche.

4.
Sur la robe elle a un corps” was published for the first time in 1916 in a cata
logue prepared for an exhibition of paintings by Robert and Sonia Delaunay
that took place in Stockholm. The publication was not authorized by Cendrars,
and he had no occasion to revise the manuscript version he had entrusted to
Robert Delaunay three years earlier. The poem appeared again in Cendrars’
1919 collection Dix-neufpoèmes élastiques with very few revisions. Given the
poem’s odd itinerary, it would be simple to dismiss “Sur la robe elle a un corps”
as a flawed and trivial poetic effort, one lacking the rhetorical coherence and
rhythmic balance of many of Cendrars’ other, more carefully wrought poetic
works. Indeed, critics of French poetry have neglected to provide any extend
ed readings of the poem, consigning it in this way to an early oblivion. Depart
ing from earlier critics, however, I will proclaim “Sur la robe elle a un corps” a
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centerpiece of Cendrarsian poetics, a crucial “art poétique” of the prewar gen
eration. For I believe that Cendrars’ own approach to the poem suggests that
he accorded it far more importance than his critics have previously noted.12 In
fact, Cendrars demonstrated an almost excessive concern with the publication
and preservation of “Sur la robe elle a un corps”; his correspondence of the war
time period provides valuable evidence to the effect that the poem constituted
for him a viable response to what he considered an outmoded Parisian avantgarde. The significance of the poem for Cendrars resided in the fact that it
posits a new, more dialectical relation between poetry and culture, one that his
avant-garde contemporaries, as Cendrars himself stressed in 1916, had yet to
envision.
During the war, Cendrars wrote repeatedly to Robert and Sonia Delaunay
from the front to inquire what had become of his only existing copy of “Sur la
robe elle a un corps.” “Chers amis,” Cendrars begins typical missive,

Je n’ai pas de copie du poème de la robe — surveillez donc à ce que Canudo
ne perde pas le brouillon que vous lui avez donné. Peut-être pourriez-vous
me le faire envoyer, et je lui renverrait une copie très lisible. Je ne le sais pas
par coeur et je ne saurais pas le refaire. Je tiens beaucoup à recevoir le man
uscrit. (Letters)13
[I have no copy of the poem on the dress — so make sure that Canudo [the
publisher of Montjoie!] doesn’t lose the draft you gave him. Perhaps you
could get him to send it to me, and I would send him back a perfectly leg
ible copy. I don’t know it by heart and I wouldn’t be able to write it again.
I really want to receive the manuscript.]

Apparently the Delaunays did not reply, for in January 1916, while Cendrars
was recovering from the amputation of his right arm, he sent word to Sonia
Delaunay that he still longed to know where his manuscript of “Sur la robe elle
a un corps” might have been misplaced. The fact that neither of the Delaunays
ever responded to Cendrars’ repeated inquiries seems to have caused a rift in
their relationship: “Je m’étais juré de ne pas vous écrire tant que je n’avais pas
reçu le poème sur la Robe' [I swore I wouldn’t write to you until I got the poem
on the Dress], Cendrars avows in another letter of 1916, “que je vous réclame
depuis 1 an . . .” [I’ve been asking you for it for over 1 year\, (“1 an” is under
lined three or four times.)
I cite this epistolary evidence of Cendrars’ continuing interest in the fate of
“Sur la robe elle a un corps” in order to suggest the extent to which he valued
it as a representative work of the prewar period. In general, scholars have tend
ed to look upon Cendrars’ early poems
the somewhat careless jottings of an
author who would only find his true voice in the major novels of the forties and
fifties. But Cendrars himself seems to have considered the early poems to have
been quite significant in their own right; they were so radically prescient, so
beyond their own time, that,
he wrote Robert Delauney in an undated letter
from approximately 1916, all other efforts of the “soi-disant” avant-garde
appeared to him “foutu[s] d’avance” [screwed in advance]. Of course, Cendrars
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would probably have exhibited a similar degree of concern for any manuscript
of his that had been mislaid or placed in neglectful hands. I believe, however,
that “Sur la robe elle a un corps” had gained its authors affection for a very spe
cific reason. The poem contains many elements of what I consider to be a tran
sitional poetics in the context of twentieth-century modernism, a poetics
departing from the typical modernist sense of writing as the reorganization of
fragments around a new center to approach a postmodern erasure of the notion
of centrality itself. “Sur la robe elle a un corps” can be read as kind of “art
poétique” in the rough, an inchoate manifesto of a poetics on the cusp of post
modernism. Publishing the poem was the closest Cendrars ever came to circu
lating a poetic manifesto on the order of Apollinaire’s “Anti-tradition futuriste”
(1913) or Marinettis “Parole in libertà” [“Words in Freedom”] (1913). And
that why Cendrars was so determined to locate the manuscript and to have a
hand in its eventual publication.
Just what did Cendrars’ “art poétique” consist of, and in what ways can it be
said to constitute a point of transition between a modernist and a postmod
ernist aesthetic epistemology? As I have argued, “Sur la robe elle a un corps”
draws poetic techniques into close association with the specifically decorative
practices of Sonia Delaunay. While links between the domain of painting and
the decorative industries were often forged, by the early twentieth-century
avant-garde, the potential continuity between lyric poetry and the decorative
arts was less frequently asserted. And yet Cendrars’ attempt to eliminate the
hierarchy and even attenuate the distinction between the lyric and the decora
tive arts consistent with the practices of a specific group of lyric poets who,
early as the 1850s, were already exhibiting a fascination with the ornamen
tal. Cendrars represents the culmination rather than the reversal of a trend
developing within lyric modernism, one that begins with Théophile Gautier’s
collaboration with La Mode (and his claim that fashion is an art), proceeds with
Baudelaire’s “Éloge du maquillage” and his analysis of the “dandy,” and reap
pears in Mallarmé’s meditations on style and self-ornament in La Dernière
mode. But while Mallarmé’s schizophrenia produces a split between poems of
monumental impersonality and ephemeral journalism, the two are fully recon
ciled in Cendrars’ “Sur la robe elle a un corps.” By explicitly associating the
poem with the dress, “Sur la robe elle a un corps” in effect “spiritualizes” — by
means of a carefully selected vocabulary of Christian allusions — an instance of
apparel.
However, while Cendrars’ goal may be to “spiritualiser” the decorative, to
solicit and celebrate the “profondeur sensuelle” immanent to the transient, the
end result is inevitably a demotion of the poetic to the order of the decorative.
For poetry’s distinction no longer resides in a heightened diction (there are no
more “beaux vers” or “rimes riches”); nor can such distinction be derived from
a circumscribed set of themes or located in a compositional technique peculiar
to poetic production (assemblage, for instance, is a procedure shared by poets
and dressmakers alike). True, the demotion of the poetic to the status of the
decorative
merely hinted at rather than confirmed in the poem. Cendrars
seems to enjoy the risk he runs when he identifies the poet with the fashion
designer, and yet he retreats before celebrating the full implications of his anal
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ogy. Cendrars in effect protects the poet from full contingency by choosing as
his double a fashion designer who
also an accomplished modernist painter.
As an artist, Sonia Delaunay hypothetically exercises greater autonomy over her
creations than would a couturière employed by a large firm. Cendrars may be
seen, then, as occupying the crossroads between postmodern refusal of cul
tural distinctions and a Baudelairean poetics that retains the superiority of high
art over industrial products and what Baudelaire terms “leur grimace de circon
stance” (Baudelaire 1034). Nevertheless, Cendrars’ identification with the dec
orative arts, as well as his excessive attention to surfaces, eventually implicates
the lyric in set of conditions from which it cannot, without recourse to a high
er order — Spirit, Deity, autonomous subjectivity, or even biology — escape.
Delaunay’s efforts to harmonize her "simultanéiste” project with the exi
gencies of mass production highlight the dilemmas encountered by artists or
writers who sought in the twenties to establish a middle-ground between a
meaningful participation in the social and a strict refusal of heteronomy. It
should be recalled that the theory of simultaneous contrast was developed sev
eral years before the stock market crash of 1929, during a period of immense
enthusiasm for democratizing industries. At that time the competitive capital
ist market seemed to offer previously unimaginable opportunities for the demo
cratic distribution of high quality commodities. The rapidity with which
Delaunay found industrial backing for large-scale production of her “robes
simultanées” might have persuaded her that industry could indeed provide the
means for promulgating an avant-garde aesthetic iconography previously con
fined to the haute couture salon. During the teens and twenties Delaunay
expended a great deal of energy attempting to develop “pochoir” (stencil)
technique that would allow her to mass reproduce her simultaneous designs
without a consequent loss of tonal integrity (see Wallen). She also invented the
"tissu-patron,” a dress pattern upon which she printed both the motifs of the
“simultanéist” iconography and instructions for the cut and assembly of the fin
ished garment. All her experiments in fashion production aimed to synthesize
an “artistic conception” with “the standardization to which everything in mod
ern life tends” ("The Influence” 206). Delaunay maintained that such a syn
thesis between pure art and industry could indeed be achieved. Denying, for
instance, that her geometric patterns were proof of her compliance with con
temporary fashion trends, Delaunay defended her designs in the following
manner:
[Critics] have announced confidently at the beginning of each new season
that geometric design will soon pass out of fashion and be replaced by nov
elties drawn from older patterns. A profound error: geometric designs will
never become unfashionable because they have never been fashionable.
Bad geometric design is the untalented interpretation of copyists and minor
decorators.
If there are geometric forms, it is because these simple and manageable
elements have appeared suitable for the distribution of colors whose rela
tions constitute the real object of our search . . . (207)
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In contrast to the “minor decorators,” responds Delaunay, the real artists of
fashion, those who create the “good” versus the “bad” geometric designs, are
involved in a type of scientific research. In pursuit of truth not profit, these
“good” designers are destined to enjoy the laurels bestowed on every “lyric
vision” (“Rugs” 201). A “lyric vision” in the domain of fashion is, for Delaunay,
nothing less than a Baudelairean vision, one capable of discerning eternal laws
in transient appearances. A talented decorator, like a pure scientist, can mobi
lize a fashionable geometric iconography for the purpose of discovering the pro
found relations established by colors operating in a geometric design. It only
by obeying these laws that the decorator resists the role of “copyist” and man
ages to offer an intuition of permanent (physiological) harmonies and, happily,
a fashionable dress.
But if Delaunay in effect retains the Baudelairean lyric schema, if, that is,
she sustains a belief in a higher order (in this instance, the essential truth of
chromatology), then Cendrars announces the advent of an aesthetics that will
place biology, physiology, anatomy and consequently all ahistorical orders of
knowledge in serious jeopardy. Along with Baudelaires “foi,” in other words,
will go the self-assured epistemology of the chromatic scientist. No “élément
éternel,” no absolute science of relations, accords one geometry epistemological
priority over another. In this sense, then, Cendrars’ tentative “art poétique”
leaves Delaunay’s modernist preoccupations behind and advances toward the
postmodern world of relativized knowledges and nonhierarchial cultural prac
tices. By abandoning a poetics of depth, or rather, by reconceiving depth as an
effect of surface, Cendrars anticipates a postmodern aesthetics in which “[t]out
est artificiel et bien réel. . . . Les produits des cinq parties du monde figurent
dans le même plat, sur la même robe” [all is artificial and totally real. . . . Prod
ucts from the five ends of the world appear on the same plate, on the same
dress] (Aujourd'hui 12).
Cendrars thus transforms Delaunays dress from a scientific experiment
into a postmodern pastiche. No underlying order or chromatic law determines
the sequence or pattern of the surfaces and any attempt to locate a center from
which to observe and hierarchize the colors of the “robe,” or for that matter the
“cinq parties du monde,” constitutes a baldly ideological gesture. Cendrars’
decentering, similar to Rimbaud’s “dérèglement,” denies priority to any onto
logical, metaphysical, biological, or even aesthetic order. “Je suis trop sensuel
pour avoir 'du goût’” [I’m too sensual to have “taste”], announces Cendrars; “J’ai
tous les goûts” [I have a taste for everything] (Aujourd'hui 193). The subject
thus set adrift in a world of surfaces, each of which possesses an equal claim on
its scattered attention.
To reiterate, Cendrars is celebrating this delirious subject and its aesthetics
of decentering during a period of euphoria when Europe was only just begin
ning to appreciate the full consequences of capitalist expansion.14 As time went
on, industry did eventually disappoint both Cendrars and his collaborator,
Sonia Delaunay. Sherry Buckberrough recounts how, during the thirties,
Delaunay abandoned all attempts to ally the decorative arts with her scientific
experiments in painting. Repulsed by the aesthetic compromises industrial
manufacture was increasingly imposing upon her after 1929, Delaunay retreat
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ed to the exclusive domain of the gallery exhibition (Buckberrough 105). As
early as 1925 Cendrars also registered the failure of industry to accommodate
the talents of artist-designers: “Je regrette surtout qu’on ne voit pas plus sou
vent de vos robes dans la rue” [Above all, I’m sorry we don’t see your dresses in
the street more often], he wrote to Delaunay (quoted in Goldenstein 55). Cen
drars’ mature work in particular focused increasingly on democracy’s disap
pointed promises; in 1949, he even concluded laconically that “[o]n peut
aujourd’hui . . . condamner le capitalisme” [today we can blame capitalism];
Vest du fric qu’il s’agit, et de rien d’autre” [all that matters is dough, nothing
else] (Le Lotissement 286, 285).
“Sur la robe elle un corps” introduces the dilemma that Delaunay and
many artists of her generation would eventually face: the dilemma of having to
choose between the elitist pretensions of higher order on the one hand and
the dictates of an industry on the other. In a sense, the task Cendrars sets the
modern artist in his “art poétique” is an impossible one: to de-stabilize hierar
chies without homogenizing values; to retain aesthetic grandeur without the
support of Kant, “objective Spirit,” or conventional faith; and finally, to wel
come contingency without capitulating entirely to capital. Like most of the
early and most audacious members of the avant-garde, Cendrars wanted to
maintain high degree of craftsmanship (and thus preserve the categories of
artist and poet) and simultaneously to collapse the distinction between art
objects and everyday (mass-produced) items. But Cendrars neglects to address
directly the question of how art is to prevent the vacant order of the transcen
dent from being inhabited by the interests of an industrial or military class. In
contrast, Adorno chooses to devote himself entirely to this problem in his mas
sive study of art under capitalism, Aesthetic Theory. In a long digression that he
was never able to integrate into the final manuscript, Adorno presents fashion
in art as the dangerous hinge between self-reflexivity and submission. “Fash
ion,” asserts Adorno,

art’s permanent confession that it not what it claims to be.. .. Against
its detractors, fashion’s most powerful response that it participates in the
individual impulse, which is saturated with history.... If art, semblance,
the clothing of an invisible body, fashion
clothing as the absolute.
(316, 317)
Adorno’s art-as-clothing metaphor could not be more à propos. The important
word here, however, is absolute,” a term Adorno uses to refer to the phenom
enon in which one aspect of an entity (such as its contingency) gains dominance
over every other aspect (such as its effort to reclaim its independence). Art
becomes pure fashion when it abandons all attempts at resistance to fashion.
Fashion, and even more pertinently, art’s confession of its fashionable aspect (its
desire to please) may indeed provide “strength” to art and prevent it from "atro
phy” (317); but the “renunciation” or denial of fashion, Adorno stresses, is an
equally integral part of art. For Adorno, then, fashion appears to penetrate art
in two different ways, or really, to two differing degrees of depth. In a first
instance, art fends off its subservience to fashion by insisting upon its own
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counter-order, its own set of exigencies related to an intangible ideal. In a sec
ond instance, art penetrated by heteronomous constraints to the point where
it hypostatizes — fully embodies — what previously constituted only one of its
conflicting aspects. In this second case, art comes to resemble “clothing,” a thin
tissue or “enveloppe . . . apéritif” that now hangs upon a body whose vulnera
bility, whose material existence, has become irrelevant. Fashion in art is “legit
imate” since it manifests the immanence of the historical, except when it is
“manipulated by the culture industry” which tears it away from “objective spir
it” (192).
Cendrars situates his poetics precariously between the two possibilities
sketched out by Adorno. In this respect, Cendrars represents a turning point
between a modernist celebration of the everyday and the postmodernist com
mercialization of the same. Cendrars does not have recourse to an abstraction
such as “objective spirit” to defend his creations from manipulation; he can only
hang his poem/dress on an unstable and utterly amorphous clotheshorse called
“sensualité.” Stretching lyric form to its utmost limit, rendering lyric subjec
tivity as porous as it can possibly be, Cendrars seems to ask whether a lyric
poetry can in fact relinquish the principle of autonomy — confess to its inca
pacity to “live up to” its own ideal — and yet still remain a counterforce to
unmediated administration.
Finally, the only thing preventing “Sur la robe elle a un corps” from capit
ulating to radical heteronomy the slender, nearly imperceptible barrier pro
vided by the signature of the poet (“Et sur la hanche / La signature du poète”).
In the poem, this signature must take on the huge responsibility of fighting off
the repeated assaults of technological and commercial standardization. Yet this
signature is by no means the fully authoritative paraph of the Romantic lyric
poet, nor is it reduced to the status of a designer brand label. Instead, this par
ticular type of signature seems to allude to an intermediary order of subjective
mastery, a hybrid state between autonomy and commercialism, absolute tran
scendence and purely ephemeral value. This signature belongs to the space of
hybridity, an increasingly significant third field of cultural production in which
one would want to situate a wide variety of modernist and postmodernist pas
ticheurs. Cendrars and Delaunay are typical of many artists in France, Italy,
and Russia who were attempting from early on to realize hybrid creations draw
ing from both the decorative and the contemplative arts. It remains to be seen,
however, whether the space of hybridity that Cendrars helped to carve out as
early as 1913 can prove capacious enough to accommodate all the cultural man
ifestations that stake a claim within it. As the fashion industry begins to play
a greater role in funding museum exhibitions (and as publishing houses are
forced by economic conditions to promote the study of visual culture over the
study of poetry), the question of whether “confession” can be balanced with
denial, the energy of fashion with the energy of resistance, grows ever more
pressing.
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Notes
1. All translations from the French are the authors.
2. On the persistence of artisanal modes in the France of the Second
Empire, see Walton.
3. Silverman traces both the threat of machine mass-production on the
decorative arts and the antagonistic response of aestheticians to this threat. See
also Lipovetsky.
4. This is Jamesons description of the postmodern aesthetic (7).
5. Delaunay lost all of her Russian properties during World War I. Find
ing herself in a precarious economic situation, she extended her field of opera
tions beyond the domestic sphere, opening a Casa Sonia in Madrid, an Atelier
Simultané in Paris, and a Boutique Simultanée at the 1925 Exposition des Arts
Décoratifs.
6. Cendrars was working under the sign of the simultaneous contrast tech
nique when he collaborated with Sonia Delauney in 1913 to create “La Prose
du Transsibérian et de la Petite Jehanne de France,” a two-meter long poem
stenciled with Delaunay s designs and folded in the manner of an accordian.
7. Although Delaunay may not have admitted it at the time, her “robe
simultanée” was very much response to moves made on the competitive chess
board of avant-garde art. As several commentators have noted, the competi
tion between the Futurists and Sonia and Robert Delaunay was quite intense
before World War I. See Morano; and Braun.
8. It is highly likely that Cendrars intended this pun. The poet had just
returned from six months in New York where he worked for the Butterick pat
tern company. For details, see Bochner’s detailed account of Cendrars’ life in
New York.
9. “Sensuality” Cendrars’ modernist synonym for spirituality. A follow
er of Remy de Gourmont’s theory of the aesthetic as the spiritual life of the
senses, Cendrars substitutes “sensuality” for more traditional poetic values such
as spirituality, divinity, beauty or truth. Cendrars’ “profondeur” a “profondeur
sensuelle” (Aujourd'hui 193), an arousing visceral experience involving the five
senses.
10. This manuscript passage does not appear in the published preface.
11. The now classic version of the theory of identity as masquerade is
Judith Butler’s. In response to Joan Rivières “Womanliness as a Masquerade,”
Butler asks provocatively whether masquerade “serve[s] primarily to conceal or
repress a pregiven femininity... [o]r is ... the means by which femininity itself
first established” (48). I am suggesting here that once an organic femininity
eliminated as a possibility, any female identity one creates may be susceptible
to other reifying forces such as commodification.
12. Leroy provides an exhaustive treatment of this period in Cendrars’
career. He does not, however, recognize the significance of “Sur la robe elle a
un corps,” nor does he link the poetics it advocates to Cendrars’ later works.
13. The letter is undated; June 1914 an approximate date suggested by
the archivist of the Fonds Delaunay, Bibliothèque Nationale, Department of
Manuscripts. In another letter dated 28 June 1914, Cendrars again expresses
anxiety concerning the fate of the poem.
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14. In “Profond aujourd’hui” of 1917 Cendrars relates the ex-centric nature
of the subject directly to an experience of high capitalism: “Tu te perds dans le
labyrinthe des magasins où tu renonces à toi pour devenir tout le monde” [You
lose yourself in the labyrinth of stores, where you renounce yourself to become
everyone] (Aujourd'hui 12); “Tu vis. Excentrique” [You live. Eccentric] (14).
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All Hopped Up:
Beer, Cultivated National Identity, and Anglo-Dutch
Relations, 1524-1625
George Evans Light

George Evans Light,
Assistant Professor of

English at Mississippi

I would like to begin with something that we will
recognize, at least generically, as a joke. Thus Henry
Peacham in The Worth of a Penny (1641):

State University,

I remember, when I was in the Low Countries,
there were three souldiers, a Dutchman, a Scot,
and an Englishman, for their misdemeanours
condemned to be hanged: yet their lives were
begd by three severall men, one a Bricklayer, that
he might help him to make bricks & carry them
to walls; the other was a Brewer of Delft, who
beg’d his man to fetch water, and do other worke
in the Brewhouse; now the third was a Gardiner,
and desired the third man to help him to worke
in, and to dresse an Hop-garden: the first two
accepted their offers thankfully, this last the Eng
lishman told his Master in plaine termes his
friends never brought him up to gather Hops, but
desired he might be hang’d first: and so he was.
(10)

writes about early
modem English culture

from

and

theater to naming
practices, memory, and

identity.

In other words, during the Thirty Years War, some
military justice is about to be meted out to three var
ious men, but three local businessmen intercede by
“begging” the lives of these felons; that is, they accept
liability for the men in exchange for indentured servi
tude of some prescribed length. The Dutch and
Scots felons gladly accept the trade-off of life for
labor, working for bricklayer and brewer respective
ly; however, the Englishman refuses his good fortune.
While the apparent moral of this anecdote
an
exemplary notion of the ubiquitously idle masterless
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man, I will argue that its curiously obscure punch line masks deeply felt cultur
al anxieties about the nature of what it means to be English; that is, does the
Englishman refuse his new job out of sheer class disdain for working, or is his
refusal due to a particular cultural prejudice against the job of gathering hops?1
Moving from jokes to their comic effects, following Freud following Heymans,
we expect Verblüffung (bewilderment) succeeded by Erleuchtung (illumination):
just such illumination is the goal of this essay.
In the century from 1524 to 1625, beer replaced the more traditional ale as
the constitutive national drink of the English, a fact enabled by the introduc
tion of cultivated hops. Concurrently, this period, especially the latter half, saw
an enormous growth in the sense of English self-identification, due in no small
part to constant fears of and then the ultimate defeat of the Armada.2 In Forms
ofNationhood, Richard Helgerson goes so far as to claim originary status with
respect to national self-fashioning for generation of mid-Tudor authors of the
middling sort born between 1551 and 1564 and active between the 1580s and
the 1640s (1ff.). Alan G. R. Smith at once expands and narrows this historical
moment: “The changes of the 1530s also led to the formal establishment of an
English nation state,’ a realm subject to no outside authority. . . . [T]he feeling
of national identity and uniqueness continued to grow reaching an apogee in
the reign of Elizabeth” (88, 89). Whatever the historical framework, these
Elizabethans certainly engendered “a national cultural formation that has . . .
survived for the last four centuries on the British Isles” (Helgerson 299-300).3
Like Helgerson, I am specifically interested in how Elizabethans and Jacobeans
themselves created and then defined their own national identity. Unlike him,
however, I do not accept with an unquestioning Eurocentric glee that this Eliz
abethan English cultural formation “has served as a sequentially engendering
paradigm for nations throughout the world,” a phrase far too reminiscent of
history written by colonial victors. Instead, I focus my argument temporally,
geographically, and psychically within the confines of Elizabethan and
Jacobean England.
I believe that the two phenomena (the replacement of “English” ale with
“Dutch” beer and the growth of English nationalism), linked however humor
ously in our opening joke, were related. In this essay, I examine just how drunk
enness served as a generic marker of otherness for European ethnic groups on
the verge of national self-identification. Specifically, the English were deter
mined to blame their own perceived national inebriety on foreign agents, espe
cially the Dutch. However, even this assertion bore a kernel of truth, as the
Dutch were fundamental in the development of the large-scale English brew
ing trade because they originally imported hops into Britain and then later pur
chased the exported product for resale in the Low Countries. The essay closes
with a reconsideration of these competing nationalisms by examining, in some
detail, two English plays with important Dutch characters in the paired con
texts of militarism and commercialism.
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Our joke plays upon ethnic and national biases: a willing Dutchman, a loutish
Scot, and a haughty Englishman.4 In fact, the triumvirate of felons is really a
pair of doubles with the Englishman a member of both: English-Dutch and
English-Scots. Each pair consists of the English and a race against whom they
defined themselves, but with whom they felt some amity and connection. I
focus on the former pair. The English and Dutch were either great allies, as
leading Protestant countries who jointly fought Spanish Catholic ambitions for
a “unified” Europe, or great rivals, fighting over the true form of religion and
the emerging commerce of the high seas, not to mention cloth production —
often in quick succession, especially during the seventeenth century.5 As G.
Hunter asserts, “The inhabitants of the Low Countries (‘Dutch’ and ‘Flem
ings’) were the best-known strangers in Elizabethan England” (17).6 But what
explains the prevalence of drinking images connected with two of their three
potential employers: the brewer and the hop gardener?
Drink and drunkenness were concerns of great interest in late-Tudor and
early Stuart England. Typically the problem of excessive drinking was demo
nized as something alien and other. In 1617 the English traveler Fynes
Moryson epitomized this trend, as he saw fit to recount the drinking habits of
the many nations he visited. Thus at German feasts, there was “endlesse drink
ing” (84); “Drunkennesse” was their “almost sole vice” (165). “Danes passe (if
it be possible) their neighbour Saxons in the excesse of their drinking” (101).
Poles were “as stout drinkers as the Germans” (104). The Swiss claimed mod
eration, “yet drunkennesse hath much patronage among the best sort” (91).
Only the French avoided the tar of drunkenness. It “is reprochfull among the
French, and the greater part drink water mingled with wine” (135).7
While excessive drinking was prevalent throughout Europe, nowhere was it
more noticed than in the Netherlands. Moryson stated that “Netherlanders use
lesse excesse in drinking then the Saxons, but more then other Germans. . . .
But I will truly say, that for every day drinking ... doe they use so great excesse
as the Saxons” (99).8 Thomas Wilson’s Art ofRhétorique (1560) provided a pre
scriptive catalogue of national characteristics in which the Dutch were known
for their drinking:

And not onely are matters set out by description, but men are painted out
in their colours.... The Englishmen for feeding and chaunging for appar
eil. The Dutchman for drinking. The Frenchman for pride & inconstance.
The Spanyard for nimblenes of body, and much disdaine: the Italian for
great wit and policie: the Scots for boldnesse, and the Boerne for stubbornesse. (178-9)
As Hunter notes, “Surveys of the time were fond of making lists of French,
English, Spanish, etc., national characteristics” (43). For example, Henry
Butte’s Dyets Dry Dinner (1599) discussed an “English Foole” and his penchant
for foreign habits: “wanton Italianly; Go Frenchly: Duchly drink: breath Indianly” (P4r). In 2 Henry IV, Hal states,
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Belike then my appetite was not princely got, for, by my troth, I do now
remember the poor creature, small beer ... as thou hast not done a great
while, because the rest of thy low coun-tries have [made a shift to] eat up
thy holland. (2.2.9-11,20-2)

Commentators have been quick to note the punning on “low countries” and
holland, but none have seen fit to mention the more literal relation between
“small beer” and its homeland. John Taylor in writing his Drinke and Welcome
(1637) assumed authorship by one “painefull and industrious Huldricke Van
Speagle, a Grammaticall Brewer of Lubeck,” whose work Taylor has translated
from “the high Dutch tongue” (title page). Richard Young in The Drunkard's
Character (1638) juxtaposed English to Dutch inebriety (Aa8-Aa8v). The dip
somaniacal Dutchman even became stock character in Renaissance drama
(Haugtons, Englishmenfor My Money [1598], Dekkers The Shoemaker's Holiday
[1599], Dekker and Websters Westward Ho! [1604], Middletons No Wit, No
Help Like a Womans [1611], and especially Belchiers Hans Beer-Pot [1618]).9
The English went even further, blaming the Dutch for English social prob
lems. Much of this anxiety, of course, was economic; as Joyce Appleby notes,
“Dutch success obviously puzzled Englishmen. . . . Dutch prosperity, like
Dutch land, seemed to have been created out of nothing” (74). From the late
1570s through to the Civil War, social and moral commentators developed a
commonplace that drunkenness was a sin only introduced into England after
soldiers returned from the Low Countries,
“metaphysical” commodity
destroying the moral economy much as “their command over the products of
other nations” threatened those nations’ real economies. In his Pierce Penilesse
(1592), Thomas Nashe complained:
let me discend to superfluitie in drinke: a sinne, that euer since we haue
mixt our selues with the Low-countries, is counted honourable: but before
we knew their lingring warres, was held in the highest degree of hatred that
might be. (1: 204-5)

Even the historian William Camden believed the English “learned by these
Netherland warres to drowne themselues with immoderate drinking”
2). As
late as the 1630s, Samuel Pepys claimed that the English learned the custom of
drinking healths while stationed in the Netherlands
172, n. 4).
The English were not alone in this demonization of inebriety as a cultural
marker of the other. Moryson stated that the Swiss “say that excesse came into
the Commonwealth, together with the accepting of military stipends from forraigne Princes” (91). That most famous Elizabethan tourist, the Swiss Thomas
Platter, had this to say about his trip to London: “I have never seen more tav
erns and ale-houses in my whole life than in London” (189), implying that the
English were drunkards. This finding was confirmed by a lunch given by the
mayor, where “[t]he drinks consisted of the best beer and all manner of heavy
and light wines to follow, as for instance, Greek, Spanish, Malmsey, Lanquedoc, French and German” (Platter 158).10 Rabelais also noted the drunkenness
of the English, when he said Jobelin Clotpoll, Garganteas second tutor, might
“die in that manner, drunk like an Englishman” (1: 61).11
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As Chris Highley has shown, drawing upon Foucault, national identity in
this period was often defined in terms of that which was either not present or
somehow perceived to be other; thus the English defined their own civilization
relative to their neighboring other, the Celtic Fringe of Wales, Scotland, and
Ireland.12 Moryson demonized this fringe in terms of its drinking as well,
specifically citing the latter two cultures for their excesses: “The excesse of
drinking was then farre greater in generall among the Scots then the English,”
while the Irish “use excesse therein” (156,162). The English also defined their
sober nation relative to its sodden neighbor and ally just across the Channel, the
States General of Holland; however, continental visitors, even prior to the
1590s, were quick to notice the excessive drinking of the English. Clearly
drunkenness as a foreign and alien phenomenon was a widespread cultural par
adigm in the Renaissance; what is important is not so much the “truth” of such
assertions but rather their very existence. Consider the following exchange in
Othello:
Iago. Some wine, boys!
Cas.
Tore [God] an excellent song.
Iago. I learn’d it in England, where indeed they are most
potent in potting: your Dane, your German, and your swag-bellied Hol
lander, — Drink, ho! — are nothing to your English.
Cas.
Is your [Englishman] so exquisite in his drinking?
Why, he drinks you, with facility, your Dane dead drunk; he sweats
not to overthrow your Almain; he gives your Hollander a vomit ere the next
pottle can be fill’d. (2.3.74-85)
Here all the usual suspects are rounded up and their various drinking capacities
displayed for our mirth. Ostensibly a Venetian and thus foreign view of the
English character and culture, Iago’s paean clearly played as nationalist propa
ganda to the groundlings, if not to the rest of the audience.

Hops and English Identity
While I have expounded on the drunken stereotypes inscribed in our opening
ethnic joke, I have not yet explained how the punch line ties into an emergent
national identity. What are hops and why would an Englishman refuse to grow
them other than out of laziness? A brief historical background will establish
the importance of beer — the chief by-product of hops — to the material pro
duction of normative cultural values. Because the water in early modern Eng
land, especially that in London, was virtually undrinkable, the everyday drink
was some sort of alcohol, which has the dual virtues of killing off all bacteria
while providing an ample caloric intake.13 Originally this drink was ale, but by
the 1590s production and market forces had combined to replace ale with beer.
One simple technological improvement accounted for this transformation
from ale to beer — the introduction of hops production on a large scale in Eng
land.14 This transformation encoded the curiously mixed nature of national
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self-consciousness. Beer, a Dutch invention, unlike English ale, was made with
hops, which served as a preservative.15 This foreign triumph, however, was nei
ther straightforward nor immediate. The original reception of both the plant
and its by-product beer was underwhelming. Hops in its wild form was native
to England, but as a cultivated crop it had to be reintroduced from Europe in
the 1400s.16 During Henry VI's reign a petition was presented to Parliament
against the “wicked weed called hops” (Fuller 1: 493). As a going economic
concern, however, hops production did not begin in England until the 1520s,
when Flemish farmers began cultivating it in Kent (Bickerdyke 71).17 Later,
such “Dutch who settled in Colchester, Canterbury, and Sandwich in the 1560s
retained the legendary Dutch work habits, according to Thomas Manley, who
compared them to the ‘lazy, wastfull, and disorderly’ English” (Appleby 76). A
popular but unreliable distich ran: “Hops, Reformation, bays and beer / Came
into England all in one year” (Bickerdyke 67).18 An alternative version in
Henry Buttes’ Dyets Dry Dinner emphasized the fifth-column element of
Dutch brewing practices:
Besides the necessitie hereof [of hops] in brewing of Beere, is sufficiently
knowne to Germany and England, and all these Northerne parts of the
worlde: yet I know not how it happened (as he merrily saith) that heresie
& beere came hopping into England both in a yeere. (G4r)
In other words beer northern in its origin as is the Protestant Reformation
that Henry VIII’s failed divorce set in motion. Hops’s association with hereti
cal Protestantism as significant Dutch exports breeds a kind of xenophobic hys
teria; hops may be necessary for beer, but beer belongs in other “Northerne
parts” than England. Henry VIII went so far in 1530 as to enjoin the Royal
brewer to put “neither hops nor brimstone into the beer” (Bickerdyke 71).19
Not only was the spice devilish, it was also foreign, attributes that were far from
mutually exclusive. Andrew Boorde in his Dyetary (1547) played up the
nationalist characteristics of drink: “Ale for an Englysshe man is a natural
drynke. . . . Bere ... is a naturall drynke for a Dutche man. And nowe of late
dayes it is moch vsed in Englande to the detryment of many Englysshe men”
(10). As late as 1574, Reynolde Scot in his A Perfite Platforme of a Hoppe Gar
den was instructing Englishmen how to grow hops based on Dutch methods he
had seen at Poppering; he also accused the Dutch of “dazeling us with the dis
commendation of our soyle, obscuring and falsifying the order of this mysterie”
(B2v).20 Notice the quasi-religious metaphors at work here, as if the Dutch
were false angels who misrepresented the Eden that was England by “dazeling”
its inhabitants.
By the 1580s, however, there was a clear change of heart. The economic
viability of hops as a crop and the market penetration of its most significant by
product, beer, necessitated a revision of English cultural heritage. Hops was
recuperated as a “native” plant within the herbal literature (Gerarde 737-8).21
Authorities complained of a lack of beer for the English Armada due to a
shortage of hops! (Public Record Office, SP 12/215 fol. 55). The English even
distinguished between native hops, which were good, and the foreign version
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filled with any powder, dust, dross, sand, or other soil whatsoever ” (Fuller 1:
493, quoting Statues of the Realm 1 JI c. 18). A royal investigation by the lord
treasurer in the 1590s found that hops grown “beyond sea” were seldom used in
domestic brewing because they “were boyled before they came over” and “would
moulder to verry duste” (British Library, Landsdowne MS 71 fol. 65r). Admit
tedly, during this period there was some linguistic confusion over ale and beer;
however, at any time after the 1580s when the proper distinction was made,
beer was praised for its medical and dietetic advantages over ale, specifically for
those accorded by the inclusion of hops (Culpeper 130).
Similarly, English authorities sought to legislate against foreign competi
tion. As far back as 1289, the Norwich Leet Roll recorded the following fine:
“De Ricardo Somer quia vendit cervesiam / flandrensem occulte per quod Bal
livi / perdiderunt custumam ... ijs” [Of Richard Summer because he sells Flan
ders ale privily, whereby the Bailiffs have lost custom] (Hudson 21).22 Such
efforts were widespread, especially at the local level in and around London.
Legislation against or limiting the scope of foreign brewers has a long history
dating back to at least the 1460s (Guildhall Library, London Letter Book L fol.
25). Alehouses owners were “enjoyned not to suffer any tapster that is a forreyner to draw or offer any beere or ale for or under them” (Corporation of
London Record Office, Repertories 30 fol. 40v).23 Like other trades regulated
by the guilds,
No Inholder, vintner, winesellor, hostiller, pybaker (?), cooke, tippler or
huxter or any other shall buy anie manner of Ale or beere to sell by retaile
but of freemen enfranchized and inhabitinge within the fredom and liber
ties of the saide cittie. (Guildhall Library, MS 5496 fol. 8v)
Just such an exclusionary law allows the economic resolution brought on by a
“deus ex machina supplied by a Dutch captain who, as an alien merchant, could
not sell his shipload of goods directly on the London market” in Dekker s The
Shoemakers Holiday (Seaver 93). Of course, this anxiety over foreign competi
tion is also part and parcel of the cultural fantasies of self-determination that
underlie nationalist sentiment; surely Dutch beer was not a staple import of
Britain because even with hops as an ingredient the product still did not keep
well enough to be transported long distances. Israel demonstrates that most
Dutch brewing occured in big “inland towns . . . which produced a good deal
of beer, mostly for local consumption locally but also in the south Netherlands”
(18).
This curious shift in the status of hops exemplifies the fluid and transfor
mational nature of cultural and national identities in this period. As illustrat
ed by Boorde in 1547, beer originally was considered a “Dutch” drink. A scant
thirty years later, however, the English crowed about their “beere exceedinge in
goodnesse faire the beere that anie of them can brewe in the lowe countries”
(British Library, Landsdowne MS 71 fol. 50r). Conversely, only after Leices
ters failed military campaign of 1587 ended serious English intervention in the
Low Countries was drunkenness perceived
a continental sin imported back
from the Netherlands to England; the high correlation between vagrants and

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jx/vol2/iss2/8

38






Editors: Vol. 2, No. 2 (1998): Full issue
166

Journal x

ex-soldiers seemed to solidify this truism (Beier 93-5).24 For the English in the
1590s, beer remained a troublesome product as well as a cherished element of
their national heritage. Well into the seventeenth century, John Taylor, the
Water-poet, was still rehearsing cultural xenophobia around alcohol praising
“english Ale” against foreign beer (B3v). Such old habits die hard.
Now we must turn to related internal debates over the status of beer in
English society and the definition of England itself as a nation. I will focus on
how these issues were dramatized in the popular theater.

Beer, Englishness, and the Popular Stage

Typically, Renaissance stage Dutchmen either provide local cosmopolitan color
or comic dialect effects (see Middletons No Wit No Help like a Womans and
Haughtons Englishmen for my Money); however, in two specfic instances they
actually produce a commentary on emergent nationalism. I wish to examine
two very different plays: one extremely well known (Thomas Dekker’s The
Shoemakers Holiday), the other virtually unknown (Daubridgcourt Belchier’s
Hans Beer-Pot). Through these plays, we will see how the English constructed
their own national identity with respect to and/or with the help of drunken
Dutchmen specifically.
In Dekkers The Shoemakers Holiday, Rowland Lacy’s disguise as Hans
Meulter places him in a tradition that includes Shakespeare’s Prince Hal. Both
are aristocrats who seek to understand the baser sort by frequenting their tip
pling haunts, only “Tom, Dick, and, Francis” (1 Henry IV 2.4.8) are here
replaced by the journeymen, Firk, Hodge, and Ralph; unlike Hal, however,
Lacy does not seek to lead such London lads into foreign combat. Rather he
avoids his commission as “Chief colonel of all those companies / Mustered in
London and the shires about / To serve his Highness in those wars of France”
(1.47-9), and chooses instead to serve the gentle craft of shoemaking. This dis
guise serves mutliple purposes: at once comic, economic, and perhaps even
xenophobic.
The comic nature of Hans twofold: alcoholic and linguistic. Lacy’s sec
ond appearance in the guise of Hans after his Hal-like soliloquy in act 3 defines
the stereotype of the droll, dropsical stage Dutchman, while marrying the two
themes in a comic drinking song:
Der was een bore van Gelderland,
Frolick sie byen;
He was als dronck he could niet stand,
Upsee al sie byen;
Tap eens de canneken,
Drincke, schone mannekin. (4.42-7)
[There was a boor (peasant or country clown) from Gelderland
Merry they are
He was so drunk he could not stand,
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Drunk they all are.
Pour another cup,
Drink, pretty little man]

This language is actually “a mixture of Dutch and English” and typical of
Renaissance stage dialects, which were primarily used for Irish, Scottish, and
Welsh characters (R. Dekker 62). Although Firk has been insistently hinting
at his thirst, his master Eyre only relents out of hospitality for the newly hired
Dutch journeyman: “Hodge, entertain him.... Come, my last of the fives, give
me a can. Have to thee, Hans!” (4.105-20).
The play is rife with puns on gentle (Bevington 110; Seaver 100). Eyre and
his journeyman as well as Lacy practice “the Gentle Craft” (3.4). Indeed, Eyre
seems to manifest gentility in many of his actions, as in the drinking scene
above. Ultimately Eyre becomes a true gentleman as he is both elected lord
mayor and granted “[o]ne honour more” by the king (21.130). However, this
world of gentility is bounded by harsh economic and political realities. David
Scott Kastan has shown how the very work of the play
work itself. The
arrival of the Dutch “ship of merchandise” which empowers Simon Eyres
ascension to the lord mayoralty precisely mimics contemporary reality (7.134).
In contrast to European powers that got rich on the plunder of colonialism, “the
Dutch ... had made their money in a most mundane fashion.... [B]road-bottomed Dutch fluyboats had plied the waters of the North Sea in a seemingly
endless circulation of European staples” (Appleby 73). Consider the ships
“sweet wares : “Prunes, almonds, sugar candy, carrot-roots, turnips — O, brave
fatting meat” (7.139-41). Firk expounds on a brave new world of seemingly
exotic comestibles; however, the seriousness of trade still seeps in. Most critics
seem to think Firk mistakenly either lists turnips as exotic or includes them by
association; however, turnips were to become an essential part of Englands
rural-agricultural economy, for their planting allowed quicker renitrification of
fields than simply letting them lie fallow.25 Already they were used as both a
table item and
a replacement crop for hops. The savvy Dutch merchant
knows there is much profit to be had in such a plain tuber. Similarly, Hans
hired on as a journeyman by Eyre because he is, as Hodge asserts, “Fore God,
a proper man and, I warrant, a fine workman” (4.63-4) and because even a
native son like Firk threatens to quit if Hans is not hired. As Bevington notes,
“this even-handedness” in Dekkers presentation of Hans “is remarkable in view
of the strength of feeling in London about cheap immigrant labor” (111).
Finally, however, there is tinge of xenophobia to Dekkers play world:
Firk would have Eyre hire Hans so “that I may learn some gibble-gabble. Twill
make us work the faster” (4.51-2). Although primarily good-natured, Firk’s
interest in Hans and his skills displays a typical English anxiety about superior
Dutch industry; as Bevington notes, there was “resentment of foreign labor
from the Lowlands” (101). Indeed, “Dekker manages to have it both ways with
his audience about xenophobic stereotypes: they can laugh at Firk and yet con
descend to Hans s beer drinking German drollery” (111).26 Much of this xeno
phobia is based on Britain’s seemingly unique situation as a fortress island girt
against the conflict ravaging Europe; throughout the period leading up this
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play, the last decade of the sixteenth century and of Elizabeth’s reign, England
was consumed both by a sense of strife and one of apocalypse (Seaver 87-8).27
However, the play more than compensates for this xenophobia by also
allowing Hans to be the agent of Eyre’s ascendancy. In this interpretive ver
sion of a play that presents a moral lesson on the virtues of hard work in the
guise of the shoemaking lord mayor, Dekker’s invention allows the disguised
noble Lacy to help London tradesman. The enabler of this aid the Dutch
disguise by which Lacy can converse with the Dutch captain. Here, Dekker
scores a double point: the industry and success of Dutch merchants are given
nationalistic acceptance by underlying a constitutive myth of English urban
self-creation; and, at the same time, the disguise allows a noble free range in the
commercial world of the city. However, it only a disguise, and there comes
a time for it to be doffed. Lacy manages to turn even this act to good effect by
telling Eyre:

Let me request you to remember me.
I know your honour easily may obtain
Free pardon of the King for me and Rose,
And reconcile me to my uncle’s grace. (20.43-6)
Now he knows the lord mayor and can "change a man” (1.151) as he could not
at the play’s beginning. But the pardon he seeks is great for he has been, as Lin
coln claims, a traitor "heaped” with "desertless favours . . . / To be commander
over powers in France” (21.47, 48, 49), a position he forsook for "love’s desire”
(57). .
Like any English play on nationalism, The Shoemakers Holiday owes more
than a little debt to Shakespeare’s Henry V, I have already argued that Lacy’s
disguise mimics those of Hal, although he obviously lacks the latter’s battle
experience. We perhaps most clearly see this debt in the play’s royal conclu
sion: the moment at which the royal prerogative supersedes the royal grant of
journeyman’s holiday in commercial London, the moment when the troops
return to the Continent: "Come, lords, a while let’s revel it at home. / When
all our sports and banquetings are done, / Wars must right wrongs which
Frenchmen have begun” (21.194-6). This time apparently no Dutch disguise
will serve Lacy, nor has he need of one, having wooed and won Rose.
Some twenty years later at the onset of the Thirty Year’s War, Daubridgcourt Belchier returns to these issues of beer and nationalism and to the source
text of Henry V in his "closet” drama, Hans Beer-Pot, his Invisible Comedy of See
me and See me not. The play, apparently printed in London in 1618, interest
ingly reverses our beverage flow. Hans, a sodden country servant who likes to
"cracke a pot” (B3r) with soldiers while on his master’s business in Utrecht,
continually seeks "cans of English Beere” (D4v; emphasis added). The play was
most likely intended for a fervently nationalistic English audience, although no
evidence that the play was ever performed in London exists; nor it certain
that it was performed in Utrecht for expatriates and soldiers, even though the
title page claims that the play was "ACTED In the Low Countries, by an hon
est Company ofHealth-Drinker"; one can imagine a sort of early modern ver
sion of the soldiers’ review in South Pacific. Belchier himself lived in Utrecht
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from 1617 and died there in 1621 (Webb and Stephen 4:144). The play
becomes something of a fount of cultural nostalgia for the Elizabethan world
of the 1590s even as its “plot” disintegrates into a tissue of set speeches in three
acts followed by a pseudo-Petrarchan pastoral song about a “Queene” (H2v).
Throughout the play, England
the cultural measuring stick even while
Holland is the setting. In an early speech, later repeated and embellished with
respect to martial accomplishments, “Cornelius Harmants, a rich Country
Gentlemen” (Bv) explains at least his own fascination with all things English:

What courting calst thou them, thou rubst me up,
To thinke upon the times forepast, I saw
In Englands Court
famous and renownde
Of great Elizaes blessed memory
That ayded so these troubled Netherlands
With men and money; still oh, oh, still me thinkes
I see those Worthies marching on earthes Stage;
The famous Essex, Norreis, Sidney too,
And wisest Vere, that held Ostend so long,
Gainst hells foule mouth, and Spanish tyranny,
As yet his complices can testifie. (B4r)

This speech brings the spirit of Henry Vs St. Crispins Day speech to life, as the
names “Familiar in his mouth as household words, / . . . / Be in their flowing
cups freshly rememb’red” (4.3.52, 55). Of course, given the probable audience
for the play, it can also be seen as a spirit booster: you soldiers now should want
to live up to the reputation of your predecessors. Furthermore, it perpetuates
the myth of Elizabeth I as gallant, generous, and warlike, when the reality
that she had mixed feelings about active involvement in the Low Countries (see
note 5). Also, for a play printed in 1618, it proffers a nostalgic vision of a late
English greatness. While James had no interest in continental squabbles,
Belchier, himself an expatriate who would die in a siege of Utrecht, praises
“Elizaes blessed memory / That ayded so these troubled Netherlands.”
The fascination with Britain goes beyond its martial prowess to its eco
nomic prowess, as English commodites are all the rage. Beyond Hanss taste
for English beer, the “rich merchant Garland” (Bv), son-in-law to Cornelius,
also orders “two cans of your best English beere” (Er). Later, Cornelius in a
moment of unfettered profligacy invites the tapster Joaske Flutterkin to his
house “[t]o eate some venison, here ’tis novelty; / It came from England, baked
in Rye paste” (F3r). Even the lower orders have the same fascination. “Pasquill
Beeremond a Sentinell” (Bv) desires “a Tankard full of Spanish Wine / Like
those in London Water-bearers use” (F4v) and will eat some “Pies” on his jour
ney of “[t]hree English miles” (Gr) that surely must be like the venison pastry
just described.
The play further intermixes things Dutch and English in its economic the
While the Dutch were usually seen
innovators even to the point of
English anxiety, Belchier has his Dutch characters learn from their English
compatriots. Thus Cornelius is described by Flutterkin:
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O theres a man lives bravely, keepes an house,
Releeves the poore, his gates be never shut;
His tables free, theres meat for honest men:
He livde in England, learnt that countrey guise,
For Hospitality, few such be here:
Yet frugall too, was never prodigall,
Spends nothing more, but what he well may spare,
He borrowes nought, nor lends on usurie:
Yet hath ynough. (G4r-Ev)
If anything, Flutterkin is mimicking English complaints about Dutch econom
ic success. As Appleby notes, The Dutch “enjoyed a burgeoning trade, a
remarkable prosperity, had plenty of money, high land values, high prices, and
the lowest interest rate in Europe. A group of English writers were convinced
that Dutch success stemmed from their low interest rate” (88). This wellmeaning moderation runs through the entire family. “Hanneke, his wife” (Bv)
has a similar approach to life:

As God doth blesse the earth with great encrease,
And in great measure send us ten for one:
So must those blessings carefully be kept,
And not with wretchlessse heed, let runne at large,
For
huge heapes of wealth consume to nought,
And like fayre buildings unrepayrde, decay.
Yet must not beastly miching niggardize,
Cause us forget our selves, and those that want,
But give releefe from our aboundant store:
We have enough, our charge not so great,
One daughter shee s bestowed richly, and
Her portion payde, no penny more in debt,
Two sonnes besides, and they provided for,
The yongst at Schoole, the other trayles a Pyke,
And for preferment lookes each day, each houre. (B2r-v)
Hans the servant praises his mistress
“the best that ever trode on shooe: / I
would not chaunge my life to be Lord Mayor / Of that fayre towne of London
(B3r) — not Amsterdam or Utrecht; again England is the fount of value and
meaning.28 The aforementioned elder son Younker, although deemed a profli
gate by his family for suffering from the “fancies of unbrideled youth” (B2r),
in fact his fathers son, a sober sort who shares the wealth: “In this Ile please
you, but Ile drink no more” (E2r). The two are finally reunited in their love of
martial affairs. Younker complains that “it grieves me much / To see poore
Souldiers walke in mean attire; / And lesse respect that have deserv’d well[,]”
for which he blames “times corruption” (G3r-v). In response to this Cornelius
returns to his favorite tale:

When I was in my flowre of youth, and livde
in Englands Court, that swarmde with Marrtialists,
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Seaman and Souldiers, there had great respect,
Were set by; honourd more than other men. (G4r)
He continues for another 30 lines with a catalogue of English heroes and clos
es with stirring refrain: “Blest be that hand which brought this blessed peace;
/ And blest be those that pray it never cease” (Hr). Like father like son:
Younker himself has absorbed his fathers speeches and, as we shall see, his nos
talgic love of England.
The militarism of the play turns to further comic effect when Serieant
Goodfellow tries his hand at debating Younker in “construction of Quids vers
es” (Er) and on various other matters “Italian, Spanish, English, Dutch, or
French” (Dv). Their debate soon turns to matters military, as Younker prevails
over his less-educated tavern comrades:

The question which I prosecute this,
If horse or foot should haue preheminence:
They are needfull both, to make an armie vp:
Yet those great Armies which the Tartars usde,
Were all of horse; so were the Persians
Till later times English Shirleis taught
The use of foot, and how to entrench a Campe. (E2r)

In this continuing discourse on the “disciplines of war” (Shakespeare, Henry F,
3.3.96-7), Younker could be Fluellen himself. Like all his fathers discourses
before him, his has its own nationalistic and nostalgic agenda praising foot over
horse, “[w]hen Henry th’ eight of famous memory, / Wan Bolleigne from the
French” (Fv). Here again the Tudor myth firmly founded on continental vic
tories.
Both Belchier and Dekker reinscribe Anglo-Dutch relations after their
own fashion to further nationalist agendas, be they attempts to solidify support
for foreign wars amongst all strata of London society or attempts to remember
an earlier age when English glory was gained on Dutch soil. In that sense, they
invert our opening joke, which operates on its own kind of nostalgia. Written
in the mid-seventeenth century when the royal houses of England and the
Dutch Republic were linked in marriage, Peachams joke fondly remembers a
much earlier Tudor England brought up on “local” ale instead of “foreign” beer,
and it evokes a mythical time when matters continental, be they hops or war,
did not threaten the English way of life. In The Shoemakers Holiday, Dutch
hard work not a threat but rather a support for the morality tale of Eyres rise.
Beer becomes a sign of holiday festivities but also of comradeship, even across
classes. Hans Beer-Pot similarly signifies good fellowship across the various
orders as “two cans of your best English beere” (Er). Its mid-Jacobean nostal
gia looks back at closer Anglo-Dutch relations under Elizabeth and fantasizes
a home away from home for Englishmen like Belchier himself amongst the
Anglophilic Dutch community of Utrecht. In both plays, hopped beer com
bines the best of Dutch and English spirits.
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Notes
An earlier and much different version of this paper focussing on the Henriad
was delivered at “Reinterpretations: the New Heaven, New Earth of the Past,”
the 23rd annual regional meeting of the Northwest Conference on British
Studies at the University of Oregon (October 11-12, 1991). For their helpful
suggestions, I would like to thank the anonymous reader forJx, Judith Bennett,
Michael Bristol, Ivo Kamps, Seth Lerer, Ania Loomba, Ron Rebholz, David
Riggs, Bradley Rubdige, and Paul Seaver. Derede Arthur shared her expertise
on nationalism; Jeff Erickson alerted me to the Dickensian usage of “Hollands.”
I especially would like to thank the staffs of the libraries at the University of
California at Berkeley, the British Museum, the Corporation of London
Record Office, the University of California, Davis, the Guildhall, Mississippi
State University, the Public Record Office (Chancery Lane), and Stanford Uni
versity for their generous support. The essay is dedicated to S. Smith, J. Tetley,
and T. & R. Theakston.
1. While I'm more interested in national identity expressed in terms of
alcohol, the English traditionally viewed themselves as superior to other Euro
peans and explained their idleness by pointing to the paradise in which they
lived. Thus Richard Morison in condemning the Pilgrimage of Grace notes the
difference between the English and other Europeans: “Other men, that are
borne in bare countreys, and can not lyue, onles they moche trauayle the world,
auoyde myserie by their great labour and toyle. In Englande the grounde
almoste nourisheth us alone. . . . God hath gyuen us to good a countrey, we
maye here to many of us lyue ydle” (E4v).
2. Defining nationalism and determining when it first arose is a vexed
problem in social and political theory. For some recent important work, see
Anderson; Armstrong; Colley, Britons 5-9; Corrigan and Sayer; Elton; Gellner;
Hechter 47-73; Helgerson; Newman; Samuel 1: 1-56; Anthony Smith; and
Tilly. According to Peter Sahlins, national identity is organized around “the
social or territorial boundaries drawn to distinguish the collective self and its
implicit negation, the other,” a formulation I find useful in my argument even
if the North Sea separates England from the Low Countries (270-1).
3. Here Helgerson's diachronic argument gets away from itself. The Irish
certainly did and do not share this English enthusiasm. Nor do the Scots, as
the recent devolution debates make clear.
4. The joke belongs to the genre, “There were three men, an x, a y, and a
z.” As Henri Bergson notes, “repetition is the favourite method of classic com
edy. It consists in so arranging events that a scene is reproduced either between
the same characters under fresh circumstances or between fresh characters
under the same circumstances” (121-2).
5. For good discussions of the changing relationship between the English
and the Dutch during the seventeenth century, see Duffy 27-31, and Edmund
son. Recently Wallace MacCaffrey has neatly summarized Anglo-Dutch rela
tions during Elizabeths reign: “For the English the long-term advantages were
equally important. The experience of the years since 1572 had made the estab
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lishment of an independent regime in the provinces an axiom of English poli
cy.... By 1585 it was painfully clear that only direct English intervention could
prevent the restoration of Spanish power in the Low Countries, wielded by a
monarch whose well-founded suspicion of English intentions was fast harden
ing into relentless enmity. ... By 1598 it was beginning to become apparent
that such a goal did not necessarily demand a general peace, that there was a
half-way house in which England could withdraw from active participation in
the Low Countries campaign without breaking altogether the cords that bound
her and the States-General in a common interest” (298). For more on eco
nomic and military rivalries, see Pincus, “Popery” and “Republicanism.”
6. See also Pettegree and Grell. In the census of 1567, 2030 out of 2730
aliens counted in London were Dutch (Kirk and Kirk 365). Similarly in 1573,
there were believed to be 60,000 Flemings in England (Traill and Mann 3:
500).
7. However, this lack of excessive drinking may be read negatively, as a
marker for the effeminacy of the French. As Alan Sinfield notes, “In Henry V,
the superior manliness of the English is so insisted upon that it comes to appear
the main validation of their title: because they are more manly than the French,
they are more fit to rule anywhere” (130).
8. For a general discussion of English travellers in the Low Countries, see
Stoye 239-325. For good discussions of alcoholic consumption in the Low
Countries, see Schama 189-220 and Van der Wee 126-8, 281-3.
9. For a more thorough discussion of this topic specifically and the role of
national identity generally in Renaissance drama, see Hoenselaars.
10.
Notice how most types of wine are assigned a nationality.
11. The translation is mine. The original runs “si d’auenture il mouroit
ainsi sou comme vn Angloys.”
12. Christopher Highley says that conceptually “the English organized
their Celtic neighbors through a network of flexible and shifting relationships
that allowed the English to both distinguish and where appropriate make
strategic connections between them” (92). For more on Britains and Others,
see Colley, “Britishness and Otherness” 309-29.
13. Consumption data for the early modern period is notoriously hard to
come by and unreliable. Josephine A. Spring and David H. Buss note that
“[b]eer consumption reached a maximum of 832 pints per person pr yr (or 2.3
pints pr person pr day) in 1689” (568). However, in The English Alehouse, Peter
Clark notes that “[i]n 1545 soldiers in the English garrison at Boulogne prob
ably drank about 4 1/2 gallons each of beer a week or rather more than 2 quarts
a day” (109).
14. Today the terms ale and beer have collapsed to have basically the same
meaning, but in terms of sixteenth-century brewing they had quite distinctive
significations; ale was traditionally and then legally a mixture of fermented
malt, water, and yeast; beer substituted hops for the yeast. For the legal defin
ition of ale, see London Letter Books L 31. For a good explanation of the tortu
ous semantic transformations of the terms “ale” and “beer,” see Mathias xvii-xix.
15. Intriguingly, gin, first distilled by Franciscus Sylvius in Leiden in the
seventeenth century, has a similar cultural history. The beverage was intro-
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duced to England by soldiers returning from the Low Countries. Late into the
nineteenth century, gin was also called Hollands. The standard work on the
Dutch brewing industry remains R. Dekkers Holland in Beroering,
16. Clark 31-2; Mathias 3-4; and Monckton
The etymologies of beer
and hops in the OED illustrate the changing nature of this reception. Hops is
first mentioned c. 1440 as a plant used in the brewing process. Beer, while an
ancient English word,
rarely used in Old English, except in poetry. It
becomes common only in the sixteenth century, just as the product takes off.
17. To this day Kentish hops are among the finest in the world and high
ly sought after. Anchor Steam, a San Francisco microbrewery, imports Kentish
hops for its fine ales and beers.
18.
Two other versions of the ditty are extant:
Hops and turkeys, carp and beer
Came into England all in one year

and
Turkeys, carps, hops, pickerel, and beer
Came into England all in one year.

Note that this tune already highlights the unique nature of England's insulari
ty; outside products had to come into England. This ditty provides the tradi
tional but unprovable date of 1524 for cultivated hops introduction to England
by the Dutch.
19. Perhaps the use of sulfuring, whereby sulfur was added to old hops as
a preservative, accounts for the ban on brimstone; however, the hellish conno
tations of fire and brimstone were a commonplace. See Genesis 19:24 and Rev
elations 19:20 in the Geneva Bible,
20. This how-to manual was so popular that it went through three editions
in four years.
21. A century later, Culpeper wrote of “such things only as grow in Eng
land, they being most fit for English bodies” (title page), in which he included
hops.
22. Hudson mistakenly translates “cervesiam” as beer; however, the foreign
nature of the drink and its relation to the fine are worth noting.
23. Here “forreyner” is a wider term denoting anyone not free of the city,
but that would include foreigners in the more modern sense. As Ian Archers
notes, “immigrants mainly from the Netherlands and France” were typically
called “strangers or aliens” (131).
24. Gregory A. Austin provides a useful caveat: “Camden, Nashe, and
Shakespeare, among others blame this [prevalence of drunkenness] on Dutch
influence, but it is also clearly rooted in a variety of major domestic changes
occurring since at least the mid-century” (180).
25. John Gerarde demonstrated the English turnips relationship to the
Dutch in two ways. First, “[i]t groweth in fields and divers vineyardes, or hoppe
gardens in most places of England” (178; emphasis added). Second,
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They of the lowe countries does give the oile which is pressed out of the
seede, against the after throwes of women newly brought to bed, and also
do minister it to yoong children against the wormes, which it both killeth
and driveth foorth. (178)

The significance of turnip husbandry for the four-crop rotation system which
spawned Englands agricultural revolution was a discovery of the mid-seven
teenth century (Kerridge 269-77). For the standard interpretation of the
turnip, see Smallwood and Wells’ edition of The Shoemakers Holiday (Dekker
125, n. 139-40).
26.
Confusing the Dutch and the German is typical of this period.
27. Here contemporaries have it both ways: they see England as distinct
from Europe and in some ways safe, but they also note that their island occu
pied by other “races,” especially the Scots — some of whom display French
Catholic leanings. The fear of Scotland or Wales proving a backdoor into Eng
land for Catholic forces proved prescient with the Jacobite invasions of the
eighteenth century, even if the invasions themselves failed.
28.
Surely this remark is a nod towards Dekker s play.
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My title refers to a moment in act 3, scene 4 of Mac
after Banquo’s ghost has disrupted the quiet of
Macbeths conscience. Left alone with Lady Mac
beth, who has hastened their guests’ departures, Mac
beth murmurs, “It will have blood, they say; blood
will have blood” (121). These lines provide the con
text for my reading of the play, in which the bloody
competition for preferment and power implicated in
absolute systems of monarchy is doomed to cycle of
failure and repetition. “To be thus is nothing, / But
to be safely thus” (3.1.47-8), Macbeth discovers, so
that Duncans blood is only the first that must be
shed in Macbeths chase after an ever-illusive state
security. Thus, blood calls to itself; the violence upon
which his precarious authority stands breeds more
violence. Comforted by his wife, however, Macbeth
abandons his hysteria and confirms the dialects of
this logic: “Come, we’ll to sleep. My strange and
self-abuse / Is the initiate fear that wants hard use: /
We are yet but young in deed” (3.4.141-3). Mac
beth’s ability to shake off his terror and his doubt to
refocus his attention on the bloody business of kingship ever before him is enabled, I will argue, by Lady
Macbeth, who gives him the image of himself he
seeks. Thus Shakespeare’s tragedy interrogates the
tyranny of absolute monarchical practices that the
playwright divorces from naturalized gender con
structions by placing Lady Macbeth at the center of
the play’s violence. While she is often read as rup
turing her designated gender function, I argue that


beth
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she provides a parodic inversion of the ideal wife and allows Shakespeare to put
pressure on masculinist and violent structures of relations that depend on
womens abject confirmation for their unremitting self-perpetuation.
Lady Macbeths "evil” is, in this regard, an ideologically inscribed notion
that is often linked in our literary tradition to strong female characters who
seek power, who reject filial loyalty as prior to self-loyalty, and who pursue
desire in all its forms — romantic, adulterate, authoritarian, and even violent.
Evil, then, is a gender-linked concept that reifies constructions of action as
definitive of masculinity. I want to suggest that Shakespeare’s tragedy presents
a complex vision of gender and power, which, rather than reinscribing binary
oppositions of male/female, active/passive, and good/evil, exposes structures of
violence and tyranny as dependent on naturalized definitions of femininity and
masculinity. Macbeth explores a system of power relations that requires both
mens glorification of violence and women s renunciation of desire for a phantasmatic stability.1 That women in power seem to behave like men suggests
that binary oppositions are cultural fabrications. Thus Shakespeare uncovers
the gender trouble2 behind the prescriptions that constitute femininity as com
pliance, masculinity as violence, and violence as power.
Lady Macbeths place in critical history one of almost peerless malevo
lence.3 Scholars argue that she violates the dictates of gender by conjuring the
spirits to “unsex” her. When she encourages Macbeths violence by questioning
his manhood, she is perceived not just as shrewish but as the play’s source for
the definition of masculinity as violence.4 In her defense of Lady Macbeth,5
Joan Larsen Klein writes,

In spite of the view of some critics that Lady Macbeth
the evil force
behind Macbeth’s unwilling villainy, she seems to epitomize the sixteenth
century belief that women are passive, men active. . . . Lady Macbeth’s
threats of violence, for all their force and cruelty, are empty fantasies. (244)
Klein suggests that Lady Macbeth’s femininity absolves her of evil, fusing
female action with evil and passivity with a naturalized femininity. Despite the
poststructuralist and feminist practice of questioning monolithic, essentialist
readings of subjectivity, critics find it all too easy to resort to more traditional,
even moralized, analyses, so that they ignore cultural imperatives constructing
gender norms and vilifying deviation.6 My analysis of Lady Macbeth begins,
in this regard, not by measuring her behavior according to naturalized pre
scriptions of appropriate and inappropriate , feminine conduct but by probing
the cultural injunctions — invoked by the play’s politics of gender and violence
— governing her conduct.7
The violence underwriting the structures of power in place prior to Lady
Macbeth's encouragement of Macbeth’s violence, in this regard, cannot simply
be cast off when a woman contemplates power. Shakespeare succeeds in high
lighting the brutality of absolute monarchy by placing power in the hands of a
woman who approaches it not according to “womanly” virtues of mercy and
reconciliation but according to politically expedient and pragmatic notions of
suspicion, deception, and death. I urge a reading of Lady Macbeth at least
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resembling the complexity of scholarly views of Lear, Edmund, Edgar, Duncan,
Macbeth, and Macduff, who are often read sympathetically despite the violent
and ruthless competition for preferment and power in which they take part.
Such reading is possible despite Alan Sinfield's contention that Lady Macbeth
“is not a character,” and it can be made within the very paradigm of character
analysis that he advocates (Faultlines 78, 61-6). Rather than violating and then
collapsing back into a natural (and prior) passive feminine conduct, Lady Mac
beth performs gender according to the fluctuating politics of power and vio
lence staged by Macbeth. Just as the violent cultural context of the play provides
competing discourses for Macbeth, it enables and, in part, encourages a shift
ing set of responses from Lady Macbeth that are simultaneously “masculine”
brutality and “feminine” obedience. If she does indeed transgress her gender to
become manly, therefore, it is because she must do so to reflect — as conduct
manuals demand — the bloody desire of her husband. That tracts on women’s
conduct cannot be said, literally, to demand anything of the kind is less impor
tant than the submission they do demand, which can be misunderstood, mis
recognized as a constant and unquestioning feminine compliance with the
desires of the masculine.8
In this light, Lady Macbeths encouragement of her husbands regicide can
be read as Shakespeares parodic depiction of wifely duty. Set within a structure
of power dependent on violence for stability, Lady Macbeth’s behavior adheres
to rather than transgresses her gender role. Macbeth comprises a radical staging
of female gender, then, that contextualizes womens desire in hostile patrilineal9
structures and points to a cultural manufacturing of femininity as passive, ten
der, and merciful. Because Lady Macbeth reproduces the bloody competition
for preferment and power ostensibly inherent to masculinity, Macbeth demon
strates the artificiality of gender divisions; and because Shakespeare underscores
the brutality of patrilineal power regardless of the gender of its perpetrator or
the “legitimacy” of a given monarch, the moral distinctions traditionally
informing critical reception of state power and violence become uncertain. The
differentiation between that which
socially sanctioned and that which is
abject, in Kristeva’s terms,10 uncovered in its ideological fragility. The abject
is located not within a feminine chaos but rather in the masculinist competition
for property and domination that builds on a ruthless denial of female desire.
Macbeth, in this light, uncovers the complex dynamics of gender and power
through representation of a ruthless female character who reproduces the vio
lent practices of a masculinist order. That we often fail to sympathize with
Lady Macbeth says more about our own moralized expectations of femininity
and masculinity, I argue, than it does about Shakespeare’s own sense of gen
der.11

2.
Many critics have noted the play’s association of manliness with violence and
power. However, these scholars do not extend their analysis of Macbeth's por
trayals of masculinity to Lady Macbeth’s gender role, despite the fact that both
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the play's valorization of masculine brutality and Lady Macbeths performance
of femininity are produced by the same socio-symbolic system.12 To begin fill
ing this void, I argue that the plays monarchical structure, sustained by brutal
competitions for preferment and power, compels Lady Macbeths support of
Macbeths regicide, so that Lady Macbeth can be read as performing gender
according to Lacans conception of male/female roles, which are governed by
the phallus.13 Rather than embodying evil within the play, Lady Macbeth
encourages her husband to seize the power requisite to ruthless patrilineal
order. I want to make clear that Lady Macbeths role as the phallus is not a bio
logical imperative but, as I have argued elsewhere in regard to feminine
masochism (see “Staging”), the product of cultural injunctions that, Kahn has
brilliantly shown (MansEstate 1-20), not only define mens honor and womens
value according to womens virtue but require womens obedience to their
fathers’ and husbands’ every desire in order to maintain that virtue. Lacan’s
theorization of phallic gender prescriptions, then, describes in psychoanalytic
terms internalized cultural mandates on gender performance — cultural man
dates that limit female action and desire to male agency.14
My interpretation of Lady Macbeth situates her phallic position within a
historically specific cultural production of early modern monarchical power and
gender configurations. Macbeth desires the power to usurp the throne, and,
subject to his desire, Lady Macbeth
compelled to reflect its fulfillment.
While the nature of her guarantee and of Macbeth’s ability to embody such
power/violence is illusory, the law drives both of them to perform gender
according to phallic principles. Because the patrilineal structure of power in
Macbeth is already based on a brutal and violent hierarchy of relations, Lady
Macbeth’s encouragement of her husband to commit regicide conforms to the
brutality of the play’s structure of authority and domination. Macbeth, in this
sense, problematizes a patrilineal system of relations based on violence for its
stability and perpetuation. This political backdrop to the tragedy suggests that
Lady Macbeth’s actions find their brutal source in both the monarchical and
gender structures of power already in place rather than in a primordial and nat
uralized maxim for feminine good and evil.
I take my argument from the Lacanian conception of female and male sub
jectivities, which are governed spectrally, as a phantasmatic "being” of and "hav
ing” the phallus, a structure that determines relations between the sexes. The
phallus, as Elizabeth Grosz explains, "is both the signifier of the differences
between the sexes and the signifier which effaces lack and thus difference. It
the term with respect to which the two sexes are defined
different, and the
term which functions to bring them together, the term of their union” (117).15
This difference, which Grosz explores in detail, is embedded in the construc
tion of female sexuality as lack, "that is, as lacking the phallus in order for men
to be regarded as having it” (119). The phallus, therefore, becomes the sym
bolic site of difference between men and women, that which distinguishes them
from one another in culture and "brings them together” in a union predicated
on the fulfillment of masculine desire. Thus, Grosz argues, Lacan’s choice of
the phallus as the point of difference between men and women in the symbol
ic order reproduces male and female inequality (122). The phallus comes to
represent male power and naturalizes men’s control over the home, the market
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place, and the government. Women lack not just the penis but power. Men, in
possession of the phallus (the penis for which the phallus stands in symboliza
tion), become the subjects of desire, the agents of power, those whose desire
must be guaranteed. It through the masculine need for fulfillment that the
woman becomes the phallus, “is” it in the sense that she becomes the mimetic
reflection, the ventriloquized guarantor, of mans desire. Male dominance and
female obedience and passivity become naturalized through this symbolic
bifurcation. Though Lacan asserts, then, in “The Meaning of the Phallus,” that
the relations governed by the phallus have nothing whatever to do with the
social or the cultural but only with the “other scene” of the unconscious (79),
we can see that they are indeed descriptive of socio-political relations between
the sexes in a heterosexual matrix.16 In this sense Lady Macbeth confirms —
as both witness and support — the masculinist violence and power her husband
values, performs as warrior, and desires in his fantasy of kingship.
My reading of Lady Macbeth as the phallus is indebted to Judith Butler,
who emphasizes womens function within the binary and extends and critiques
Lacans theorization. She argues that gender is a performance, a reading that
she bases on Lacans assertion that “it is in order to be the phallus . . . that the
woman will reject an essential part of her femininity, notably all its attributes
through masquerade. It for what she is not that she expects to be desired
well as loved” (84). In response to this passage, Butler writes:
The term [masquerade]
significant because it suggests contradictory
meanings: On the one hand, if the “being,” the ontological specification of
the Phallus, is masquerade, then it would appear to reduce all being to a
form of appearing, the appearance of being, with the consequence that all
gender ontology is reducible to the play of appearances. On the other hand,
masquerade suggests that there is a “being” or ontological specification of
femininity prior to the masquerade, a feminine desire or demand that is
masked and capable of disclosure, that, indeed, might promise an eventual
disruption and displacement of the phallogocentric signifying economy.
(47)

Two important points become manifest. First, gender is a performance consti
tuted by oppositional phallic relations. Second, the performance of femininity
compels women’s renunciation of desire in favor of the desire of the Other.
That renunciation presupposes a repressed desire, a desire that must be
repressed in order to support the desire of the Other, so that the Other will
have power (the phallus). That female desire is denied in order for male desire
to be fulfilled suggests that female desire, outside phallic precepts, threatens
male desire. To neutralize that threat, female gender is constructed into a
reflection of the desire of the Other. The dialectics of this matrix point to the
phallus’s socio-political underpinnings, which, I would suggest, are reflected
throughout early modern culture but perhaps most profoundly in the manuals
on women’s conduct.
Despite the new emphasis on companionate marriage that emerges in the
period, liberal humanist Juan Luis Vives invokes a tradition in which (sexually)
rebellious daughters are murdered by fathers, brothers, and other women:17
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Hippomenes, a great man of Athens, when he knew his daughter desoiled
of one, he shut her up in a stable with a wild horse, kept meatless. ... In
Spain ... two brethren that thought their sister had been a maid, when they
saw her great with child, they dissembled their anger so long as she was
with child. But as soon as she was delivered ... they thrust swords into her
belly and slew her. . . . [T]hree maidens with a long towel strangled a maid
that was one of their companions, when they took her in the abominable
deed. (105-6)

Vives’ text, through its advocation of education for women, sets up a curricu
lum that teaches women to mimic a masculinist moral order. He conjures
female “evil” to exorcise it and constructs a virtuous female subject compelled
to reflect the desire of the masculine other. In this regard, then, as Butler con
tends, women confront“a strategy of survival within compulsive systems [that
makes] gender
performance with clearly punitive consequences” (139).
Lacan’s paradigm, therefore, in which women “are” the phallus so that men
“have” the phallus, juridically controlled. And it is this cultural and symbol
ic system that I suggest staged in Macbeth.
What this means, then, for a reading of Lady Macbeth that she has been
scapegoated in Shakespearean criticism as the source of violence in the play.
For if she functions
the guarantor of Macbeth’s bloody desire, she cannot be
said in any way to assert her own desire or ambition. Lady Macbeth must
encourage her husband’s desire to be king, for she is required by the symbolic
order to act
his Other, as the object who, through her lack, supplies his
potency. My argument abandons the moralized reading of Lady Macbeth for a
psychoanalytic one18 to interrogate what I see to be a lingering tendency in the
literary criticism of female characters to ignore the fractured and multiple
nature of subjectivity and to posit instead a totalizing account of it. Such read
ings fail to consider the circumscribed nature of Lady Macbeth’s (among other
female characters’) desire, which, as tracts produce it, must be the fulfillment of
masculine power. These analyses also assume an individualized agency unsup
ported both by antifeminist tracts on women’s nature and by laws such as those
documented in T. E.’s The Laws Resolutions of Womens Rights. Lady Macbeth
must reflect, on pain of public humiliation, her husband’s desires, so that her
responsibility for the play’s violence is complicated by the phallic prescriptions
determining her gender function in Macbeth's masculinist culture of violence.
Lady Macbeth’s relationship to the witches, in this light, is more tenuous
than critics have often assumed.19 Their representation as spectral apparitions
sets them apart from Lady Macbeth, whose role in the tragedy is circumscribed
fundamentally by the material conditions governing gender, economic, and
hierarchical relations.20 The witches’ gender instability, uncanny powers, and
malevolence toward men embody typical early modern anxieties about female
agency. Yet it not at all clear that the witches are human, female or male, but
only that they hold power over mortal men. Such uncertainty, compounded by
the threat such power holds, sets them apart from the material conditions reg
ulating Lady Macbeth’s performance of gender. Thus the “feminine evil” they
represent is phantasmatic because their powers are specifically fantastic, other
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worldly. “Real” evil, it would seem, can only be represented by supernatural
rather than human beings. Thus their characterization highlights such evil as
belonging to mystical and specialized realms of existence, to conjuration of
spirits. While Lady Macbeth mimics their language, her actions cannot be read
in the same light as those of the witches because she must function within the
cultural and ideological limitations of her society. The witches, on the other
hand, do not function within those limits.
Lady Macduff, however, subject to the same societal restrictions as Lady
Macbeth. Both women are deserted by husbands driven by masculinist honor
to participate in the plays violence. Lady Macduff, like Lady Macbeth, must
remain at home as tyranny rages and await her husbands return. Whether
through passivity or through active encouragement, then, both women must be
read as parties to a structure of power dependent on violence for stability.
While Lady Macduff critiques her culture’s brutality when she informed of
the danger she and her children face, she is as powerless against it as is Lady
Macbeth:
Whither should I fly?
I have done no harm. But I remember now
I am in this earthly world — where to do harm
Is often laudable, to do good sometime
Accounted dangerous folly. Why then, alas,
Do I put up that womanly defense,
To say I have done no harm? (4.2.73-9)
Lady Macduff’s impotence in the face of danger points to Goldberg’s claim that
“masculinity in the play is directed as an assaultive attempt to secure power, to
maintain success and succession, at the expense of women” (259). While Lady
Macduff’s critique implies her conception of some other socio-political system
of relations, changing the play’s structure of gender and power fails in the face
of the patriarchal law that that structure reflects. Neither the “evil” of the
witches nor the “goodness” of Lady Macduff, then, need mar my complication
of critical visions of Lady Macbeth. The former underscore the phantasmatics
of feminine “evil,” and the latter’s inability to act against her unavoidable, albeit
passive, confirmation of a masculinist philosophy of violence conforms to the
same phallic prescriptions governing Lady Macbeth.
I want to make clear that I am not suggesting that Shakespeare in any way
supports the violence of Macbeth and Lady Macbeth but that in his examina
tion of a patrilineal order dependent on women’s renunciation of desire, he par
odies early modern conceptions of “appropriate” femininity. The period
marked by proliferation of tracts defining ideal femininity, and while pam
phleteers vary in method, they all agree that female virtue demands a sexual and
moral submission to fathers and husbands. As Constance Jordan has argued,
women’s participation in the economic exchange that stabilizes such power
implies a coercion (44). In Macbeth, however, patrilineal standards of “appro
priate” femininity are turned upside down. If “being” the phallus demands
women’s unquestioning obedience in a culture dependent on the violent acqui-
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sition and protection of power, then the possibilities of a Lady Macbeth who
unquestioningly assists her husband to commit regicide can be imagined. In
this light, Lady Macbeth is not an anomaly of female evil too gross to be imag
ined but a woman whose actions conform to a masculinist culture of violence.

3.
The political structure of Macbeth, as headed by Duncan, traditionally has been
accepted by critics as a legitimate and therefore inviolable government. Signif
icantly, however, several scholars have begun to question that point of view,
among them Alan Sinfield, who interrogates the assumptions valorizing "vio
lence [as] good . . . when it is in the service of the prevailing dispositions of
power; when it disrupts them, it evil” (“History” 63).21 Sinfield’s reading of
Macbeth asks what the difference between absolutism and tyranny, “between
Macbeths rule and contemporary European monarchs?” (65). The answer is,
finally, none. He argues against the necessity of a Jamesian reading of the play
that “attempt[s] to render coherent and persuasive the ideology of the Abso
lutist State” (66), and suggests instead that Buchanans History of Scotland may
constitute part of Macbeth's ideological design. Sinfield contends that, by iden
tifying Mary Queen of Scots as both legitimate ruler and tyrant and her
deposers as both usurpers and lawful inheritors, Buchanan offers an alternative
to the critical assumption that Macbeth was written with James’s Basilikon
Doron in mind (64-8). While Sinfield admits the play can be read as support
ing Macbeths opponents, he points out that

Macbeth kills two people at the start of the play: a rebel and a king, and
these are apparently utterly different acts of violence. That the [Jame
sian] ideology of Absolutism. Macduff also, killing Macbeth, is killing
both a rebel and a king, but now the two are apparently the same person.
The ultimate intractability of this kind of contradiction disturbs the Jame
sian reading of the play. (67)
Sinfield's analysis is apt, effectively disrupting the long-standing reading of the
Macbeths’ inherent evil. Legitimate and illegitimate power are exposed as ide
ological fictions, as putative guarantees of stability to those in power. That
James may have liked the play and allowed its continued performance suggests
that Shakespeare succeeded in staging the complexities at stake in absolutist
government: Duncan’s murder, followed by Macbeth’s inevitable downfall, fol
lowed by Malcolm’s ascension, can support a Jamesian reading that depends on
seeing Macbeth as “a complete usurping tyrant in order that he shall set off the
lawful good king, [and therefore] not... be a ruler at all in order that he may
properly be deposed and killed.” But these events can also be read as promot
ing the need to depose all tyrants — legitimate or illegitimate. As Kinney
observes, the play ends in unsettling echoes of Macbeth’s rise to power (155).
And missing from Malcolm’s scene of victory, he also points out, Donalbain,
“who, Holinshed tells us, will return at a later date to kill King Malcolm[,] in
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turn to take the throne himself.” The spectral nature of legitimate and illegit
imate rule, then, haunts Shakespeare’s tragedy and suggests that the violence of
Macbeth and Lady Macbeth subject to a more complex set of circumstances
than moral denunciations of them
Macbeth begins with the weird sisters’ chant that “Fair foul, and foul is
fair” (1.1.11), so that conventional distinctions between good and evil are
immediately under question. Macbeth echoes them in his observation, “So foul
and fair a day I have not seen” (1.3.38), but his speech following confirmation
from Rosse that he indeed Thane of Cawdor explicitly raises questions about
the relative moral divisions implicated in the honors promised him by the weird
sisters:
Two truths are told,
As happy prologues to the swelling act
Of the Imperial theme. . . .
This supernatural soliciting
Cannot be ill; cannot be good. If ill,
Why hath it given me earnest of success,
Commencing in a truth? I am Thane of Cawdor.
If good, why do I yield to that suggestion
Whose horrid image doth unfix my hair
And make my seated heart knock at my ribs,
Against the use of nature? (127-37)
We see in the weird sisters’ chant, in Macbeth’s observation about the weather,
and in his attempt to unravel the good and evil proposed by the images in his
mind the testing of absolute moral distinctions. Rather than pure exchange
of moral categories, the distinctions between foul and fair begin to blur. In
Macbeth’s conception of the patrilineal order, Duncan’s rewarding of his mili
tary prowess with the title Thane of Cawdor acknowledges his value as a war
rior. The title also expands his power. That the witches anticipate this news
accurately suggests to him that their identification of him as king is also accu
rate. To be king is to hold the highest, most valued and most powerful office,
and, he notes, such success cannot bode ill. Yet the news also conjures in his
mind the act of regicide that must be committed in order to be king. Such
imaginings cannot be good; yet these visions result from the good fortune
revealed to him by both the witches and Rosse. Good and evil merge rather
than remain polar and absolute opposites, so that traditional distinctions are
rendered insecure and phantasmatic. In this regard, Shakespeare establishes a
set of circumstances that elides evaluation through traditional moral divisions.
Similarly, I want to suggest that the basis for the play’s equation between
violence and masculinity is staged in act 1, scene 2 when Duncan learns that his
war against usurpers has been victorious.22 The sergeant describes the battle
between “[t]he merciless Macdonwald / (Worthy to be a rebel)” (9-10) and
brave Macbeth (well he deserves that name),
Disdaining Fortune, with his brandish’d steel,
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Which smok’d with bloody execution,
Till he unseam’d him from the nave to th’ chops,
And fix’d his head upon our battlements. (16-18, 22-3)
In his account, the sergeant identifies both the traitor’s and the defender’s acts
of violence as admirable. Duncan’s response to Macbeth’s brutality is: “O
valiant cousin, worthy gentleman!” (24). Violence becomes gentlemanly behav
ior when legitimized by the king. Macbeth’s bloody valor enhances his honor
and reputation, which are further increased when the sergeant adds a descrip
tion of the renewed assault on Macbeth and Banquo, who fought against those
new forces “As cannons overcharg’d with double cracks, so they / Doubly redou
bled strokes upon the foe. / Except they meant to bathe in reeking wounds”
(37-9). As James L. Calderwood observes, “Lady Macbeth may complain that
[Macbeth] is too full of the milk of human kindness ‘to catch the nearest way,’
but that
not the Macbeth we see on the heath enraptured by thoughts of
murder” (72). He is also not the Macbeth described by the sergeant. He
appears violent enough to commit murder, perhaps especially when his own
acquisition of power at stake.
Duncan rewards Macbeth for his violence with the title of Thane of Caw
dor. He also praises the sergeant for the honor of both his words and wounds.
Moreover, victory in battle for the Scots does not mean an end to the violence,
for Duncan orders the death of the current Thane of Cawdor as a traitor to his
kingdom. Macbeth’s reward is, then, a result of more bloodshed. The rebel
Cawdor’s violence, however, because it threatens those in power, is illegitimate,
evil, and punishable by death. The execution of Cawdor is therefore legitimate,
necessary to stabilize Duncan’s throne. The differences between legitimate and
illegitimate violence, it seems, are ideological fictions. Violence underwrites
both legitimate power and illegitimate usurpation. Rather than seeing Duncan,
then, as “the single source from which all good can be imagined to flow, the
source of benign and empowering nurturance, the opposite of that imaged in
the witches’ poisonous cauldron and Lady Macbeth’s gall-filled breasts” (Adel
man 132), we must also see him as part of the masculinist violence within the
play. The violence of Duncan’s war against the rebels, followed by Macbeth’s
murder of him and Macduff’s murder of Macbeth, demonstrates that structures
of power dependent on violence for survival breed the violence brought against
them. The patrilineal order’s very survival depends on “masculine” violence,
which is rewarded highly and praised as nobility and goodness. I want to
extend Sinfield’s analysis, therefore, to a reading of Lady Macbeth and her
putative “evil,” both because his work (along with that of Calderwood, Gold
berg, Kinney, Mullaney, and O’Rourke) complicates visions of the play as pit
ting transcendent good against transcendent evil, and because, as Sinfield’s
reading of Lady Macbeth as “not a character” indicates, a space for privileging
the experience of female characters in masculinist cultures of power and vio
lence needs carving out. Otherwise, violence and evil are all too easily displaced
onto female characters who are caught up in already established systems of bru
tality that they are compelled to guarantee.
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4.

If, then, Macbeth blurs the distinctions between good and evil monarchical
power, it should not be too great a leap to suggest that Lady Macbeths evil
might also be equally uncertain. When Lady Macbeth learns of her husband’s
encounter with the three weird sisters and asks the spirits “That tend on mor
tal thoughts” to “unsex [her] here, ! And fill [her] from the crown to toe topful
I Of direst cruelty!” (1.5.41-3), she is not creating the equation between cruel
ty and masculinity but asking for the masculine brutality necessary, according
to the configurations of the
to encourage violence.23 Having internalized
cultural injunctions to be the ready reflection of Macbeths desire, she seeks the
capacity for violence that he seems to request from her in his letter. Beyond the
valor he already possesses, attaining the power promised him by the weird sis
ters necessitates a revision in both their conceptions of legitimate violence.
Neely’s observation that Lady Macbeth asks “only for a perversion of her own
emotions and bodily functions” (328)
crucial; that Lady Macbeth requires
help to pervert her emotions suggests that she not innately wicked. Instead,
her plea signals the shift that her role as the phantasmatic guarantor of her hus
band’s capacity for murder requires her to make. In this regard, then, she calls
on spirits for masculine aggression because that what she lacks. And it is for
what she is not that, as Lacan tells us, she expects to be loved.
While Macbeth’s letter says nothing about regicide, his position in the line
of succession places him behind both Duncan’s sons, which he notes “is a step
I On which I must fall down, or else o’erleap, I For in my way it lies” (1.4.4850). In order to ventriloquize her husband’s desire for power, Lady Macbeth
conjures the spirits of mortality to
Come, you spirits
That tend on mortal thoughts, unsex me here,
And fill me from crown to toe topful
Of direst cruelty! Make thick my blood,
Stop up th’ access and passage to remorse,
That no compunctious visitings of nature
Shake my fell purpose, nor keep peace between
Th’ effect and [it]! Come to my woman’s breasts,
And take my milk for gall, you murth’ring ministers,
Wherever in your sightless substances
You wait on nature’s mischief! Come, thick night,
And pall thee in the dunnest smoke of hell,
That my keen knife see not the wound it makes,
Nor heaven peep through the blanket of the dark
To cry, “Hold, hold!” (1.5.40-54)
Lady Macbeth’s speech provides both a transgressive and parodic alternative to
that of Juliet, who conjures the night to “Come” and “Hood my unmann’d
blood, bating in my cheeks, I With thy black mantle” (Romeo andJuliet 3.2.10,
14-15). Shakespeare counters Juliet’s romantic idealization with Lady Mac-
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beth's parodic performance of the ideal wife. Night’s cloak, for Juliet, privatizes
rites of love; for Lady Macbeth, night's cloak privatizes rites of blood. Her
speech can be seen in light of Emily C. Bartels’ analysis of platea figures, the
revengers and villains in Shakespearean drama, whose soliloquies demonstrate
that
the idea of agency, of the subject’s ability to act as and on the self, at once
most vital and most vexed. . . . Their stories show us that, in Shakespeare
at least, agency and autonomy do not go hand in hand, that self-determi
nation takes place through and not despite popular forms and pressures,
and that the self’s dependence on those forms and pressures is a site of both
possibility and crisis. (175)

Bartels’ argument emphasizes the fractured nature of agency for characters such
as Lady Macbeth, who perform not only according to a theatrical pattern but
in line with a gender paradigm. Because her function is predicated on renun
ciation of her own desire, Lady Macbeth unquestioningly seeks to confirm her
husband’s ambition, notwithstanding her inability ever to do so. With the
promises of the weird sisters made word on the page before her and the knowl
edge of Macbeth’s “burnt. .. desire” (1.5.4) for the power promised him, Lady
Macbeth recognizes the requirements of her role. The act she plots to commit
(and which Macbeth conceives of on his own) is not evidence of an inherent
evil but of her subjection to the patrilineal order’s definitions of gender and
power. Thus the laws governing women position Lady Macbeth between cul
turally derived pressures and constraints compelling her to encourage Mac
beth’s bloody ambitions.
Lady Macbeth’s summoning, then, of the spirits to “Make thick [her]
blood, / Stop up the th’ access and passage to remorse, / That no compunctious
visitings of nature / Shake [her] fell purpose, nor keep peace between / Th’
effect and [it]!” (43-7) is a call for the spectral power a woman may have to
“chastise with the valor of [her] tongue” (27). Her speech is not motivated by
an individualized agency because it serves to support the power and desire of
another. Action for her, therefore, is always a fantasy with no substance. The
conjuration of spirits she attempts underscores the fantastic aspects of her role.
Lady Macbeth does not so much transgress her gender as she prepares for a
performance. Like an actor offstage who stretches, takes rhythmic breaths, and
murmurs a prayer to St. Genesius, Lady Macbeth seeks the phantasmatic state
of mind and body enabling a masquerade. Because the power Macbeth desires
lacks mercy, sympathy, and tenderness, she asks the spirits to thicken her blood
— to masculinize her — not because she wants to be a man but because her role
requires her to mime Macbeth’s necessarily ruthless, and equally masculine,
ambitions.
In this regard, she cruelly taunts Macbeth as he hesitates to commit regi
cide not because she seeks to emasculate him but because, on the contrary, her
role compels her to remind him of his culture’s expectations for masculinity.24
When Macbeth snaps at her in exasperation, “I dare do all that may become a
man; / Who dares [do] more none” (1.7.46-7), she reminds her husband of
his honor, of the honor, in fact, of his word:
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I have given suck, and know
How tender ’tis to love the babe that milks me;
I would, while it was smiling in my face,
Have pluck’d my nipple from his boneless gums,
And dash’d the brains out, had I so sworn as you
Have done to this. (54-9)

While Adelman contends that “Lady Macbeth’s image of murderously disrupt
ed nurturance .. . functions to subject Macbeth’s will to female forces” (134), I
would point out that the forces she conjures are those already underwriting the
play’s structures of power. When Garber asserts that Macbeth “becomes ... the
man-child his wife will bring to birth — and dash to shards” (154), she attrib
utes the play’s masculine brutality to Lady Macbeth. But Lady Macbeth’s
image symbolizes no more malevolent a force than Duncan’s praise of Mac
beth’s execution of Macdonwald as “gentlemanly” and of his praise of both the
sergeant’s wounds and words as smacking of honor.25 Her juxtaposition of the
love she felt for the son she nursed with a willingness to kill him is not evidence
of a lack of maternal feeling but of the monstrosity of her husband’s forswear
ing of his word. His oath to her, by this logic,
as sacred as that maternal
bond, and his forsaking of that oath is comparable, in her estimation, to the
murdering of a son. For a man to swear and then forswear as monstrous as
for a woman to kill the son and heir she nurtures.
Her success, then, is derived not from making Macbeth “imagine himself as
an infant vulnerable to her” (Adelman 137) nor from her ability to make him
“intimidated by her valor and stung by her taunts at his virility” (Kahn, Mans
Estate 181) but rather from her grasp of both male and female roles. She
invokes the masculinist honor with which her husband identifies as a soldier at
the same time that she taps the constructed masculine impulse in him toward
violence. His response confirms that impulse as also masculine: “Bring forth
men-children only!” he urges her, “For thy undaunted mettle should compose /
Nothing but males” (1.7.72-4). Macbeth recognizes in her not only the fear
lessness of a man but the maker of men. Re-masculinized by her words, he
again resolves to commit murder. His renewed conviction not spurred entire
ly by his wife, then, making her the evil instigator of murder, regicide.26
Rather, Macbeth recognizes her injunctions to be his own understanding of
bloody valor as not only valuable, admirable, and honorable but masculine, just
as Duncan found Macbeth’s violence gentlemanly. The absolute distinctions,
then, between a moralized, legitimate form of government stabilized through
violence and an immoral, illegitimate usurpation through violence collapse.

5.

Committing regicide, however, is simpler for Macbeth and Lady Macbeth in
theory than in fact. While drugging the grooms and placing the daggers in
Macbeth’s reach exhilarates Lady Macbeth, she admits “Had he not resembled
/ My father as he slept, I had done’t” (2.2.12-13). She
stopped from mur-
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dering Duncan herself because he represents for her the image of her father, the
law of the Father, in fact, which precludes her from action and compels her to
aid Macbeths action. Macbeth, however, expresses horror at having commit
ted the deed. When his wife urges him to return to the scene and leave the
daggers next to the grooms, he cries, ‘Til go no more. / I am afraid to think
what I have done; / Look on’t again I dare not” (47-9). And while Lady Mac
beth herself returns the daggers and smears the grooms with blood, the act of
regicide, counter to the law of the Father, has undone both of them. First, Lady
Macbeths chastising her husband not to “unbend your noble strength, to think
/ So brain-sickly of things” (42-3) fails to rouse Macbeths manhood
before.
The valor of her tongue, successful in planning Duncan’s murder, now falters.
And Macbeths military violence and power also fail him. He can only reply,
“To know my deed, ’twere best not know myself. / Wake Duncan with thy
knocking! I would thou couldst” (70-1). Their roles — being and having —
collapse in the face of their transgression. As Butler contends,
men are said to “have” the Phallus, yet never to “be” it, in the sense that the
penis not equivalent to that Law and can never fully symbolize that Law.
Hence, there a necessary or presuppositional impossibility to any effort
to occupy the position of “having” the Phallus, with the consequence that
both positions of “having” and “being” are, in Lacans terms, finally to be
understood as comedic failures that are nevertheless compelled to articulate
and enact these repeated impossibilities. (46)

By act 2, scene 2 just such a failure in the Macbeths’ gender positions has
occurred. The play’s culture of violence, which enabled Duncan’s murder and
enabled the polarization of gender roles into “appropriate” acts and behaviors,
collapses under the weight of the law of the Father. Macbeth’s regicide, even
within the constructions of a violent and brutal system of relations, transgress
es that law.
Critics have noted the shift in Lady Macbeth’s power once Duncan’s mur
der is committed. Both Klein and Williamson argue that Macbeth’s separation
of himself from his wife as he engages in further political machinations and
plots of murder effectively neutralizes Lady Macbeth’s conception of herself as
his wife and helpmate, sending her into her “feminine” madness. While I
would agree that Lady Macbeth is replaced by the witches in Macbeth’s confi
dence, Klein’s and Williamson’s readings reify the notion of femininity as passivity/madness (and also, therefore, as not-evil, which I have already noted in
Klein’s case). In their analyses, Lady Macbeth fails to sustain her “masculine”
power because she goes mad, and she descends into madness because Macbeth
rejects her
his dearest partner of greatness. While she cannot console or
advise her husband, I would emphasize that even in her madness her language
remains informed by masculinist structures of power. Though she is not effec
tive in recalling Macbeth to his guests as he challenges Banquo’s ghost, she con
tinues to encourage her husband in his course of action even when she is not
acquainted with the details of his plans. That by this point in the tragedy she
fails to do so confirms that “having” and “being” the phallus require constant
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shifting and fluctuation of gender-assigned acts. Failure, in this sense,
inevitably occurs only in anticipation of variation and repetition. What remains
constant is Lady Macbeths role as the feminine guarantor of her husbands
power. When she asks him “What’s to be done?” (3.2.44) in response to his
claim that “there shall be done / A deed of dreadful note” (43-4), Macbeth dis
courages her continued participation in his violence and urges his wife to “Be
innocent of the knowledge, dearest chuck, / Till thou applaud the deed” (45-6).
Clearly, her role as his “dearest partner of greatness” has altered. The reflection
of power he now desires requires his wife’s passivity.
Being the phallus by act 3, then, shifts to more traditional submissive obe
dience and inactivity. No longer an active participant in her husband’s machi
nations, Lady Macbeth must await others’ acts, like an audience member.27 It
at this point that the destructive nature of her phallic role becomes most
acute. Despite her desire to share with her husband an active role, she must
defer to his desire. We can see therefore that she denied any independence
as a subject because “being” the phallus requires a negation of herself of her own
desire always and already in favor of Macbeth’s. In this context, Lady Mac
beth’s insanity must be read not
an inherent feminine response but as the
effect of gender prescriptions. Her descent into madness and subsequent sui
cide, therefore, are responses to the subjectivity to which she consigned by her
culture and by her husband’s rejection of her in favor of the witches. Whether
in her function as the active guarantor of Macbeth’s brutal potential or as, at
this point, an innocent and silent guarantor of his role as king, Lady Macbeth
functions within constructions of female ontology requiring her to reflect back
to her husband his desires — regardless of her always, already inevitable failure
to do so.
That her role as the phallus implies a compulsion to repeat
evident in
Lady Macbeth’s sleepwalking scene, during which she painfully reenacts the
moments when she was closest to her husband, the most effective at remas
culinizing him and consoling him:

Fie, my lord, fie, a soldier, and afeard? What need we fear who knows it,
when none can call our pow’r to accompt? ... No more o’ that, my lord, no
more o’ that; you mar all with this starting. . . . Wash your hands, put on
your nightgown, look not so pale. I tell you yet again, Banquo’s buried; he
cannot come out on’s grave.... To bed, to bed; there’s knocking at the gate.
Come, come, come, come, give me your hand. What’s done cannot be
undone. To bed, to bed, to bed. (5.1.36-9, 43-5, 62-4, 66-8)
In her madness, Lady Macbeth searches for her role as her husband’s partner in
greatness, for her role as the voice of violence and comfort, piercing logic and
reassuring calm. Macbeth’s search for power as offered to him by the weird sis
ters has taken that role away from her. Lady Macbeth’s reenactment of the role
she played before Macbeth urged her to remain innocent of his actions suggests
a frustration with her role as a wife awaiting her husband’s return from war and
from the witches. Though she expresses guilt both in the repeated attempts to
wash the spot of blood from her hand and in her memory of Lady Macduff,
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Lady Macbeth relives the moments when she was most actively involved in.
public life and successful at enhancing her husband’s political power. But
because “being” the phallus subject to a set of circumstances under constant
fluctuation, Lady Macbeths desire to sustain an active partnership with Mac
beth is not just frustrated but must be denied because it does not reflect his
desire. In tracing the trajectory of her descent from sanity to insanity, we can
see that in Shakespeare’s play feminine madness
a response to “being” only
for an Other. Lady Macbeth’s insanity and suicide, therefore, interrogate polar
ized gender structures, revealing them to be destructive of female subjectivity.
Significantly, the same polarization also destroys Macbeth and ends his
reign. As Lady Macbeth ends her life in despair of her powerlessness, Macbeth
also ends his life steeped in masculinist violence:

I will not yield,
To kiss the ground before young Malcolm’s feet,
And to be baited with the rabble’s curse.
Though Birnan wood be come to Dunsinane,
And thou oppos’d, being of no woman born,
Yet I will try the last. Before my body
I throw my warlike shield. Lay on, Macduff,
And damn’d be him that first cries, “Hold, enough!” (5.8.27-34)
Macbeth’s defiance of the witches’ prophecy that Macduff, “from his mother’s
womb / Untimely ripp’d” (15-16), would defeat him illustrates his identifica
tion with the masculine role defined within the play. Valor, brutality, and brav
ery in battle are the values Macbeth takes with him into death. The bloody
virtues that Macbeth embodied and Duncan rewarded materially underwrite
Macbeth’s determination to stand against Macduff. Both husband and wife die
searching for that ruthless power in themselves valued by their culture. Both
die fixed within diametrically opposed gender roles: Lady Macbeth at home,
in private, through what is viewed traditionally by critics as the feminine act of
suicide, and Macbeth on the battlefield in defense of his power and name.

6.
Such an ending suggests not
much that evil is overcome by the good of a
legitimate monarch in Malcolm but that both the valorization of brutality and
violence as masculine and the polarization of gender roles into feminine pas
sivity and masculine action are doomed to self-perpetuation and self-defeat.
Like the ending of King Lear, which I have argued elsewhere takes no comfort
in Edgar’s legitimate acquisition of the throne (see “King Lear’s Immoral’
Daughters”), Malcolm’s ascension to the crown in Macbeth affords no transcen
dental assurance that goodness reigns again. That Malcolm may be better than
the alternative does not suggest that the system itself gains stability or that cor
ruption comes to an end. For if we are to take seriously his declaration to Mac
duff that within himself are “ [a]ll the particulars of vice so grafted / That, when
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they shall be open’d, black Macbeth / Will seem as pure as snow, and the poor
state / Esteem him as a lamb, being compar’d / With my confineless harms”
(4.3.51-5), then we must read the ending of Macbeth as nihilistically recupera
tive of the same state-sponsored violence under both Duncan and Macbeth.
While many critics argue that Malcolms claims are disingenuous, designed to
test Macduff’s loyalty to the Scottish throne and to Malcolm himself, I would
argue that the textual evidence for such a test
slippery. While Malcolm
indeed expresses doubts about Macduff’s loyalties, the ambiguity of his claim
that Macduff "Wip’d the black scruples” from his soul and reconciled his
thoughts to Macduff’s “good truth and honor” (116-7) makes it uncertain
whether Malcolm rejecting suspicion of Macduff or his own tyrannical ten
dencies.28 I favor the latter reading, so that if he tests Macduff, he tests Mac
duff’s (hopefully unlimited) ability to wink at monarchical depravity.
Macduff at first passes such a test. Malcolm’s claims to unsatisfiable sexu
al appetites (60-6), earns from Macduff comfort that “We have willing dames
enough” (73). Having won Macduff’s willingness to overlook these faults, Mal
colm only reverses his claim to tyranny when Macduff can no longer support a
monarch so utterly devoid of graces such as “justice, verity, temp'rance, stable
ness, / Bounty, perseverance, mercy, lowliness, / Devotion, patience, courage,
fortitude,” (92-4), and who promises: “Nay, had I pow’r, I should / Pour the
sweet milk of concord into hell, / Uproar the universal peace, confound / All
unity on earth” (97-100). When Macduff rejects Malcolm and Scotland upon
Malcolm’s promises of utter depravity, Malcolm repudiates that evil in himself,
crediting the goodness he sees in Macduff and claiming that his “first false
speaking / Was this upon [him]self” (130-1). While he seems to claim a sin
less life heretofore, I would argue that we are meant to identify with Macduff’s
pregnant silence and apt response: “Such welcome and unwelcome things at
once / 'Tis hard to reconcile” (138-9).29 Yet Macduff was at first willing to sup
port Malcolm regardless of his lasciviousness because he retains legitimate
claim to the throne as Duncan’s son. When Macduff renounces his support,
Malcolm must reverse his claims to depravity, for, after all, Malcolm needs
Macduff to support his claim to power militarily, despite his right to it as heir.
Macduff to Malcolm what Macbeth was to Duncan: the great warrior whose
battle strength has retained his liege’s seat on the throne.
While critics have argued that the play sustains rather than interrogates
patrilineal forms of power (see Stallybrass 193-205), I argue Macbeth problematizes binary oppositions of king/tyrant, legitimate/illegitimate, good/evil,
active/passive, and male/female. Macduff’s skepticism in response to Mal
colm’s reversal suggests that the latter’s claim to goodness is suspect, that in
fact, a revision of power at the play’s end as no longer necessarily violent or
tyrannical
in doubt. The ending of Macbeth illustrates the potential for
tyranny within absolute monarchy, specifically when it defines masculinity as
murder and femininity as governed by injunctions to guarantee an inherently
unstable system based on patrilineal power.
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I have argued that in Macbeth gender performance
enabled by an already
established culture of violence, both of which are compelled to cycle of fail
ure and repetition. Lady Macbeths evil revealed, in this light, as the product
of a system of power relations dependent on both masculine brutality and
womens phallic guarantee for its stability and power. I want to take this argu
ment one final step to argue that Shakespeares play is a parodic staging of
“appropriate” femininity advocated by pamphlet writers such as Vives, Rych,
Whately, Pricke, and Swetnam, among others. The mandate that women “be”
the phallus, that they act to confirm patrilineal power, certainly the aim of
such pamphlet writers. But their injunction works spectrally to conjure and
then exorcise the “evil” of female desire, so that any real or original of female
nature is lost, unknown. The transgression of patrilineal law that pamphlet
writers attempt to exorcise almost always sexual — adulterous — and Lady
Macbeth’s transgression not. Yet her transgression
directly aimed at the
throat, if you will, of that law. Not only does she seek to “unsex” herself, she
does so in order actively to encourage her husbands regicidal desires.
In this regard, Shakespeare's characterization of Lady Macbeth interrogates
the patrilineal naturalization of femininity as good or evil depending on
womens support of or threat to masculine desire. He assumes the absolutism
of laws governing womens conduct and stages the consequences for women
when they are denied a right to desire outside the precepts of a masculinist
socio-political gender system. Her “power,” then, which subject to that sys
tem, is unmasked as phantasmatic, as a conjuration of ghosts. In her examina
tion of parody, Butler argues that

gender parody ... does not assume that there is an original which such par
odic identities imitate. Indeed, the parody is ofthe very notion of an orig
inal; just as the psychoanalytic notion of gender identification constitut
ed by a fantasy of a fantasy, the transfiguration of an Other who is always
already a “figure” in that double sense, so gender parody reveals that the
original identity after which gender fashions itself an imitation without
an origin. (138)
To parody early modern conceptions of ideal and evil femininity, Shakespeare
conjures a woman whose loyalty to her husband offends monarchical and moral
precepts. The absolutist categories of angel and monster that produce anxiety
in and of themselves, therefore, are set against the context of a society that
thrives on violence in order to parody, to exaggerate a set of masculinist values
that women are required to reflect and guarantee. If, under early modern
morality, women must function through a compliant and unquestioning affir
mation of the patrilineal order, thereby denying their own desire in favor of the
desire of another, then Shakespeare envisions a set of circumstances that his
audience must reject. The result is a parodic displacement of patrilineal moral
ity, exposing it as a shifting set of values that supports the prevailing disposi
tions of an inherently unstable power structure.
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Thus Shakespeare problematizes a structure of power relations compelling
all of its subjects to survive through an ideology of brutality, regardless of gen
der, uncovering both the false division of masculine and feminine ideals sup
ported in early modern tracts and the potential tyranny of the patrilineal order.
Whether victim or attacker, legitimate ruler or pretender, characters express
violent desires, specifically inked to contemporary definitions of masculinity.
Unmasked
politics of gender that demands brutality and discloses patrilin
eal configurations of governance and power based on the execution of kings as
well as traitors. In this regard, the play stages a kind of hyper-doubling that
Fineman has argued
the overarching theme of Shakespeares corpus (428):
Duncan’s execution of the traitor Cawdor is no less brutal, no less ruthless than
Macbeths battle murder of Macdonwald, than Macbeths murder of Duncan,
and finally than Macduffs murder of Macbeth. Banquo’s response to Mac
beth’s regicide is not outrage, nor does he report his suspicion of Macbeth’s
guilt to others because “it was said / It should not stand in thy posterity, / But
that myself should be the root and father / Of many kings” (3.1.3-6). Violence
serves power, and power sustained by violence. Banquo willing to wink at
regicide when his progeny’s acquisition of the throne is in view. Similarly,
Macduff’s personal loss when Macbeth kills his wife and child, and not the
treason of regicide, motivates his alliance with Malcolm, the rightful heir to the
throne. Rather than being unique to Macbeth and Lady Macbeth, therefore,
such self-interest underwrites all the play’s political maneuvers. When Dun
can’s, Macbeth’s, and Malcolm’s monarchies all depend on violence for stabili
ty, the distinctions between tyrant and king collapse. As fictions designed to
sustain those in power, legitimate and illegitimate forms of power are exposed
as the same: violent, ruthless, brutal. The addition of “masculinist” to that
equation and of Lady Macbeth’s putative transgression of femininity further
complicates a politics of gender.
Thus Shakespeare does not “mobilize the patriarchal fear of unsubordinat
ed woman” (Stallybrass 205) in his characterization of Lady Macbeth if we
acknowledge patrilineal injunctions specifying “appropriate” femininity as
behavior that compliantly (and impossibly, phantasmatically) confirms masculinist power.30 If a culture is defined and sustained by violence (which is
equated with masculinity and rewarded materially), then we cannot expect
women who are required to support their men’s acquisitions of such power to
act only insofar as they are “women” — weak, passive, nurturing. Having begun
to ask questions about the ruthlessness of patrilineal forms of power in King
Lear, Shakespeare drives the point home more forcefully, I would argue,
through a female character who on the surface seems more nightmarish than
Goneril and Regan, not just because she appears willing to commit infanticide
but because she encourages her husband to acquire power illegitimately, via
regicide. But as I have shown, Lady Macbeth’s transgression of “appropriate”
(compassionate and merciful) femininity is, instead, conduct in line with the
play’s masculinist violence. Lady Macbeth, rather than being the evil source of
violence within the play, a product of a masculinist and tyrannical structure
of power relations, so that she performs gender according to that structure’s
(often) violent mandates. “Blood will have blood” (3.4.121), Macbeth observes,
echoing, I would argue, Shakespeare’s notion of patrilineal structures of power.
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I would urge, therefore, that our contemporary condemnation of womens
brutality must be re-visioned, re-viewed — in Donna J. Haraway’s terms — lest
we reify conceptions of femininity and masculinity as split along traditional
binaries of passive/active, peaceful/violent, and good/evil, and thereby enable
moralized indictments of womens actions that we excuse in men (see Haraway
188-96). In this sense, we will abandon the myth of neutrality/objectivity to
ask ourselves why we label women such
Lady Macbeth evil and what forms
of power are served by labeling them evil. Very simply, if we mean, as feminists,
to argue that subjectivity is fractured, unstable, made up of splittings and indeterminacies, then we must reengage the female characters who have, until now,
embodied precisely the opposite in literary history. Neglecting such an analy
sis creates a hole in the logic of feminist criticism’s practice. It suggests that we
cannot pay attention to female characters we cannot fully admire, embrace, and
defend while simultaneously, and without question unintentionally, reinscribing
the split of subjectivity into gender norms. This is not a practice we take with
us into our daily political lives, where, for example, we deplore the need for
Hilary Rodham Clinton to prove her femininity, and by association her right
ful place among “first ladies,” by baking cookies. Clintons experience in Wash
ington has, in fact, been remarkably fraught with gender troubles reminiscent
of those in Shakespearean tragedy. A woman of power, of educational and pro
fessional accomplishments, she is either a kind of Lady Macbeth who engineers
the suicides of White House staff and then covers up key evidence to exempt
her husband from responsibility, or a Goneril whose lust for power not right
fully hers makes her an unnatural and inappropriate advocate for children and
national healthcare. While I do not mean to suggest that Shakespeares plays
offer a universal representation of the trouble with gender and power, I do want
to point out that very close to home we may be able to find models of gender
and power that may assist us to rethink our conceptions of Shakespeares female
subjects of tragedy.

Notes
1. Derrida argues that the commodity, as theorized by Marx, is a phantasmatic construction: “For if no use-value can in itself produce this mysticality or
this spectral effect of the commodity, and if the secret at the same time pro
found and superficial, opaque and transparent, a secret that
all the more
secret in that no substantial essence hides behind it, it is because the effect is
born of a relation (ferance, difference, reference, and difference), as double rela
tion, one would say as a double social bond” (154). Similarly, male and female
genders are phantasmatically structured through having and being the Phallus,
a relation of difference that, superficially, organizes male/female relations in
Macbeth. I use the term, then, both in its Derridean sense and as it is used by
Judith Butler: “Every effort to establish identity within the terms of this bina
ry disjunction of'being and 'having’ returns to an inevitable ‘lack’ and 'loss’ that
ground their phantasmatic construction and mark the incommensurability of
the Symbolic and the real” (44).
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2. I refer here and in my title to Butlers Gender Trouble: Feminism and the
Subversion of Identity, which provides the basis for my reading of Lady Mac
beth’s performance of gender. I discuss Butler’s analysis in detail in section 2 of
this essay.
3. For three articles that typify this argument see Harding; Davies; and
Schiffer. Even feminist critics, to whom I am indebted for having enabled my
argument, fail to question readings of Lady Macbeth as evil. Adelman identi
fies Lady Macbeth as a kind of nightmare mother, “the inheritor of the realm
of . . . infantile vulnerability to maternal power, of dismemberment and its
developmentally later equivalent, castration” (137). While Kahn asserts that
“the women Shakespeare portrays in \Antony and Cleopatra, Macbeth, and King
Lear] did not contrive their ideas of manliness out of whole cloth; they took
them from world managed by men” (Mans Estate 152), even she observes
twice that Macbeth “becomes [Lady Macbeth’s] kind of [bloody] man” (173,
182). Though Willis attempts to highlight the ambiguities in the play’s invo
cations of fair and foul, Lady Macbeth remains for her an annihilating mother
in pursuit of her own “vaulting ambition” (222). See also Garber, Coming ofAge
47, 153-5; Jardine 94-5, 97-8; and French, especially 245-8.
4. See Greene, who argues that the equation of masculinity with violence
originates in Lady Macbeth. His argument depends on an acceptance of tradi
tional gender configurations, so that Lady Macbeth’s desire to “unsex herself”
(1.5.41) in order to kill transgresses normalized gender configurations. See also
Bushnell 128-9; Callaghan, Woman and Gender 62, 124; and Richmond 20-4.
Liston (233) points out Duncan’s associations of manliness and violence; and
Kimbrough notes that Lady Macbeth mimics society’s definitions of masculin
ity and femininity (177, 183). For Garber, “gender undecidability and anxiety
about gender identification and gender roles are at the center of Macbeth —
and of Macbeth" (Shakespeare's Ghost Writers 97).
5. Dash offers a sympathetic reading of Lady Macbeth based on theatrical
and film interpretations of the play and its characters (see especially 155-207).
Belsey problematizes absolutist visions of women such as Lady Macbeth, Beat
rice-Joanna, Vittoria, Cleopatra, and Joan of Arc as chaotically evil. She writes,
“these figures are also in a sense heroic, and to this extent the plays offer their
audiences no single, unified position from which to judge the heroines who
refuse the place of silent subjection allotted to women” (184). Despite Belsey’s
instructive argument, moral judgments in regard to Lady Macbeth’s evil still
dominate her critical history.
6. My analysis of Lady Macbeth is guided by Dolan’s definition of post
structuralism and performance criticism: “Poststructuralism simply questions
liberal humanist notions that men and women are free individuals capable of
mastering the universe and points out the way in which ideology masked as
commonsensical truth. Poststructuralist performance criticism looks at the
power structures underlying representation and the means by which subjectivi
ty shaped and withheld through discourse. These are intensely political pro
jects” (94).
7. Carol Thomas Neely has argued that while cultural materialist and new
historicist theorists share with feminist theorists “the view that all discourse
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culturally specific and ideologically pregnant” (“Constructing the Subject” 6),
“cult-historicists,” as she nicknames them, continue to marginalize, displace,
erase, and allegorize women. My work
greatly indebted to many cultural
materialists, foremost among them Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfield, yet
I sympathize with Neely’s critique. My analysis is, therefore, a response
(among many) to Neely’s call for culturally specific readings that privilege the
history and experiences of women (15). See also Callaghan’s invocation of the
feminist slogan “the personal is political” (Woman and Gender 35); and de Lauretis, who urges feminists toward a more historically and culturally informed
critical practice (158-86). At the same time, I want to acknowledge Loomba’s
problematizing of Neely’s argument, which Loomba rightly points out threat
ens to “devalu[e] other social differences and thereby the ‘experiences’ of‘other’
women” (22). While I privilege the experience of Lady Macbeth throughout
my argument, I do not mean to suggest that her experience of gender perfor
mance would be the same as, for example, that of an African female monarch
such as Cleopatra.
8. Several scholars, feminists in particular, have turned to the contentious
debates about women’s nature in conduct manuals, domestic tracts, and medical
treatises to contextualize their studies of women and drama in the early mod
ern period. See Belsey 138-44, 152-60, 178-83, 200-2, 217-21; Comensoli 126, 52-3, 66-8; Jankowski 45-9, 62-3, 105-6, 108-9, 169-70; Hutson 17-51;
Loughlin 13-52; Newman 3-12,15-31. Woodbridge traces the formal contro
versy from 1540 through 1620 (18-113). For feminist analyses of early mod
ern treatises on female nature, see Benson 173, 205-50; Henderson and
McManus 3-130; Jones, “Counterattacks” 45-62, as well as her “Nets and Bri
dles” 39-72; Klein, Daughters 65-9, 97-100; and Wayne 15-29 passim.
9. Through use of the term patrilineal as opposed to patriarchal, I retain
the sense of a male-dominated power structure while emphasizing the eco
nomic relations in which women are commodified. Such a structure enables
the setting of a woman’s worth according to her obedience and virtue, and
enables, I argue, a cultural injunction to be the phallic guarantor of masculine
power. The term also establishes the violence of competition among men for
property and power that women are, in part, supposed to alleviate through their
exchange. That women’s guarantee of peaceful relations is as phantasmatic as
their insurance of phallic power only highlights the always already impossible
ideal women are compelled to embody. It underscores as well the compromise
to any individualized agency or desire on womens part. For discussion of
women’s role as commodity in the Renaissance, see Jordan.
10. If, as Kristeva argues in Powers ofHorror, the abject is present in any
thing transgressing the moralized sanctions of society, but especially in blood,
pus, urine, excrement, and sweat — in the excretions of the body — then it is
clear that woman, in the depths of her uncontrollable body, represents the lim
its and limitlessness of the abject. Kristeva’s critique points to the bodily excess,
the ungraspable, and therefore fearsome, materiality of the feminine. Lady
Macbeth, in this light, as a woman whose “lust” for power coincides with a
“transgression” of maternal instincts, represents for contemporary critics all that
abject.
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11. Sprengnether observes that critical denunciation of Lady Macbeth
results from Shakespeare’s ambivalence concerning gender (“Reading” 236).
A notable exception to this tendency is Callaghans argument in
“Wicked Women” (363). Callaghan, however, sees power in Macbeth as “clear
ly located among the insatiable forces of feminine misrule” (359), and not, as I
argue, within an already existing masculinist structure.
Callaghan also invokes Lacans conception of phallic power, which she
concludes useful to an understanding of the ways in which, in tragedy, “[m]an
and woman are divided by the sword in a symbolic system which utilizes the
phallus as the marker of gender difference and as a crucial mechanism of
power” (Woman 172). She emphasizes, however, the ways in which phallic
power is turned against women and does not make an argument in regard to
women’s positions as the phallus. Cook also emphasizes the phallus in her
analysis of male anxieties about cuckoldry in Much Ado About Nothing. She
argues, in part, that women’s positions as mirrors of masculine desire obviate
feminine alternatives to the “binary structures by which patriarchy figures gen
der” (82). I want to suggest, however, that this negation of feminine alterna
tives just may be the point not only in Macbeth, but perhaps in Much Ado as
well. For the orthodox notions of appropriate femininity — which I locate in
the conduct manuals of the period — fail both Lady Macbeth and Hero. A kind
of skepticism, therefore, attends their characterization and the domestic and
state power relations governing their performances of gender. Finally, Mary
Beth Rose; Kahn (“The Rape”); and Van Watson, like Callaghan, use sword
play and imagery a metaphor for phallic power, which suggests both an inter
esting movement in early modern drama studies and that Lacan’s formation of
gender relations is indeed descriptive of power relations between men and
women in the period.
14. Freedman points out that while Lacan does indeed describe a social
formation in which men have power (over women) and women confirm that
power, he does not interrogate the structure he explains. My use of Lacan
acknowledges Freedman’s argument and attempts to interrogate the cultural
formation Lacan describes by emphasizing the renunciation of agency and
desire requisite to Lady Macbeth’s performance of gender. I recommend Freed
man’s article in its entirety as both a cogent reading of Lacan and the phallus
and as an insightful and persuasive analysis of the politics and complexities at
stake in feminist/psychoanalytic inquiries into theater.
15. See also Jacqueline Rose, especially 49-81; and Sprengnether, who both
emphasizes the phallic roles as being a perception of the child and cogently
highlights how the phallus “represents an illusion of wholeness and self-suffi
ciency” (Spectral 197).
On “deconstructing the Phallic mother’s image”
a way to “shed light
on the historical construction of [women and mothers] as categories” see Ian 8.
Vives explicitly advocates public humiliation, ostracism, and death as
punishments women will receive for disobedience and loss of virtue, but other
tracts are pertinent as well. See Pricke; Rych; Swetnam; and Whately, who
advocates female submission to male superiority and wife-beating.
18. There are psychoanalytic readings of Lady Macbeth, most notably
Adelman’s and Fineman’s. I would note, however, that both Adelman’s and
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Fineman’s visions of Lady Macbeth as an “annihilating mother” (Fineman 447)
depend on Freudian rather than Lacanian interpretations of her function in the
play. The female power Freud feared is precisely that which Lacan suggests
men require to imagine a unified masculine self.
19. See Adelman 134-8; Greenblatt 124-5; Schiffer 206-9; and Stallybrass
196-205. For a reading that complicates this view, see Dash 155-207.
20. Here I agree with Eagletons claim that "[t]he witches experience no
such conflict [between body and language] because their very bodies are not
static but mutable, melting as breath into the wind, ambivalently material and
immaterial” (7). While I might be perceived as substituting Lady Macbeth for
the witches in his argument that it
“they who, by releasing ambitious
thoughts in Macbeth, expose a reverence for hierarchical social order for what
it is, as the pious self-deception of a society based on routine oppression and
incessant warfare” (2), my argument is distinct from his on at least three major
points. First, as Eagleton asserts, the witches initiate the dissolution of firm
definitions and erosion of binary oppositions, but they are not,
Lady Mac
beth is, subject to the culture of violence on which they unleash their chaos.
Second, I do not claim that Lady Macbeth releases thoughts of ambition in
Macbeth but that Macbeth’s own ambitions are produced by his culture’s val
orization of rank and privilege. Third, while I do assert that the play exposes
patrilineal forms of power as based on routine oppression and incessant warfare,
my argument explicitly interrogates any claims Lady Macbeth or Macbeth
might have to Eagleton’s version of "bourgeois individualism],” so that Lady
Macbeth ruled — constituted — by those values prized in her culture that
her husband desires to embody. Her function as the phallus, therefore, pre
cludes her from such individuality and also places her within a material econo
my of violence to which the witches are not subject.
21. See also Berger 64-78; Biggins 269-70; Calderwood 80; Kinney 14873 passim; and O’Rourke 213-26 passim. Goldberg (especially 247-57) also
complicates critical tendencies toward reading the play as pro-Jamesian. On
the historical/political stakes in Macbeth see Hawkins; and Williamson. Willis
provides a skillful account of the opposing views on Macbeth's place as a proJamesian play (210-13).
22. On Macbeth as "the most complete representative of a society which
values and honors a manliness and soldiership that maintain a cohesiveness of
the tribe by extreme violence, if necessary,” see Asp 154.
23. Rebecca Bushnell argues persuasively that "[w]hile Macbeth’s decision
to proceed clearly echoes earlier images of the tyrant’s uxoriousness, it is also
different because in following his wife, Macbeth supposedly upholds masculine
values” (128). Though Bushnell asserts that Macbeth fulfills Lady Macbeth’s
desires (129), her argument is instructive. While Berger argues that the Scots’
“subtextual attack on the maternal provider exactly complements the reciprocal
violence of Lady Macbeth,” he sees her as "moved by mimetic desire to join the
manly ranks” (72). Such desire motivates her bloody image of “plucking her
nipple from her male child’s ‘boneless gums’ and dashing his brains out” (72).
While I too see Lady Macbeth as moved by mimetic desire, I reverse Berger’s
claim to argue that she wishes to be the mimetic reflection of violence Macbeth
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desires to embody. She is not, in my reading, attempting to join male ranks but
to ensure her mans masculinist violence. Bergers reading, however, compli
cates the traditional vision of both Macbeths and Lady Macbeths evil.
24. See Sinfield’s Faultlines for his analysis of “the orthodox idea of what a
thane should be like” (64).
25. While I cannot agree with Eagleton when he reads Lady Macbeth as
"a ‘bourgeois’ feminist who strives to outdo in domination and virility the very
male system which subordinates her” (6), I do believe that he does correctly
observe that “it hard to see why her bloodthirsty talk of dashing out babies’
brains any more ‘unnatural’ than skewering an enemy soldiers’ guts.” Clear
ly my reading takes issue with Eagleton’s use of “bloodthirsty,” but his point
resembles mine when he notes that the opposition between natural and unnat
ural “will not hold even within Macbeth’s own terms, since the ‘unnatural’ —
Macbeth’s lust for power — disclosed by the witches as already lurking with
in the ‘natural’—the routine state of cut-throat rivalry between noblemen.”
26. We can see, therefore, that when Schiffer argues that “[i]n taking up
his sword against Duncan, Macbeth assassinates his moral self, the true source
of whatever manhood, whatever humanity, he once possessed” (210), he both
moralizes a “natural” masculinity and ignores the cultural injunction within the
play fusing masculinity with murder.
27. Novy sees Lady Macbeth’s role at this point in the play as that of an
audience member (88).
28. In this regard I would read “scruples” as informed by the ambiguities
evident in the OED (1989 ed.) definition: “A thought or circumstance that
troubles the mind or conscience; a doubt, uncertainty or hesitation in regard to
right and wrong, duty, propriety, etc.” (292), which was in use as early as 1526.
In this regard, Malcolm may indeed have been struggling with his desire for
excess and the “proper” duties of kingship until Macduff’s “good truth and
honor” prompted him to abandon the temptation to “pour the sweet milk of
concord into hell” (4.3.98).
29. On the slippage between tyrant and king in this scene, see Bushnell
142.
30. Similarly, Greenblatt's emphasis on Lady Macbeth and the witches as
“implicate[d] ... in a monstrous threat to the fabric of civilized life” (125)
ignores the internal threat to society embodied in a political structure of rela
tions stabilized by masculinized violence. In such a societal formation, the
witches become, like Lady Macbeth, merely the mimetic (phantasmatic) reflec
tions of an already established masculinist and ruthless ambition and power.
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Teaching to Strike:
Labor Relations in and out of the Classroom1
Michael Sprinker
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[T]rue literary activity cannot aspire to
take place within a literary framework.
... Significant literary effectiveness can
come into being only in a strict alterna
tion between action and writing; it
must nurture the inconspicuous forms
that fit its influence in active commu
nities better than does the pretentious,
universal gesture of the book — in
leaflets, brochures, articles, and plac
ards. Only this prompt language shows
itself actively equal to the moment.
—Walter Benjamin

Professor ofEnglish
and Comparative Lit
erature at the State

University ofNew
York at Stony Brook.

He is the author of

numerous articles and
several books, includ

ing Imaginary Rela
tions: Aesthetics and
Ideology in the The
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the Third French

Republic.

Even though this essay originated in response to the
strikes at Yale during 1995-96, I wont be discussing
them in any sustained way. Instead, I want to devote
the space allotted me to draw out some of the gener
al implications that the events at Yale may have for us
as teachers of literature and culture, that is to say, as
functionaries in what Louis Althusser termed the
educational Ideological State Apparatus (ISA). In
doing so, I’ll move back and forth between two dis
tinct, though not necessarily opposed or contradicto
ry, conceptions of what we are and what we do. In
brief, Im going to be claiming that we are at once cul
tural intellectuals charged with the duty of training
citizens in a nominally democratic polity, and also
workers with a legitimate interest in improving the
conditions under which we are compelled to labor.
The biblical ban on serving both notwithstanding, we
really do answer to god and to mammon. To pretend
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otherwise
as I was taught to do as an undergraduate and a graduate student,
and as any number of silly, benighted, but ultimately just self-serving Yale pro
fessors and administrators have continued to insist by maintaining that the Yale
graduate students are being mentored into professional maturity, hence, that
they cannot really be workers
is just to ignore the obvious, material situation
of teachers in post-secondary educational institutions. It is certainly apposite
at this point to remind readers that the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) has officially ruled that graduate students are indeed workers, that not
only was Yale’s position to the contrary incorrect but the punitive actions taken
against activists of the Graduate Employees and Students Organization
(GESO) were illegal 2
Let me take up mammon first, since I understand it somewhat better, hav
ing had to work for a living my entire adult life — and even a little before that.
To gain access to a ruling-class education, I had to do a fair amount of manual
labor in my teens and twenties. Granted, one tends to romanticize this aspect
of one’s background; nonetheless, I believe that a decisive ingredient in under
standing our position as workers — and a powerful instrument in being able to
resist the ideological blandishments with which, typically, teachers in the
humanities attempt to recruit their students into what we still anachronistically term "the profession” — to have hailed from a working-class milieu and
been compelled to labor in various proletarian occupations at one time or
another. For many years the only jobs I was licensed to perform were ill-paid,
often physically demanding, and for the most part required little if any mental
exertion. In those years, I understood the difference between workers and boss
es perfectly well, and by virtue of that experience, I think, I now can get my
head around that same distinction it embodied in the hierarchies (real and
imagined) of post-secondary education. Here, then, is my workerist construc
tion of the labor relations by which we are constrained, starting at the bottom
and working up to the top level:
Graduate students = temp workers hired out of the union hall
Junior faculty = probationary full-time employees
Tenured faculty = older employees with some seniority rights
Department chairs = shop stewards
Deans = foremen
Provosts, vice-presidents = middle managers
Presidents, chancellors = CEOs
Trustees = boards of directors

You’ll notice that the structure of this hierarchy exactly that of the modern
capitalist corporation, not (despite all the stupidities spouted last spring by
Annabel Patterson, Margaret Homans, et alia) that of a medieval guild, where
the lowest tier of workers is the apprentices/graduate students. Yale Universi
ty styles itself— and is, I gather, in legal status — that older type of corpora
tion. But as Michael Moore, of TV Nation and Roger and Me fame, recently
observed at a rally in support of GESO when he nominated Yale as " corporate
criminal of the year,” it — and every other college and university I know of —
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is in most respects a corporation in the sense that IBM, GM, and AT&T are.
Indeed, as innumerable commentators have stressed, higher education is
becoming more and more corporatized with each passing year. In the era of
downsizing and capitals overt attacks on labor across the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Developement (OECD), as firms restructure to
accommodate themselves to a period of increased inter-capitalist competition,
post-secondary education marches to the very same tune, responding to identi
cal imperatives. “Leaner and meaner” — the cliché applies with equal force to
limited liability companies and colleges and universities, both public and pri
vate.
Lest you think this comparison far-fetched, let me relate what the dean of
the graduate school at my own university, SUNY at Stony Brook, reportedly
said about a plan, defunct for the moment, but doubtless on his agenda for the
future, to institute differential stipends for doctoral students in the sciences
(who would get more) versus those in the humanities and some of the social sci
ences (who would receive proportionately less). When challenged by graduate
student union representatives on the injustice of reducing stipends in English
from just under $10,000 per year to $5,000, his reply was precisely that of the
crassest capitalist entrepeneur: "If that’s what they’ll come for, then that’s what
we should pay them.” The underlying rationale for such a comment surely
transparent; nonetheless, I offer here some further anecdotal evidence of the
university’s increasing integration with the practices of corporate organization
and the stern discipline of profit maximization.
At my own institution, as at most others, the local university bookstore is
run by a national chain (Wallace’s in this case, although the dominant enter
prise nationally Barnes & Noble). Our provost issued a directive a couple of
years ago, invoking the pleasant fiction that in doing so he was merely striving
to make purchasing textbooks more convenient for students (in particular those
with physical disabilities), that enjoined all faculty to place a copy of their text
book orders with the university bookstore. In the past, some had chosen to deal
exclusively with the local independent bookseller located on the edge of the
campus, partly to support what had been for many years the only decent gen
eral bookstore for miles around, but also because service in the university book
store had historically been execrable. The results of this caving-in to the logic
of corporate monopoly are yet to be determined, save in one particular: the
local independent has closed its doors — a loss surely to be felt by students and
faculty alike, who will now be left to purchase their non-course books at the
local Borders, where the selection is much more limited, and which, by the way,
much further from the campus. So much for the argument from conve
nience.
To offer further evidence: at Oregon State University, food services in the
student union have been given over to a series of Pepsi subsidiaries, including
Taco Bell, after many years of being run by the university itself. The adminis
trator charged with overseeing this corner of the university, when criticized by
one of the faculty for his decision, reacted defensively (and utterly predictably),
by saying that: 1) formerly these services were run at loss (the extent of which
was not specified); and 2) the university was just giving the students what they
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wanted anyway. The spurious appeal to democratic values — giving the stu
dents what they want — repeats the same line that corporations themselves
adopt when challenged to meet even minimal standards of social responsibility.
Tobacco companies are currently trying to defend their criminal behavior in
promoting nicotine addiction over many years in these very terms: freedom of
choice for the consumer. But if one or more corporations enjoy a monopoly in
a market (as is the case at Oregon State), the concept of “choice” has clearly
been emptied of all content. As Marx once observed of capitalist labor rela
tions, freedom to choose one’s employer in effect but the freedom to starve in
the streets.
Finally, one wonders what bribes had to be spread around for the follow
ing to have been instituted. At Tufts University, when students phone the reg
istrar to learn what grade they have earned in a course, they are compelled first
to listen to an advertisement for Coca-Cola prior to obtaining the information
they are requesting. Doubtless, the university receives some remuneration for
making its airwaves available to this corporate giant, but it the business of
any institution of higher education to become a willing shil for a product that
rots the teeth, will dissolve nails left in it overnight, and whose exact chemical
composition remains to this day a well-guarded secret, locked in a vault in the
company’s headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia? Such is the obsequiousness of
contemporary university administrators towards their capitalist patrons that to
ask these questions is considered bad form, when it is not simply dismissed
with contempt for its naïveté. In this environment, it is small wonder that
remarks like that of my graduate dean cited above seem commonsensical: the
mentality of corporate managers permeates their discourse because they are
increasingly beholden to capitalist enterprises. The administrators ought per
haps to ponder the old proverb: If you sup with the devil, you need to have a
very long spoon.
To return to my chart, one should bear in mind that in an era of increas
ingly fierce competition among individual firms, no one in the hierarchy is
entirely secure in his or her position, although some enjoy comparatively more
protection than others. The most secure (in some instances more secure than
the administrators, who don’t always hold faculty rank in a department and
who, if they do, typically have no more interest in returning to the shopfloor
than does a foreman promoted off the line) are probably the tenured faculty,
who cannot easily be fired or even demoted. (This is true for the moment, but
may not be in the long term. Tenure could be abolished altogether, as for exam
ple the trustees of the University of Minnesota seem bent on doing, and as the
administration of the City University of New York has effectively done under
the cover of a trumped-up state of financial exigency.) Just as unionized work
ers with lots of seniority tend to be among the most conservative forces in any
struggle over downsizing, sacrificing their junior members and accepting twotier hiring as the price of protecting their own interests, so tenured faculty,
especially those who see retirement on the not-too-distant horizon, are often
the most vociferous defenders of existing structures of workplace exploitation.
Hire more graduate students and adjuncts to teach the lower-division service
courses, and pay them less if that’s what it takes — such is the message (not
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often expressed openly, of course) that tenured faculty convey to the bosses,
who are only too willing to implement it, and for two very good reasons: 1) it
not only is much cheaper than employing more professors but also 2) these temp
workers don’t enjoy the kinds of protection available to regular faculty and so
don’t create as much trouble for the administrators as do regular faculty —
until, like the Yale graduate students, they organize collectively and engage in
irritating, disruptive activities like grade strikes. I assume you are all aware that
while we are here at this convention, a group of adjuncts, part-timers, and TAs
meeting across town to establish a national union of those most exploited
members of the teaching corps. Bottom line: ain’t no other way to do it. Let’s
face it: we’re workers, and we need to recognize that the artificial — ultimate
ly feudal — hierarchies by which we have been asked to define ourselves inside
the university are in no one’s but the bosses’ interest. Given this choice, I know
which side I’d rather be on.3
Enough, then, of mammon, now for the god bit. I’ve alluded several times
to the conventional ideological conditioning one receives as an undergraduate
and graduate student of literature and culture. Recently, this ideology of the
enduring, historically unchanging value of literature — which one thought had
had stake driven through its heart by the theory boom of the 70s and 80s and
by the rise to prominence of cultural studies — has received new lease on life.
Prominent senior professors (including recent past president of the MLA San
dra Gilbert and former enfant terrible of the theory world Frank Lentricchia)
have loudly proclaimed their allegiance to it. In a breathtaking gesture of bad
faith, they have excoriated those among us who think (as Gilbert and Lentric
chia themselves once professed to think) that the study of literature and culture
is imbricated in a complex structure of socio-political relations that cannot,
without considerable violence, be set aside in the act of interpreting cultural
texts. The return from the dead of the "let’s just read literature and appreciate
its pleasures” crowd is arguably the most striking, and to me most puzzling,
phenomenon of the 90s. They even have their own national organization, the
Association of Literary Scholars and Critics (spawned by the notorious Nation
al Association of Scholars [NAS] and bankrolled by right-wing foundations
similar to those that support the NAS itself). Its officers include Roger Shat
tuck (he of the infamous comparison equating cultural value with gonads, both
being in essence immutable in his view), Christopher Ricks (high priest of
arcane allusion), and the ever-resourceful John Ellis, who decided one fine day
that a career in Germanistik would consign him to obscurity, whereas attacking
theory would likely bring him to the attention of some movers and shakers. He
was right, of course.
One need not go on much about this curious revanchism in the academy,
except to say some things about how to combat it in the classroom, for there the
decisive battle will be joined. On that terrain, we enjoy some natural advan
tages over our adversaries. First, our cultural repertoire, while it may not be
identical to that of our students,
a good deal closer to theirs than is, say,
Roger Shattuck’s or Christopher Ricks’s. A former senior colleague of mine
(now retired), when I described an especially bad lecture in our department as
"the Mr. Rogers version of Shakespeare/’ looked puzzled and responded,
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“Who’s Mr. Rogers?” I said he was the guy with the sweater (now enshrined in
the Smithsonian) who came on after Sesame Street, to which my insouciant
interlocutor replied, “What’s Sesame Street? It’s difficult to imagine someone
so singularly out of touch with contemporary American culture gaining much
sympathy from undergraduates today. On the whole, we’re better equipped to
talk to our students about their own enthusiasms than are those who think lit
erary study an invitation to outdo Eliot’s notes to The Waste Land.
Second, while I continue to hold onto some private heresies concerning the
distinctiveness of aesthetic objects, it nevertheless clear to me — and, I hope,
to most of you — that the turn to a sociological concept of culture has been
generally salutary4 and that its overall demystification of cultural value holds a
kind of populist appeal for students. If we take the view that, to recall Terry
Eagleton’s ditty, “Chaucer was a class traitor” and Shakespeare hated the mob,”
we’re likely to get further in persuading students that their studying literature
has some purchase on the real world — and is therefore worth doing — than if
we insist that not knowing Homer and Dante is a sign of their vulgarity and
well-nigh irremediable cultural inferiority. The overwhelming majority of
undergraduates today will not migrate into the upper echelons of this society,
so helping them to obtain a measure of ruling-class toning just a shuck —
and mostly they know it. Our convictions about literature as an ideological
apparatus thus give us the basis for a pedagogy students can actually use to
understand the world in which they live, an advantage not likely to accrue from
teaching them to appreciate the elegance of Elizabethan sonnets or to gloss the
allusions in The Rape of the Lock..5
Third, and finally, by understanding our own situation as workers rather
than as members of a priesthood charged with passing on the artistic mysteries
to future generations, we are much more likely to comprehend and be capable
of speaking to those entirely legitimate desires of our students that center on
career and material security. The principal goal of students who persevere in
higher education is certification — of skills, of intelligence, of some disciplinary
knowledge or other that will gain them access to decent job, if not immedi
ately then over the long term of their working life. Why, after all, do we our
selves stay in this racket? Well, the pay is decent (for some), the hours and the
nature of the tasks performed not too onerous (for many), and the vacations
generous (for most). What at least some among us are enraged about these days
are the diminished material advantages of a career in higher education. Such
is, remember, the general situation of most people compelled to work in corpo
rate America. In recognizing that we have more in common with clerical and
custodial staff (as the Yale graduate students have done) than with doctors,
lawyers, and investment bankers (which the company in which we imagina
tively place ourselves when we call our work a profession), we take the first
small step towards identifying with our students and thus towards a more
democratic pedagogical practice.
All that said, the tough questions about how and what we teach our stu
dents remain.6 I want to close with the following admonition. The right to
strike is, with some few exceptions, guaranteed for all workers in the United
States by the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, the so-called Wagner Act;
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it is a right workers earned through long years of violent, bloody struggles
against the capitalist class and its paid lackeys. Even Yale University will now
have to concede, however unwillingly, that graduate students holding teaching
assistantships are workers, not apprentice bosses. But the logic of the NLRB
decision (not lost on Yale)
that if this segment of the teaching staff can
unionize, so (pace the Yeshiva decision) might the rest of the university’s teach
ers. Employers in every corporation where unions have little or no historic
presence are plainly scared that their workers will start forming unions. Wit
ness the brutal way in which the self-styled “progressive” bookstore chain Bor
ders has responded to the threat of unionization among its own employees.7
On the whole, workers understand the facts of economic life with great lucidi
ty. They know when they’re getting the short end of the stick, and sooner or
later, they realize that their interests lie in collective organization, in not accept
ing whatever the owners are pleased to give, and in demanding decent wages
and working conditions and long-term job security. In short, workers typical
ly don’t need to be taught to strike, because they know strikes are the principal
means at their disposal for compelling owners to return some of the surplus
appropriated from the workers’ own labor.
But for some the temptation is not to recognize that they are workers at all.
Teaching to strike begins by showing people that they are, most of them, work
ers and not owners, that no matter how often they are promised substantial
material rewards and the compensation of increased status for ignoring this
fact, the implacable logic of capitalist accumulation will in the end determine
the limits of what the owners are pleased to grant them. To convey this basic
lesson in what it means to live in a capitalist world, we all have to get our heads
straight about which side we’re on. The students who voted overwhelmingly to
have GESO represent them sorted that one out sometime back. And if it can
happen at Yale, I daresay it can happen anywhere.

Notes
1. This paper is an emended and expanded version of a talk delivered at a
special session of the Modern Language Association Convention, held in
Washington, D.C., December 1996; the session was devoted to the significance
of the Yale strikes for literary studies. It retains traces of the occasion for which
it was originally written.
2. Since writing this sentence, events have proven just how bloody-mind
ed Yale is determined to be, while demonstrating the equal resolve of GESO
not to be cowed. The university chose to ignore the NLRB ruling, and GESO
has had to refer the matter to the courts, naming individual administrators and
faculty in their suit. At this writing, GESO is preparing for an NLRB-sanc
tioned recognition election that will include (as the original, non-sanctioned
vote in favor of the union did not) graduate students in the sciences. The law
suit is pending.
3. The person who refereed this article for Jx registered the following
objection to my overly generalized characterization of “the profession”: “the
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profession is extremely varied, and there is a great deal of difference between
Yale and Kansas State, not to mention South-Southwest Oklahoma State Col
lege [a fictional institution one presumes]. This constitutes its own hierarchy,
whereas the paper elides it into one structure. All universities are not alike, and
professors at Yale have vastly different status accrediting other professionals
with some consequences (a recommendation letter or suggestion to a journal
editor for a prestigious publication, or lack thereof, matters).” No argument
from this quarter, but this so different from working, say, for Chase Manhat
tan as opposed to the local finance company? One rubs elbows with a different
class of clientele in each, at the same time that the tasks performed by persons
holding comparable positions in these different institution tend to be remark
ably similar, as does the ideology binding shareholders, corporate officers, and
salaried employees together in an invidious relationship that masks the realities
of exploitation. I have more direct contact with my students than Annabel Pat
terson and Margaret Homans, and I’ll wager I supervise more doctoral disser
tations than both of them put together, but our job descriptions are essentially
identical. At the level of actual labor, of course, those who teach in the less
prestigious (or is it just less pretentious?) colleges around the country are more
akin to the sweated factory workers spread across the globe in the era of flexi
ble accumulation. And like sweated labor, those whose teaching loads are five
and six courses per term tend to be less mystified about the conditions of their
employment than those of us who occupy comparatively privileged positions in
the imaginative hierarchy of educational distinction.
4. A senior member of Stony Brooks English department has recently
taken the opposite position, asserting in a letter to the dean of Arts and Sci
ences that this kind of work inappropriate to the discipline of English, and
that those who think otherwise ought to be transferred to some other depart
ment to be replaced by staff with a more dutiful regard for the special qualities
of literature art. One can only guess at how widely this view shared. I sus
pect it’s for the most part confined to those whose training antedated the the
ory boom of the 70s and 80s, but my evidence for this claim is almost entirely
anecdotal. On the other hand, the most recent MLA survey of frequently
taught texts in standard curricula for English and American literature indicates
that changes in course syllabi since the 1950s have been minimal — a few addi
tions have been made, but for the most part the same authors continue to dom
inate. Whether Hawthorne, Melville, Shakespeare, and Milton are taught in
much the same way these days is a nice question that the survey does not
address.
5. The referee further objected at this point: “While I understand the sense
of this, those on the right or moderates might say the same thing, but specify
an entirely different way to do this [that to say, make sense of the world they
inhabit]. ... Also, I don’t think it is primafacie true that a cultural studies cur
riculum would differ, from a student’s standpoint, from a priestly curriculum.
Students simultaneously take such classes and internalize the measures of both
— as Evan Watkins puts it, as long we give grades, whether we teach a con
servative or radical curriculum, we still circulate students through the same sys
tem.” True enough, but I continue to believe, perhaps naively, that what we
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teach makes a difference (else why would economists assign Samuelson rather
than Marx?), and that how we approach our subject matters even more. Ask
ing socio-historical questions of literary texts rather than limiting oneself to
discovering what makes them aesthetically pleasing will not bring us to the
brink of social revolution, but it can, in some measure, prepare students to rec
ognize in literature a form of knowledge about societies past and present.
Whether they draw conservative or progressive political lessons from that
preparation will depend on many other factors, the majority of which we can
neither predict nor control. About the progressive potential of cultural studies,
and the general failure to realize it here in the United States, I have had my say
in “We Lost It at the Movies.”
6. The following discussion informed by the Marxist Literary Group’s
roundtable panel on “Teaching Marxism,” held the morning previous to the day
I delivered my original talk on the Yale strikes. A longer version of my remarks
there, which will appear in the journal Mediations, contains specific recommen
dations about what it means to teach marxism in the university and its poten
tial contribution to progressive politics.
7. In brief, faced with an organizing drive among its employees, the cor
poration responded by firing the organizers. When Michael Moore supported
the workers, first by confronting the chain over its anti-union campaign, then
by donating the royalties garnered from sales through Borders of his recent
bestseller, Downsize This, he was summarily denounced by the corporation and
barred from future book-signings at its outlets. As I write, Borders employees,
including those already dismissed, continue to struggle for decent wages and
benefits by organizing a union, while the company responds with the same line
(and utilizes the same illegal tactics) that Yale did with GESO. You don’t have
to be an old-fashioned marxist to recognize that the fundamental social conflict
in our time remains that between labor and capital, however subtle the varia
tions in its form.
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I must confess that when first asked, in 1996, to par
ticipate in a MLA special session on the Yale strikes,
I was doubtful that those strikes (as important as I
think they are in numerous ways) had anything what
soever to do with literary criticism. However, while
reading the Fall 1996 MLA Newsletter I changed my
mind as call after call for more stringent "fact-find
ing” procedures in the resolution process passed
before my eyes. There are more references to the
need for "facts” in the "President’s Column” and the
“Comments” of the executive council members in
that publication than even Mr. Gradgrind could
shake a stick at. This obsession with the "facts”
piqued my curiosity from both a theoretical and
political perspective. For one thing, such a firm,
uncritical faith in "the facts” seems at odds with the
usual positions taken by humanists on these matters.
Whether because they ally themselves with the Dick
ensian view that "the facts” can’t get at everything
(which is why we need poetry, ethics, and humanistic
thought in the first place), or because they have kept
up with the most cutting-edge work in critical theo
ry, which suggests that the processes of meaning-pro
duction call into question any simple division of labor
between "fact-finding” and "interpretation,” few lit
erary critics these days would accept that "fact” bears
any simple relationship to "truth,” or that either of
these categories can be separated from problems of
interpretation. Remarkably, however, nowhere in the
Newsletter does anyone raise the possibility that we
might be dealing primarily with a problem of inter
pretation in the various controversies and disruptions
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that have ensued in the wake of the Yale strikes, and of Resolution 6 in partic
ular. Pursuing the reasons for this curious neglect might tell us something, it
seems to me, about how the Yale strikes — to which most of this concern over
“the facts” has been directed — shed some light on problems in literary criti
cism (and vice versa).
As a starting place, I can cite one of the MLAs own publications: Redraw
ing the Boundaries.2 An article on “Cultural Criticism” in that volume suggests
that

[t]heory ... has become a name for the reflective or second-order discourse
that breaks out when a community’s previously unspoken assumptions are
no longer taken for granted. These assumptions then become objects of
explicit formulation and debate — very likely because the confines of the
community are breached. Literary theory emerges when critics and teach
ers of literature no longer share agreements on the meaning of terms like
literature, meaning, text, author, criticism, reading, aesthetic value, history,
teaching, discipline and department — and, of course, culture. (Graff and
Robbins 428)
When there is agreement about the “keywords” used in a specific discourse
community, the definitions of these terms appear to be “common sense” or “the
facts.” Disagreement, on the other hand, exposes a certain ambiguity about
determining “the facts,” and reminds us that what we see irreducibly depen
dent on our frames of reference.
Resolution 6 — I do not think anyone would dispute — has brought to the
fore numerous disagreements: about the mission of the MLA, the organization
of the university, the relationship of graduate students to universities, and the
legitimacy of unions in an academic context. To read the Fall Newsletter, how
ever, you would think that the only issues it raises concern the mechanics of the
resolution process: the difficulty of ascertaining “facts,” and the ethics of cen
sure. I do not wish to belittle these concerns; what does trouble me, however,
that they seem to have entirely overshadowed the substantive issues of Reso
lution 6. What we should be seeing in the Resolution 6 dilemma, it seems to
me, is not primarily a problem with the resolution process, but rather a break
down in fundamental assumptions, a disagreement about values and basic def
initions. “Union,” “University,” “MLA” and “academic community” have
become “community-breaching” concepts, in Gerald Graff and Bruce Robbins’
terms. However, examination of disputes around these “keywords” has been
rather peremptorily laid aside as the MLA officers direct us to the presumably
more important work of “getting the facts” — or, more accurately, talking about
the importance of getting the facts (which takes us even further away from the
important issues raised by Resolution 6).
To refresh your memory, here are a few examples of comments from the
Executive Council on the resolution process as they appear in the Fall 1996
Newsletter.
— “I have serious doubts about the appropriateness of resolutions censur
ing individuals or institutions, since these imply quasi-judicial fact-finding pro
cedures that the MLA not equipped to conduct” (15; emphasis added)
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— “I’d propose that all resolutions citing by name a specific person or edu
cational institution be sent directly to a standing committee on fact-finding
(emphasis added).
— “Fact-finding takes time, and as scholars and in the interest of fairness,
we owe it to ourselves to take that time before risking that divisiveness” (14;
emphasis added).
— “Emergency resolutions seldom afford adequate opportunity for checking
facts or soliciting other opinions and should therefore be abandoned in their
present form” (16; emphasis added).
— “When a resolution includes complicated and controversial issues, it is
difficult to amass enough information to foster judicious decisions” (14; empha
added).
The headnote that introduces these comments helpfully points out that
they were generated in response to “questions about emergency resolutions and
resolutions that censure institutions or individuals [that] came up after the
1995 convention.”
The 1995 convention was, of course, the very one at which Resolution 6, an
“emergency resolution” censuring the administration (individuals) of a particu
lar institution (Yale), came onto the floor. Although Resolution 6 not explic
itly mentioned in the comments by executive council members from which the
above-cited quotations are drawn, the repeated references to “emergency reso
lution” and “censure” keeps pulling it in as a subtext — but not in order to con
sider any of its substantive issues; the council appears to see such resolutions
only
dangers to be avoided. Indeed, aside from a repression of “Yale” while
talking of it constantly, what all of the writers for the executive council seem to
share is fear that (1) because of resolutions like 6, the MLA is vulnerable to
lawsuits if its resolution process not changed, and (2) a proper defense against
such legal challenge to institute a committee (between the delegate assembly
and the membership) to facilitate the collection and “checking” of “facts” in
proposed resolutions. This is not so simple proposition as it sounds in the
abstract, as I will argue below, nor are its difficulties primarily ones of “amass
ing” and “checking” as the executive council implies — but first, back to the
“facts” at hand.
An obsession with “the facts” — similar to that found in the executive
council members’ comments cited above — also manifests itself in the three let
ters from Yale senior faculty that accompanied the printed texts of the 1995 res
olutions, circulated to the membership after the MLA that year. In the first of
these letters, Annabel Patterson establishes this theme in her opening sentence,
which claims that she will reveal “the facts that lie behind the graduate stu
dents’ inflammatory rhetoric” in Resolution 6. Likewise, Margaret Homans
contends that Resolution 6
“factually erroneous, slanderous and personally
motivated,” while Linda Peterson and Ruth Yeazell critique the Delegate
Assembly for passing the resolution before “ascertaining the facts.” Homans
additionally calls for the emendation of the MLA constitution to prevent the
passage of such “groundless” resolutions in the future. I draw attention to this
particular theme in these letters because we find it repeated so emphatically not
only in the comments of the executive council that I quote above but also, even
more forcefully and explicitly, in Sandra Gilbert’s analysis of the Yale situation.3
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In her “President’s Column” in the Fall 1996 Newsletter, Gilbert presents
numerous objections from the membership to the passage of Resolution 6 on
evidential, political, and other grounds, including the claims that the accused
were given insufficient opportunity to defend themselves, that the membership
who voted in favor of the resolution improperly leapt to the conclusion that the
complainant was right, and — the unkindest cut of all — that the presentation
of facts in the case of Resolution 6 on the part of its proposers was so shoddy
that it “betrays the ordinary standards of scholarship.” The bulk of Gilbert’s
column given over to the reported speech and writing of those MLA mem
bers who think that the resolution process in general, and Resolution 6 in par
ticular, are silly at best, and perhaps even evil and destructive of our professional
practice. Lurking behind all of these comments (reinforced by the constant
repetition of this theme in the executive council members’ comments), is the
assertion that “the facts” were never properly established in the case of Resolu
tion 6, a view that Gilbert herself admits to holding: “I too am deeply disturbed
by the same questions about standards of evidence that have troubled others
who had procedural objections to the
resolution.” This announcement is
followed by paragraph in which she details in the most incriminating way
possible the ostensible bad behavior of proponents of Resolution 6 at the dele
gate assembly meeting. The story — for her column — ends there.
However, in the real world, as opposed to the “made for MLA Newsletter
version,” the story does not end there. Gilbert fails to mention the eight pages
of dissenting letters from
faculty and administrators (cited above) which
went out with the first mailing on the 1995 resolutions, a forum that gave these
members of the Yale community ample opportunity — an opportunity denied
to the “complainants,” it should be added — to present, at length, both a
defense and “the facts” as they saw them, to the membership as a whole. Addi
tionally, no mention is made by Gilbert that, in spite of the attempt by these
faculty to discredit the resolution — which one would presume was
through the best possible case that they could devise — the membership who
voted was not convinced by their “facts.”
One possible explanation for why these two niggling little matters are left
out of Gilbert’s account is that if this longer story is told, it becomes rather
more difficult to describe the Resolution 6 dilemma in terms of a crisis over
“facts” and “standards of evidence.” Although they claim to be bringing the
flaming sword of “the facts” to cut through to the truth obscured by the
“rhetoric” of Resolution 6, the letters from the Yale senior faculty actually offer
little evidence of disagreement about any significant “facts” whatsoever. If one
does not assume from the get-go that unions are inappropriate at Yale, or in
general, the letters actually corroborate Resolution 6 by indicating that the strik
ing graduate instructors were motivated by an attempt to have their elected
union recognized by the administration, that they had made many other
attempts through less drastic means to gain this recognition, and, most impor
tantly, that threats of firing and other repercussions were directed at these
instructors.4 These are the crucial “facts,” the very ones that the National Labor
Relations Board found easily determinable, and upon which they based their
decision that the Yale administration behaved improperly.5 However, instead
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of focusing on the problem of interpretation raised by these issues — real dif
ferences about the relationship of graduate students to universities, the status of
academic labor, and the value of unions for academic organizing — the presen
tation of the resolution dilemma in the Fall Newsletter seems to claim that the
3,828 members of the MLA who voted for Resolution 6 must be poor scholars,
swayed by “passion,” who did not have the best interests of the profession, the
MLA or “scholarship” in mind.
In order to see if there any merit to such a view, let us examine the actu
al sites of disagreement as the letters of the Yale anti-union faculty indicate
them. (1) The letter writers contend that the graduate instructors’ union is ille
gitimate and therefore cannot serve as an appropriate motivation to action;
Resolution 6 contends that the union is legitimate and being thwarted unfair
ly by the Yale administration. (2) The letter writers aver that conditions at Yale
are not so bad that they warrant union in any case; Resolution 6 asserts the
right of the graduate instructors to make their own decisions on this score. (3)
The letter writers argue that threats of firing and academic blacklisting do not
constitute inappropriate responses to what they see as unwarranted and inap
propriate actions on the part of the graduate instructors; Resolution 6 sees these
threats as union-busting “academic reprisals” in the sense that they disrupt the
possibility of “academic community” in any but the terms of the Yale adminis
tration (about which more below). These disagreements, I think it is rather
easy to see, arise not at the level of “the facts” (in spite of the claims of the let
ter writers), but rather at the level of interpretation.
Let us assume for a moment, then, that an MLA “fact-finding” committee
had been in place and that Resolution 6 had been referred to it. On what exact
ly would they have ruled? On the simple “facts” (that graduate instructors did
not hand in their grades; that they were threatened with disciplinary action and
loss of jobs), there was no disagreement between the claims of Resolution 6 and
those of the
senior faculty who wrote their letters attempting to undermine
it. Indeed, a letter (from senior Yale administrators) threatening the striking
student-instructors with the loss of their jobs is actually included (as an attach
ment) with the materials sent out by the Yale senior faculty. Given this mass of
“evidence,” what would a “fact-finding” committee decide? Whether or not
unions were appropriate organizing agents for graduate instructors? Whether
or not grade strikes were appropriate activities? Whether or not the Yale strik
ers’ grievances were “real”? I for one would be extremely unhappy with the
insertion of an MLA committee between the membership and the Delegate
Assembly on these matters of interpretation — which would constitute a pro
foundly undemocratic move. Before we shift to any such system, then, we
should be clear about its potential implications, especially given the tendency
the MLA leadership has shown to displace so very problematically issues of
“interpretation” into issues of “fact” in the case of Resolution 6.
That so many of the anti-union commentators on the strike have failed to
notice this odd equivocation between interpretive problems and “factual” ones
seems to stem from a fantasy that if only “the facts” were known, then the Yale
administrators obviously would have been exonerated and the graduate instruc
tors exposed as ungrateful, spoiled children who were acting up. Instead of
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admitting the possibility that conflicting visions of the relations of students to
universities are at stake here — and, in “fact,” that the world might look like a
quite different place from the empyrean height of the Karl Young Chair and the
more earthy plane of graduate life, even graduate life at Yale6 — many MLA
officers seem to assume that those who voted in favor of Resolution 6 must
have misunderstood, been deluded by, or blinded themselves to, the “actual” situation. This astonishes and dismays me, not only because my vote (and that of
many others whom I know personally, and with whom I discussed these issues
at length) was highly informed and thoughtful, and I am insulted by the impli
cation that such a vote necessarily indicates shoddy scholarship and “prejudice,”
but also — more importantly — because I think that in the displacement of a
question of “interpretation” into a question of “the facts,” one of the most
important issues of the Yale strikes for the MLA being occluded — namely,
that the visions of “scholarly community” that underlie the various positions
taken are radically different. On the one hand, the Yale senior faculty seem to
assume that “academic community” something that we already have, a given,
and that a union is, thus, a threat to the very “ideals and standards” upon which
that community is based. On the other hand, the striking graduate instructors
seem to be suggesting that we need to rethink “academic community” altogeth
er.
As I read the letters from the senior Yale faculty — which I did, very care
fully, many, many times before I voted — I was struck by their reliance on a cer
tain vision of “academic community” as opposed to “corporate community” or
wage relation. The senior administration at Yale, for example, described its
rationale for refusal to recognize the union
“educational reasons,” emphasiz
ing the difference between the university and other payers of wages. In other
words, the university community is special and fragile and unions contaminate
it. Margaret Homans puts it this way: “it not possible for Yale students —
in training, after all, to occupy professional positions — to constitute the proletarianized body they claim to be.” What both of these commentators take
pains to assert that the university in general — and Yale in particular —
a
qualitatively different sort of space than a corporation and that its internal rela
tions cannot, then, be ones of exploitation but must, rather, be ones in which its
members will, in time, be able to work things out in “an atmosphere of mutual
respect.” Annabel Patterson, after pointing out — emphatically — early in her
letter that unions are not conducive to “an appropriate relationship between
students and faculty in a non-profit organization” concludes her letter with the
observation that the faculty “regret that graduate student anxieties, especially
about their future in a constrained job market, have led to such alienation” and
offers the assurance that the Yale faculty “continues to work hard to improve
morale and communication, and to persuade students that the teaching profes
sion has ideals and standards which can never be identical with those in an
industry or corporation.” It is easy to sympathize with such assertions; the
myth of “academic community” one of the most powerful ideologies in the
academy — and it is attractive: a fantasy of the space outside of capitalism
where scholars think deep thoughts and organize their mutual relations with
receptive and supportive colleagues in an “atmosphere of mutual respect” with
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no exploitation or pettiness anywhere in sight.7 However, if we attempt to
examine this myth outside the sentimental haze produced by hooding cere
monies and their appeal to the “ancient and universal community of scholars,”
we can begin to ask questions of power that paint a different landscape than the
idyllic scene of the grove of academe (now disrupted, alas, by those unruly and
indecorous graduate students) that the senior faculty from the putative Garden
of Yale attempt to conjure up.
To consider these questions of power, it might be helpful to recall that peo
ple can (and necessarily do) occupy multiple subject positions at the same time.
It is possible to be “a student” and “an employee” simultaneously, and for the
interests of each of these roles to conflict with the other, depending upon the
structuring relations. For example, if we change the above formulation to “a
woman” and “an employee,” it probably would be relatively easier for most read
ers to see what I am getting at. Although as an “employee” a woman may be
“well-paid” and have “good-benefits” as these are understood under conditions
of capitalism, she might at the same time be treated in a patronizing or unpro
fessional ways by male colleagues who rationalize their behavior by appeals to
certain male and female “roles” in the social order. Or, alternatively, an employ
er might claim he treating a female employee “well” even while paying her
less than men who perform comparable tasks, on all sorts of grounds that now
seem questionable to most people but not so very long ago seemed perfectly
“natural.”8
With this in mind, going back to my example of students who are also
employees, I want to open up the possibility of imagining that what might
appear to be treating “students” well, according to a certain set of traditional
hierarchical (even quasi-“feudal”) assumptions (for instance, that graduate stu
dents are bound to the senior faculty by ties of duty and should rely on them to
manage their relations with the administration rather than act as agents on
their own behalf), might well leave them exploited as “employees,” especially
under current conditions in which so-called “apprenticeship” leads so infre
quently to tenure-track employment. At Yale in 1994-5, for example, the com
bined placement record of 10 humanities departments was only 27%, which
must have left many students — not to mention the 73% of candidates who
remained unplaced — doubtful, if not rueful, that they were “in training ... to
occupy professional positions” (as Margaret Homans asserts) since painfully
few of these positions seemed to exist (Young 184). In any case, surely the
senior faculty at Yale can’t really believe that they are simply doing graduate
assistants an “educational” favor by hiring them to grade papers for the large
lecture classes, and that the department and the university benefit not at all
from this arrangement? Only according to the logic of a Tom Sawyer tricking
his friends into whitewashing the fence for him can we be expected to go along
with such a ruse.
Of course it important to be able to point out the ways in which the uni
versity is not exploitative in the same way that a factory is, but it also helpful
to be able to see the ways in which it is like a factory, if one interested in cre
ating a real alternative to capital, to whose needs the university, as well as fac
tories, are subsumed. Willy-nilly, universities are increasingly taking on the
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practices and discourses of corporate capital. Jeff Williams recently catalogued
many instances of this trend, noting in particular an administrative fascination
with “productivity” in publications from the New York Times to the Chronicle of
Higher Education. One of my own former employers, Carnegie Mellon Uni
versity, has even been praised by Business Week magazine as exemplary in its
move toward corporate-style management: “Managing a university as if it were
a business seems to pay off.... Research money pours into [Carnegie Mellon’s]
computer science department. Industry pays for fully half of the engineering
department, with each professor bringing in an average of $215,000 year in
outside research money” (Baker 116). In 1994 alone, Carnegie Mellon received
over a million and a half dollars in royalties for its technological and other
inventions. Lest you think that this performance was singular, I hasten to add
that thirty universities earned even more that year in this way — including Yale.9
Indeed, in spite of the confident assertions of the senior faculty in English
that Richard Levin is one of them, and that he does not see Yale as corpora
tion, the president’s actual practice suggests otherwise. A recent Business Week
article reports that “Levin has for several years mulled what many of his peers
have considered for their colleges — running the place like a business. 1We
have to manage this institution efficiently,’ he says, ‘we cannot do everything
under the sun’” (Jackson 102). Only faculty and alumni resistance, the article
goes on to claim — not a devotion to the singularity of academic community
attributed to him by Annabel Patterson, et al. — have limited Levin’s efforts to
downsize Yale as rapidly as he would like. Meanwhile, numerous other insti
tutions are downsizing at a more or less rapid pace, increasing their use of parttime and graduate student instructional labor with alacrity, as well as increasing
teaching loads and course enrollment numbers.10 Hence, Evan Watkins has
observed recently that though “the analogy [between a factory and a universi
ty] doesn’t yield a point-by-point comparison,.. . there seems to me good rea
son to suspect that the dominance of a capitalist mode of production has
involved structurally comparable transformations of 'intellectual' work as well,
such that it would be no more possible to imagine a university English depart
ment as Samuel Johnson’s study writ large than to imagine a factory as a giant
artisan’s workshop” (14). Watkins’ point is that while it might not be accurate,
strictly speaking, to analyze English teachers as proletarians (a view he vehe
mently rejects), it might be important to wonder how the structure of the uni
versity as a workplace changes as capital restructures, and what impact these
changes have on English — and other — teachers.
One of the changes that occurs in such a situation is that "academic com
munity” comes to signify differently as the vast majority of its members find
themselves in an unanticipated position relative both to the institutions in
which they work and to each other. Stanley Aronowitz has chronicled the
declining power of faculty organizations relative to administrative staffs backed
by boards of trustees over the past two decades as universities modeled them
selves more on corporate and less on communal models. He observes: “Near
ly all institutions of higher education maintain the formal apparatus of faculty
sovereignty.... But in both public and private university sectors, power to make
decisions has slowly shifted to administrators who now retain final determina
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tion of nearly all university issues” (91). Aronowitz, rightly I think, sees this as
an assault on academic freedom — not in the sense of an individual's freedom
to think, research and write as he or she sees fit, but rather in terms of “the
rights of the faculty as a collectivity to retain sovereignty over the educational
process” (91). This important reminder that “academic freedom” an issue for
a community and not just for individuals salutary. At a time when, especially
for humanists, the university changing radically, we find ourselves in posi
tion to rethink not just what the university should be but to whom it belongs:
questions that crises such as recent labor unrest at Yale bring to the fore dra
matically.
These questions of “belonging” confront the next (potential) generation of
scholars most immediately and painfully. When less than half of the advertised
jobs in English — according to the MLAs own data — are tenure-track in any
given year, it is not surprising that graduate students are unwilling to suffer
their graduate years in silence.11 For many of them, unions have come to rep
resent a chance at belonging, after all, to an "academic community” of which
they too have dreamed but which seems increasingly elusive. To anyone who
thinks that unionization is, of itself, the death of that community, and that
unions, like the resolution process, incite divisiveness, this must seem misguid
ed at best. But I would like to put forth another reading: that neither unions
nor the MLAs resolution process cause divisiveness; they are, rather, symptoms
of divides that are already here. To fail to recognize this is to continue to see
an imperiled (but pure) community where there is actually already (to borrow
from Graff and Robbins) a breach. For this reason, I found it disturbing that
Sandra Gilbert refers (in the Fall MLA Newsletter) to the “sides” of the dispute
in the Yale strikes as “the union” and “Yale,” with the unfortunate implication
that the striking graduate instructors — most of whom had been at Yale longer
than at least one of the letter writers among the full-time faculty — are not part
of Yale. For the graduate instructors, however, the union is not a declaration of
independence from an actually existing academic community called “Yale.” It
rather an assertion of rights to some meaningful powers of self-determina
tion in a community-to-be called Yale to which they contribute their labor,
pedagogic, scholarly, and political.
Hegemony theory offers us a way to analyze this situation in a more help
ful manner than accusing dissenters of inciting divisiveness (see note 3). It
directs us to examine the dynamic among competing group interests and con
sider why the “consent” of subordinated groups (such as, in this case, graduate
students) to the rule of the dominant academic ideology of “community” has
broken down (which is another way of saying that “the confines of the com
munity are breached”). Seen from this perspective, the function of the call for
“fact” collecting on the part of the senior faculty at Yale emerges as an attempt
to “define the situation” in such a way that it can be resolved on terms most
favorable to them, at a moment when dominant ideology is in crisis. Ideology
works by naturalizing a partial view as universal and necessary: as “fact.”
Hence, the senior faculty at Yale want to try to make it seem to be a “fact” that
unions are inappropriate organizing vehicles for university teachers, that grad
uate instructors are simply “students” and not in any sense “employees,” and that
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the university is somehow outside of capitalism. Other definitions of the situ
ation are, of course, possible. Graduate student unions disrupt the balance of
power in the universities, including the power of the senior faculty to “define
the situation.” Rather than relying on their advisors to see that they are looked
after when departmental largess handed out, or assuming that the very senior
faculty who benefit from the pleasures of graduate teaching — and a decrease
in their own work load provided by graduate assistants and instructors — can
be relied upon to advocate student interests at all times, graduate students are
increasingly taking matters into their own hands. In doing so they “define the
situation” of graduate study and employment rather differently than their senior
colleagues. If the MLA senior staff and officers could manage for a moment to
think of the ensuing disagreements as a struggle among competing “definitions
of the situation” rather than a stark black and white of “facts” (a position so unnuanced that they would be unlikely to bring it to their study of literature), they
might be able to see how they have simply taken on in their discourse of “facts”
the “definition of the situation” of one side in the
dispute. A more bal
anced perspective would prompt them to bring the interpretive skills and
appreciation of complexity gleaned from their professional practice to bear as
forcefully upon this social text as upon literary ones.
Of course if it so, as I am suggesting, that the positions of the senior fac
ulty at Yale who wrote the letters, and those of the senior MLA staff as well,
are “interested” rather than neutral “fact” amassing, then what of the striking
students: are their positions “interested” too? Surely, yes. It here that the
question of “justice” — and some recognition of the ways in which different
relations to concrete, material conditions of existence can lead to quite differ
ent “definitions of the situation” — must come into play. One of the striking
students has described a moment of recognition and politicization in his grad
uate career when, as a young and doubtful-of-unions newcomer to Yale, he had
listened to the narrative of an older graduate student who, because he had wife
and child who needed to be included in his health plan, ended up being forced
to give “roughly half of his income back to Yale for health care” coverage. Com
ing up against the hard realities of graduate life for himself and his peers caused
him to conclude that “there really are issues of justice here. GESO [union] has
the moral high ground; it’s not just
[the corporation] trying to do whats
in their interest and we re trying to do what’s in our interest” (quoted in Robin
and Stephens 60; emphasis added). This sorting out of “interest” in a materi
alist analysis proceeds by way of examining the relative structural positions of
the speakers. In this instance, we might well ask whether it might not be pos
sible that graduate students are in better position than the senior faculty at
Yale to see the “facts” that matter and the interpretations that matterforjustice
in the case of Resolution 6.
So what is to be done? I propose foremost that we think about what “aca
demic community,” as we wish to have it, means in explicit terms, without
assuming that “academic community” is some timeless, obvious and perfect
thing that we already have, that has somehow suddenly become threatened by
unruly graduate students and pesky unions. Community is, rather, what we
must imagine and work for, with clear-eyed analysis of the complex material
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conditions in which we all (at present, unequally) work. Moving the debate in
this direction will push the emphasis from the local divisiveness that unions
supposedly generate to the long-term possibilities for an academic community
that is democratic and broad-based in ways we might not yet be able to com
prehend fully. This
not to say that there is — pluralistically — room for
everyone; the Annabel Pattersons of the world, who confuse the capitulation
of graduate students to administrative interests with "mutual respect,” are, it
must be said, not very promising candidates. In the meantime, we cannot give
in to a fear of taking stands because powerful groups (such as the Yale admin
istration) might be unhappy about it and threaten lawsuits (which would be
possible no matter how many "facts” are collected so long as fundamental dis
agreements about how to interpret them are in force). Dismissing the perspec
tive of an opponent as due to "passion” rather than "reason,” “rhetoric” rather
than "fact,” and "prejudice” as opposed to objectivity — as the senior Yale fac
ulty and MLA officers have attempted to do — stops the debate to be sure. But
at what cost? Surely it not impertinent at this juncture to consider the power
relations that have structured the MLAs representation of what counts as "fact”
and what does not, what counts as "reasonable” and what does not, what counts
as "neutral” and what does not, in the case of Resolution 6.
This said, let me be perfectly clear about what. I am not saying. I am not
suggesting that "evidence” unimportant and that resolutions should be freefor-alls in which anyone can say anything whatsoever and that the membership
should simply go along. Resolutions should be carefully scrutinized by the
membership, and as much information should be circulated concerning them
possible. The recently-instituted revision to the resolution process — which
provides a forum for members to comment on the resolutions prior to voting —
very helpful. Given that safeguards such as this are already in place, howev
what I am suggesting that a situation in which resolution composed of
out-and-out lies would be proposed strikes me as extremely unlikely; establish
ing the “facts” is not so much of an issue
the executive council and president
of the MLA are claiming.
The vague and obsessive focus upon "the facts” seems to function as a dis
traction, a red herring, more than anything else, especially since Resolution 6,
the motivating case for "reform” of the resolution process (in ways that renders
it less democratic), does not really fit the "lack of facts” thesis when examined
carefully. MLA members are sophisticated readers of text, and those who actu
ally vote on resolutions have numerous means to become well-informed on the
issues under discussion (which in these days of the computerized databases and
e-mail is easier than ever before). I myself read the (anti-union) comments on
Yale's official web page and every article in major US papers written on Yale and
strikes since 1984 to get a sense of its administrations past behavior in labor
disputes (not very nice). I also saw a great deal of diverse and thoughtful mate
rial written on the strikes, including a widely circulated letter penned by Yale
senior faculty who supported the striking instructors (a view not explicitly rep
resented in MLA publications at all). Given a highly literate, engaged, and
research-skilled membership, I think a case of outright fraud in a resolution
extremely unlikely, and its passage even less likely.
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What is likely, however, is that numerous issues will arise that will be con
tentious, and in which each side’s position might well look outrageous, unfair,
and impossible to the other. The NLRBs list of faculty and administrators at
Yale who threatened students during the strike is unlikely to convince those
faculty that they acted improperly if they do not accept the students’ right to
organize and strike, however incriminating the list might look to those readers
who see the strike differently. On the other hand, the declaration of Yale’s PR
department on its webpage that “
is a good employer!” with its list of
aspects of life at Yale that support this contention to its own satisfaction, is
unlikely to convince unsatisfied workers (or their supporters), whether they are
in the library, the classroom, or the kitchen. The point here is not that there
are no “facts” but rather that no amassing of “facts” — without attention to the
underlying issues through which we “see” them — is going to get us very far in
the debate over how to conduct the resolution process.
So I think it is lamentable that the important issues raised by Resolution 6
(about the status of graduate students in the universities, their labor, the
restructuring of universities, the possibilities of new ways of imagining “acade
mic community”) have been displaced onto an argument about how the resolu
tion process should be conducted — an argument that seems to keep us from
looking at the issues of the resolution as we go around and around about the
process of generating them. (This is not to say that these issues are not being
discussed by MLA officers, or in forums the MLA provides; I am simply sug
gesting that it is unfortunate that Resolution 6 has been excluded as a site for
these discussions.) It is, of course, much easier to debate how we should make
resolutions than to debate what they say, at least in the case of the really con
troversial ones; there are, surely, no simple answers to the issues raised by Res
olution 6.
In “fact,” I’m not entirely convinced myself that unions (as we know them)
are the best way to achieve “academic community,” or that grade strikes are the
best possible strategy for academic unions to deploy. But I am convinced that
my vote to censure the Yale administration was well-informed, thoughtful and
in good faith; I still think that graduate students should have some rights of
self-determination, and thus that the administration at Yale behaved badly to
thwart their unionization efforts. This is, I maintain, a reasonable conclusion
to come to from the “facts” available for review, as produced by both the uni
versity’s administration and their supporters, as well as the critics. I am also
convinced that Resolution 6 should have marked the beginning of an ongoing
public discussion of these issues — not the end of “emergency resolutions.” It
is unfortunate that the interpretive grid provided by MLA officers suggests that
a vote to censure Yale’s administration was tantamount to a declaration of pro
fessional incompetence, and hence that no one need take the issues raised by
Resolution 6 (other than the purely formal ones about the resolution process
itself) seriously at all. Those thousands of us who voted (thoughtfully, careful
ly) "yes,” deserve better. Those who voted (thoughtfully, carefully) “no” do too.
In this life, all of us want lot more than facts.
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Notes
An earlier version of this essay was part of the panel, “What does Literary Crit
icism have to do with the
Strikes?” at the 1996 MLA Convention. It was
organized by the Division on Literary Criticism in order to consider the impact
and meaning of the Yale Strikes12 of 1995-6, and how their lessons might be
useful to thinking through problems facing higher education today. To these
ends, in this essay I was particularly concerned with the Fall 1996 MLA
Newsletters representations of Resolution 6 (censuring the Yale administrations
behavior during a “grade strike” waged by graduate student instructors) and
with how these representations seemed to foreclose the complex analysis of the
situation necessary to gleaning any lasting lessons from that resolution. I
attempt to open up the possibility for an ongoing conversation on some of its
fundamental issues in these remarks.

1. The title is borrowed from Mr. Gradgrind in Dickens’ Hard Times, a
book that reminds us that there are more than “facts” in this world. I am grate
ful to Andrew Ross for asking me to participate in the MLA panel for which
this paper was originally written, and to those colleagues, especially Tim Bren
nan, Lisa Frank, Keya Ganguly, Paula Geyh and Jeff Williams, who comment
ed on it before and/or afterwards. Thanks also to Ivo Kamps, who solicited this
essay for Jx when he got wind that it had (unsurprisingly) been turned down by
Profession, In the rejection letter from Profession, Phyllis Franklin suggested
that “more space than was needed” was given in this article to the critique of
the MLA. I hope that other readers might see this as a matter of interpreta
tion.
2. I chose to cite this text primarily because it is collected in an MLA pub
lication; its position would thus presumably carry at least some weight and
legitimacy with members of that organization, whether they agree with it or
not. My own position on theoretical work, which I will develop through the
argument of this
is actually closer to Stuart Hall’s neo-Gramscian “ideol
ogy critique” which relies upon a complex theorization of hegemony. See, for
example, “The Problem of Ideology: Marxism without Guarantees.”
3. I am not implying that this similarity necessarily points to “collusion” on
the part of the MLA officers and the Yale faculty who wrote the letters com
plaining about Resolution 6 — ideology does not work that way for the most
part. What interests me is that so many MLA officers — probably with the
best of intentions — consciously or unconsciously bought into, and reproduced,
the claims of the senior Yale faculty as “true” when these same claims appear to
be patently “rhetorical” to other readers. Leaving open the possibility for the
moment that the attempt to place all the “facts” on one side and all the
“rhetoric” on the other in this dispute simply will not bear up to scrutiny, we
must consider, then, the implications of the MLA officers’ discursive alliance
with the Yale senior faculty, as I attempt to do in this essay.
4. Linda Peterson and Ruth Yeazell note in their letter, for example, that
“for a number of years now, some graduate students at Yale have been agitating
in various ways in support of a union — meeting, pamphleteering, picketing,
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even engaging in temporary job actions?” Annabel Patterson points out that a
letter from senior administrators at Yale “explained to the part-time acting
instructors that those who failed to turn in their grades [that is, participated in
the grade strike] . . . would not be allowed to teach in the spring.”
5. The New York Times reported in November of 1996 that “lawyers for the
National Labor Relations Board . . . plan to charge Yale University with acting
illegally by punishing teaching assistants who staged a grade strike last Decem
ber in a drive to unionize” (Greenhouse 6). The Board’s determination to pur
sue this course was based on the collecting of evidence of numerous threats by
various members of the senior faculty and administration of Yale toward strik
ing graduate assistants. Representatives of the administration never have
denied the making of these threats; their position was rather that, as the New
York Times article notes, “in the past, the board’s lawyers treated graduate assis
tants as students rather than employees” and thus that their treatment of the
striking teachers was justified.
6. The thorny question of how to deal with the relatively elite status of Yale
graduate students in relation to other graduate students (which they would
hardly deny) raises itself here. One thing that clear, however, is that no mat
ter how privileged they may be in relation to graduate students in other sites,
they are not privileged in relation to the senior faculty in their departments.
Furthermore, I think that an important analogy can be drawn through an
examination of labor history. It has often (though, of course, not exclusively)
been the case that relatively well-off groups were organized before other groups
(northern factories before southern ones; “Big Steel” before the small plants) —
and that the organizations established by the somewhat more secure workers
provided a structure for the more vulnerable groups to join, offering them an
otherwise unavailable margin of protection. Without claiming that graduate
students are exactly like steel workers (obviously not so), I think that one can
claim that elite graduate students are in a position relative to more exploited
graduate students which is analogous to Big Steels relationship to smaller
plants earlier in the century. If it succeeds in unionizing the teaching staff at a
major private university, GESO will have set an important precedent that will
be helpful not only to graduate student organizing but also to the organizing of
part-time faculty and even full-time faculty at private schools far less privileged
than
Hence, Margaret Homans misses the point in her observation that
“it would be appropriate for students to unionize at those schools where teach
ing loads are much higher than at Yale and where reliance on graduate teach
ing greater. Part-time and adjunct faculty with Ph.D.’s present an even more
legitimate motive to unionize, although they are not part of the union move
ment at Yale. But it is not possible for Yale students — in training, after all, to
occupy professional positions — to constitute the proletarianized body they
claim to be.” The unionization of Yale students might well
the union
ization of the other groups Homans names. In any case, “students ... at those
schools where teaching loads are much higher than at Yale” are also in “train
ing .. . to occupy professional positions” — so it not entirely clear why it
proper for them to unionize but not Yale students on that ground alone. But
more importantly, while Yale students are undoubtedly better off financially, in
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work conditions, and even in future prospects than many of their graduate stu
dent colleagues at other schools, this by no means suggests that within the local
power dynamic they have no legitimate grievances. In addition, the part-time
workers with Ph.D.’s, who Homans admits are an exploited group at Yale, can
certainly benefit from a graduate instructors’ union, which, should it ever be
recognized, would provide a site in which they could organize in relative safety
from reprisals (such as being fired), fear of which no doubt contributes to their
current non-participation in GESO.
7. Jameson’s dialectic of ideology and utopia pertinent here. At the con
clusion of The Political Unconscious, he argues that even retrograde ideological
positipns can contain the germs of utopian hope, and thus that they should be
read in such a way that “a functional method for describing cultural texts
articulated with an anticipatory one” (296). In other words, one might (and
should) explore the work performed by particular texts toward reproducing the
status quo, or a specific nexus of interests, while also recognizing the desire for
non-exploitative, democratic “collective-associational” future that might be
expressed simultaneously with it (in concepts, to take the case in hand, such as
"academic community”). Problems arise in assuming that the latter already
exists in the guise of the former.
8. One of the main issues of the staff strikes at Yale in the mid-80s was,
a matter of fact, such gendered discrepancies in pay. Though hotly disputed at
the time, the case for equal pay now seems practically incontrovertible, and the
case against it preposterous (which does not, alas, mean that inequalities do not
persist). On such a model, one wonders what the case against graduate student
unions will look like in ten years time!
9. Data culled from the Association of University Technology Managers’
survey of “Gross Royalties Received ... for Fiscal year 1994” — part of its
Licensing Survey for that year.
10. See Cary Nelson’s much-cited article for Social Text, and the essays col
lected in Higher Education Under Fire, edited by Berube and Nelson.
11. If these figures are “disquieting” (as she puts it) to Sandra Gilbert,
imagine what they must be like for those people more immediately affected.
The passage in which she makes this admission bears quotation in all its grim
detail: for the 1993-4 graduating Ph.D.s who got postsecondary academic jobs
(75%) “only 45.6% of the jobs in English . .. were full-time tenure-track posi
tions. The smaller percentage of tenure-track jobs especially disquieting... .
I remind myself that the placement survey several years old and the number
of advertised positions has dropped since then!” (4).
12. For an excellent general overview of the issues posed by the strike, see
the essays collected by Cary Nelson in Will Teach for Food: Academic Labor in
Crisis, The title of the MLA panel in which I participated refers to Yale striker,
not just the graduate instructors’ strike, even though, because of the particular
emphasis of Resolution 6, the graduate instructors have received most of the
attention among MLA members. Nevertheless, it is important to recall that
students were not the only group engaged in strike action recently at Yale; cler
ical workers, librarians and dining hall workers were striking
well. In join
ing a union, the graduate instructors have allied themselves with these workers
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(and vice versa), as well as with a long history of labor struggle both at Yale and
in the US. They have opened the possibility of forging an “academic commu
nity” that includes all university workers, professor and kitchen staff, librarian
and secretary, as our colleagues in Britain have done in the General Strike of
the universities in November 1996 (see Guardian, November 19, 1996). They
have forged lateral alliances with other universities where students are union
ized (or hope to be) rather than thinking of their own predicament or the
predicament of others as isolated and isolatable. The problems that confront us
are collective problems, requiring collective solutions. As capital and the uni
versity restructure themselves over time, we will find ourselves in the position
of having to reassess assumptions, concepts and relations previously taken for
granted. Unions might not be the only, or even, the best, solution to the prob
lems we confront along the way, but at the current conjuncture they have pro
vided collective structuration for thinking and organizing that for too long has
gone on in an atomized fashion.
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Pleasures lie on the other side of attentiveness. The
physical act of reading, thefocus, the posture, and the
suspension may at times approach levels of pain,
although this discomfort, usually no more than the
awkwardness ofelbows in the dark, isfleeting. What
a text solicits is not attention, but distraction. The
text provides leave, it asks that you walk alone, and
accuse the world that possesses you, including your
own cognitive resources, of insufficiency. After all,
with the page in hand, you are lookingfor something,
listening for it. If the readingfails, if distraction is
not rewarded with even the slightest increase in the
capacity to endure the world that commands atten
tion, you will retaliate, and someone will sufferfor it.

Race, Sex, and His
tory in American

Culture, and Willa
Cather and the

Myth of American
Migration, as well
essays on American

literature and culture.

In 1936, Willa Cather wrote a letter to The Common
weal defending the function of writing and reading
literary texts. The letter is included in the volume,
Willa Cather on Writing, with a 1930s left-baiting
title, “Escapism.” Cather's central argument that to
accuse art and literature of being escapist to engage
in tautological thinking. “What has art ever been but
escape?”, Cather asks, and what possible purpose can
literature otherwise serve?
Nearly all the Escapists in the long past have
managed their own budget and their social rela
tions
unsuccessfully that I wouldn’t want them
for my landlords, or my bankers, or my neigh
bors. They were valuable, like powerful stimu
lants, only when they were left out of the social
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and industrial routine which goes on every day all over the world. Indus
trial life has to work out its own problems. (21)

Literary criticism in the twentieth century has been engaged in a quest for rel
evance that invites failure and brings displeasure and aggravation to its practi
tioners. Deans and accreditation boards want to know about outcomes. Career
planners want to know about options for undergraduate majors. Meanwhile,
the ambitious graduate student
at work to prove that the past ten years of
criticism on My Ántonia is false or windy and the true interpretation at hand
— his hand. Or the even more ambitious assistant professor is set to establish
how the intricate puzzle of gender relations in her culture is exposed in the text,
which she explicates. The quest for relevance in literary studies has resulted in
a succession of theoretical approaches, arguing everything from all the world’s
a text (and thus the province of formalist literary scholarship) to all the world's
social ills exist in some particular text, or canon, or tradition. Meanwhile, the
function of literary criticism within the structured performances of public
thinking has eroded steadily, and the only voices that are certain to reach the
public at large are those that attack the institution and the practice of literary
scholarship.
Willa Cather's letter to The Commonweal addresses the question that every
generation of literary scholars must answer: Why study literature? The implic
it answer in recent decades has been anything but Cather s invitation to escape.
Cather opens her letter with an account of primitive Southwest Native Amer
ican women, living “under the perpetual threat of drought and famine,” who
nonetheless invest hours of effort to paint geometrical patterns on their earth
enware jars and pots even “when they had nothing to cook in them.” The urge
to make the world aesthetically pleasing, according to Cather, springs from “an
unaccountable predilection” of human behavior (19). Nonetheless, the question
of the usefulness of such activities dogs us, especially in United States civiliza
tion, where our attention is turned so persistently to productivity. Here is
where Cather takes a less than genteel turn. All true poets are “useful,” she
argues, “because they refresh and recharge the spirit of those who can read their
language” (20). Cather retreats quickly from the second point, referring instead
to the “powerful stimulants” in literature and defending literature against calls
for immediate social relevance. The point she does not pursue is her assertion
that whatever escape literary artists provide, they do so only for those who can
read their language.
The women who painted intricate patterns on pots and jars saw past the
practical utility of these items to something more — not necessarily more pro
found, but certainly less immediate. At the very least, the etched shapes reflect
a power of cognition that refuses to limit itself to water-carrying, that by its
artistic endeavor asserts that the limits of its attention are not met merely by
toting water up the hill and toting human waste back down. The basis for read
ing the language of arts is to recognize how their attention has been focused,
and then to read past representation to the cognitive quality of the impulse that
produced it. The inability to read their language produces charges of irrele
vance and uselessness because such readings read the text but cannot read past
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it. Likewise, the insistence upon reading the language of art as if it were lim
ited to its representational or performative functions leads to successive, dis
posable interpretive gestures, resulting in higher-level charges of irrelevance
and uselessness. It is as if to say, how nice that those Pueblo Indians decorat
ed their pots, they must have had plenty of leisure time to make such pretty
shapes.
In Moby Dick, Melville invites the process of reading past on a number of
occasions, extracting from everyday whaling operations richly evocative con
tent. The narrative itself reads past the business of whaling to a succession of
complexities embodied in the purposeful actions of sailors. In the following
passage, Melville describes the whale line, tied to the harpoon:
Again: as the profound calm which only apparently precedes and prophe
sies of the storm, perhaps more awful than the storm itself; for, indeed,
the calm but the wrapper and envelope of the storm; and contains it in
itself, as the seemingly harmless rifle holds the fatal powder, and the ball,
and the explosion; so the graceful repose of the line, as it silently serpen
tines about the oarsmen before being brought into actual play — this is a
thing which carries more of true error than any other aspect of this dan
gerous affair. But why say more? All men live enveloped in whale lines.
All are born with halters round their necks; but it is only when caught in
the swift, sudden turn of death, that mortals realize the silent, subtle, ever
present perils of life. And if you be a philosopher, though seated in the
whale-boat, you would not at heart feel one whit of terror, than though
seated before your evening fire with a poker, and not a harpoon, by your
side. (306)

The useful whale line explained metaphorically,
it shares the qualities of
the quiet that precedes a storm, or of the unheld, loaded weapon — harmless
and calm until its potential function commences. These images are enough to
know the whale line, and to appreciate its utility and its purpose in the narra
tive. But to read past the whale line to recognize the thought processes con
tained within those metaphors. If all men live enveloped in whale lines, living
day to day might be understood as the storm's calm prologue, or the uncocked
weapon, so that we might offer the interpretation that grace, dignity, and even
the larger structures of civilization simply give form to human illusions of per
manence. Here, with Melville s language, we begin to read past his image, but
not quite. We are still at the level of the image of the whale line and its applic
ability to human nature, still thus at the symbolic function.
The last line of the passage invites the process of reading past its interpre
tive possibilities. One does not need to sit in a whaleboat and hold harpoon
to attend to the terror of the image created by the whale line. If you are philo
sophical, if you can read their language, then “seated before your evening fire
with a poker, and not harpoon, by your side,” you will gain access to the cog
nitive horrors tapped by the coiled whale line. The gesture of poking the fire
thus emerges as an attenuation of the harpoon thrust (as well as a hundred
other such outward gestures), and the safety of the domestic hearth a delusion
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equal to Ahabs ambition of control over natural forces. Linked this way to the
Pequod's mission, fire poking becomes a task worthy of pleasured distraction,
like toting water in decorated pots. The material circumstances of an action
obscure but do not change the precarious nature of the chain of circumstances
to which it ultimately contributes. To read past the whale line to read past
whaling as a whole toward the cognitive processes that led Melvilles imagina
tion to be filled so deeply with harpoons, vessels, and madmen.
In Moby Dick, Melville consistently documents and reads past the utilities
of whaling, and the whale line passage exemplary, not exceptional. Nonethe
less, to read past Melville is to contemplate the turn of his attention to whaling
in order to capture images sufficient to the imaginative direction of the text. To
read past the juxtaposition of harpoon and fireplace poker, for example, might
lead one to recognize subsequent correspondences between images in the text
and gestures contained within the reader’s own daily performances. Thus, the
existence of Ahab’s quest for the great white whale exists over the facts of whal
ing like those geometrical patterns on earthenware pots. The women need
those pots, but they don’t need the geometrical designs except as an escape from
the needed pots. Ahab and the crew of the Pequod need whales, but they don’t
need Moby Dick except as an expression of their need to transcend or escape
the business of whaling. The limits of this crew’s attention are not met, in other
words, merely by killing whales. If one’s sense of the now expansive, it con
tains room in it for the day-to-day functions of whaling and pot-toting, and
also for great white whales and geometrical figurations. Throughout the text,
Melville probes the unaccountable predilection of human beings to project the
forms and structures of their thoughts on wider canvases than circumstances
provide, to become creatively, and at times destructively, inattentive to the prac
tical content of their thoughts and the tasks at hand. The continuous move
ment by Pueblo Indian women, up and down the cliffs, from their rock-perched
homes to sources of water far below, most surely influenced the geometrical
patterns of their aesthetic impulses, reified on their pot burdens. The continu
ous movement by New England whalers, further and further out to sea, to
destroy life for commerce and for illumination, worked on Melville’s mind
that every operation, from signing on to the ship to harpooning the whale,
became invested with a significance to those who could read its language. Plea
sure arises from the discovery that through inattention labor may come to pos
sess value, even significance, far beyond our capacity to comprehend fully each
gesture, each toting. In every case, the literary emerges from these forms and
structures of distraction, and it is in this mode of cognition that literary critics
find their vocation.
Distraction is serious business in literature. At its very best, the literary
the art of reading past. It not the study of history, or the study of social con
ditions, or the study of any particular representation of reality but the study of
how one reads past every one of these phenomena. Reading past means over
passing the mimetic detail — a whaling venture, a pattern of conflict, a social
issue — to a consideration of the particular representation as imaginative stim
ulus within the larger system of meaning created by the work. And even then,
it is not the system of meaning that one settles on but the creation of meaning,
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the action, or movement of the system towards expansive meaning. One reads
literature to be present at the creation, and then to move past what has been
created toward the something more that informs, in essence, the literary. Those,
who cannot read the language of literary texts, or whose minds are satisfied
with lesser works, or who prefer the seemingly less mediated language of histo
ry or social science, may not be comfortable or find use in reading past but read,
rather, for the mimetic or informational quality of the text. This
under
standable, as we seem to lack an articulate rationale for the study of literary
writing, and much of what passes as literary criticism really history, sociolo
gy, or cultural commentary.
Reading precedes comprehension, interpretation, and criticism. The ques
tion of how one reads is not a simple one, and its complexity has become
increasingly apparent as reading habits shift at the end of this century and as
literary criticism loses its public relevance. Charles Altieri thus proposes “that
we shift our attention from the relations between interpretive statements and
their objects to the positions that works of art make available for reflecting on
ourselves as interpreting subjects” (291-2). Altieri proposes a move away from
concern with the constellation of interpretive paradigms surrounding literary
texts and toward greater attention to textually-based extensions of the readers
own imaginative capacities — and then to construct a language and a means of
explaining this process. “The problem for contemporary theory is to show how
.. . imaginative activity can at once be assessed within a common language and
have some influence on the principles adapted for those assessments” (16).
Similarly, Michael Bérubé finds that “while we academic readers have been
devising more and more exacting ways of reading our texts, our worlds and our
critics, the reading skills and reasoning facilities of [even the college-educated
mass public] have become cause for national alarm” (65). It may be that the
ways in which academic readers read are ill communicated by the rituals of crit
ical presentation and poorly represented within the discourse of college and
university curricula. It is not likely, for example, that the demands of reading
imaginative literature and the skills required to read an executive summary are
properly or usefully conflated in assessing facility with language. John Guillo
ry correctly dismisses the internecine battles within the literary establishment
over canons and cores as a symptom of a much larger problem, a crisis shared
by conservative and radical academics alike. Two distinct forms of “cultural
capital” are pitted against each other in the processes of contemporary intellec
tual formation, “one of which ‘traditional,' the other organic to the constitu
tion of the professional-managerial class” (45). The literary establishment has
not performed well in defending the place of traditional literary study (in any
form, from Great Books to postcolonialism) within the context of the intellec
tual demands of corporate capitalism. “It has proven to be much easier to quar
rel about the content of the curriculum than to confront the implications of a
fully emergent professional-managerial class which no longer requires the cul
tural capital of the old bourgeoisie.” Nonetheless, Guillory's sense of "cultural
capital” stresses the content over the active demands of imaginative literature.
When academic readers become entrenched over issues of what to read, they
sidestep and become mournfully inattentive to issues of how to read.
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“Through the fence, between the curling flower spaces, I could see them
hitting.” The sentence is the opening line of Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury.
It makes little sense, literally, to talk about curling flower spaces or what lies
between them. Explication can
this problem, and maybe a drawing of a pair
of curled flower stems, showing how the space bordered by the stems also curls
(like one of those pictures of a lamp that turns out to be two profiles facing one
another) will settle the issue once and for
But after all that, we still have
this confused sentence and the question: Why was it written this way? To
demonstrate how perception can be deceiving, psychologists use the trick pic
ture with the lamp and the twin profiles. Is Faulkners sentence meant to
deceive? Unlike the profile/lamp, the sentence does not represent two images
simultaneously. There is the fence, the curly spaces between the flowers, and
the “I” who could see them hitting. More explication can help. The “I” is the
voice of an idiot, the character Benjamin Compson, a retarded man whose per
ceptions are thus discordant with conventional narrative methods. Of course,
we would have to forewarn anyone who might think that Faulkner’s book is an
accurate depiction of the consciousness of a retarded man. Such representation
would be impossible, since only the retarded man would be in position to ver
ify the text and no one as retarded as Benjamin Compson can read The Sound
and the Fury. This, then, returns us to the sentence, which, divested of mimet
ic qualities and any test of credibility, remains senseless. We must read past the
representational sense of the sentence toward something else.
With Faulkner, there often the problem of making sense and the chal
lenge to read past this problem. Not everyone has seen it this way. Edmund
Volpe, in A Reader’s Guide to William Faulkner, provided number of charts,
graphs, and genealogies to make sense of Faulkners texts. Volpes project has
continued over the years, with guides, notes, interpretations, approaches, and
book-length readings produced regularly to aid the uninitiated in making their
way through the text.1 There are fifteen time shifts in Benjamin Compsons
narrative, and Volpe charts them. The implication is that once the reader mas
ters the time shifts, the meaning of the text is clear. But this is not necessarily
so. Knowing all the time shifts introduces an entirely new level of meaning to
the text. To make schematic logic of Benjamin’s narrative is to establish a level
of meaning that knows what the chapter, and the narrator, does not know: the
schematic meaning of the text’s opening narrative. Clearly, even in an age when
we do not talk about authorial intention, this text was meant to be confusing.
If we eliminate the confusion by charting the time shifts, we are damaging the
text no less than if we rewrote Dickens to make him more confusing: “Times
the best it was of, worst the times it was of.” Why would anyone do that? The
revision doesn’t help clarify what happens when the text read written. The
same is true of the curling flower spaces, where making sense, of the narrative
destroys its effect and its meaning. Rather than making sense, the reader must
read past.
Much of literary criticism proceeds in the same manner as Volpe’s famous
(and admittedly seductive) guidebook. The critic’s method often “this means
this” and “this says this but really means this” and “this
meaningless unless
you know that and once you know that then this means this” or, ultimately, “this
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says this but really means this.” It no wonder that the general readership for
literary criticism — unlike that for history or the social sciences — has nearly
disappeared. Who wants to be told what a book means? And worse, if you
can’t know one book without reading another, why read either? “You don’t
know about me,” announces the narrator on the first page of Mark Twain’s
Adventures ofHuckleberry Finn, “without you have read book by the name of
'The Adventures of Tom Sawyer,’ but that ain’t no matter.” It’s no matter
because there is little about Huck Finn in the other book that is necessary to
the experience of reading his emergence in the book he narrates. The selfdefeating quality in much of literary criticism that criticism is too often tied
to explication — efforts to make the meaning plain are inevitably doomed to
disposability because meaning changes with context, with readers’ sensibilities,
and with shifting political, cultural, and social priorities. It is no wonder that
the guidebooks keep coming, each decade making sense, again, of the tales told
by idiots and artists. For literary studies to reassert its value in the present, it
must get past, or read past, the meaning of texts.
To readpast — say, to read past common literary theme, such as social tol
erance — is to experience a transformation of intellectual capacities so that the
mimetic question, what is this book about? is supplanted by the reactive, or com
pensatory, question, what is this book doing to me and my distracted sensibilities?
There is no other question wholly appropriate and wholly exclusive to the lit
erary. Consider the hypothetical example of a novel about social tolerance. To
read past tolerance to expiate a prior understanding — not merely to recog
nize one’s own thinking but to have one’s thinking suspended, distracted —
that the mind
cognizant of the parallel, or the literary equivalence, to the
intellectual energies that tolerance necessitates. It may well be that a novel that
depicts an intolerant man would be wholly beside the point. Our attention,
then, might be more productively focused on “expressions of certain modes of
intelligence, thought, and feeling” in the novel, expressions unavailable else
where, in other discursive practices (Parker 38). David Parker thus directs the
reader to attend to “the spirit, the ethos or character of a literary work’s creative
thinking” and not to become snagged on its subject matter, its theme, or its
mimetic qualities. What Parker is describing a land of inattention, where one
willfully attends not to what is literally depicted but to the cognitive energies
and structures that produced or gave rise to the representation. This kind of
thinking is not always polite because it is often mistaken for irrelevance or
taken as a form of hostility toward pressing business. “Reading is a judgment,”
according to Sven Birkirts. “It brands as insufficient the understandings and
priorities that govern ordinary life” (85). Unless one holds that literary texts are
simply decorative, or that the geometrical shapes serve no cognitive purpose
either in the drawing or the repeated, daily viewing, one must confront seriously
the mode of attention demanded by literary distraction. To enter into the world
of the curling flower spaces, one must become inattentive to the world where
such utterance would interfere with business or be disruptive, and .one must
decide, for the time, that that ain’t no matter.

inattention n.
L17. [f. IN-3 + ATTENTION.]
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Failure to pay attention or take notice; heedlessness, negligence. L17.
Lack of courteous personal attention. L18.

The OED traces inattention to the late seventeenth century, when it signaled a
“failure to pay attention or take notice” and the resultant judgment of “heed
lessness, negligence.” One hundred years later, the inattentive were judged
more severely and held more specifically responsible for their actions, as the
term since then has indicated “lack of courteous personal attention.” Thus what
starts as an observable human tendency (“failure to pay attention”) linked to
irresponsibility (“negligence”), becomes, by the end of the eighteenth century, a
form of misbehavior and a breach of etiquette
well (“lack of courteous per
sonal attention”). In the twentieth century, inattention has evolved into a diag
nosable intellectual malfunction, marking its complete metamorphosis from
tendency to pathology. Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD) a psychological
ailment commonly associated with childhood but also diagnosable in adults.
Current research on the disorder, however, finds that far from indicating a
deficit, the symptoms associated with ADD may signal an excess of attention.
“The irony is that behavior interpreted as ‘thoughtless’ probably is a result of
too much awareness and the desire to cope” (Cherkes-Julkowski et al. 6). The
desire to conform to expectations and to cope with felt inadequacies produces
behavioral irregularities, such as hyperactivity. Significantly, the person with
ADD is more comfortable in an environment characterized by rapid shifts in
stimuli and less comfortable in environments that call for sustained attention or
the practice of repetitive tasks (9). The disorder may well be an advance indi
cation of human adaptation to current trends in the social and intellectual envi
ronment. As the volume of sensory stimuli increases, the mind must spend
more and more of its energies prioritizing its attentive capacities.
The issue, of course, involves what one ought to attend to. The processes
of socialization and education involve directing ones attention in socially
acceptable, preferably productive ways. It is no coincidence that issues of atten
tiveness should fall within the provinces of medical science in the late twenti
eth century; the environment produced by technology makes the phenomenon
particularly problematic, and thus “inattention” joins drinking, drug use, and
smoking as medical illnesses, not rational social choices. Anyone who writes on
a Windows-based word processing and personal computing system and feels
the need to check e-mail periodically knows that communication technology
works at cross-purposes to the art of sustained attention to single tasks. On the
contrary, Windows technology specifically functions against focused attention
and actively encourages a “multi-task” desktop ecology. The use of internet
technology to foster reading skills also acts quite explicitly against sustained
attention, as web sources are predicated on the fact that alternatives, or linked
texts and images, are always one mouse-click away.2 These are not incidental
matters. Indeed, forms of attention have been recognized for decades by com
munication scholars to lie at the very core of civilization. “Attention^ structure
is a way of understanding social organization in terms of the structure ofthe sys
tem of communication, rather than solely in terms of the nature of the signal,
its content and behavioural effects” (Chance and Larsen 2). Hence, the divi
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sion of attention within social groups is fundamental to the power structure and
future development of the social order. For example, the way in which ones
attention is deployed may define ones relationship to the larger group — inat
tention may indicate anything from lack of concern to hostility, but it may also
signal a position of leisured power. Similarly, the function exercised by some
agencies to direct our attention, such as the power of news corporations and
television broadcasts to set the agenda of public concern, far exceeds the con
tent of any particular message conveyed. Chance and Larsen conclude that
“[b]ecause of the central role of attention in the control and coordination of
social behaviour, it is probable that the social organization of attention has been
a crucialfactor in human evolution?
How does a literary text direct our attention? Birkirts identifies the asocial
nature of reading, where reading is understood as an implicit rejection of the
demands of the social world — whether it be the pressures on children to go
play outside because it is nice day, or on adults to interact with others or
engage in some productive activity, such as going to the office or mowing the
lawn. Reading like walking alone, in Emerson s terms: “Whoso goes to walk
alone, accuses the whole world; he declares all to be unfit to be his companions;
it
very uncivil, nay, insulting; Society will retaliate” (100). Unlike a self
improvement book, gardening manual, or a study of childhood development,
the literary text
not read to prepare for more efficient, subsequent activity.
Literary reading is more accurately understood as studied inattention, as it
argues implicitly for a conception of the meaningful that may discount shared
values of efficiency, including linear conceptions of time, the privileging of
immediate, present concerns, and the injunction that one be accountable,
always, in ones activities. When one reads literature attentively, one loses time,
is unaware of present concerns, and is unaccountable. It no wonder that lit
erary employments — reading as well as writing — are seen as an affront to
those with schedules to attend to, or to those who seek to maintain efficiency
standards. Society will retaliate. One cannot claim to need to know about
Benjys curling flower spaces, or Ishmaels whale line, in order to do ones busi
ness or attend to ones obligations properly. However, it more likely that one
cannot make these claims credibly because literary critics have not articulated
their validity.
Reading literature mirrors the kind of social rejection necessary to the cre
ation of imaginative fiction. When readers engage in the forms of distraction
demanded by the text, they participate in a ritual of inattentiveness set into the
fiction by its creator, its author. The twentieth century has not always proved
so hospitable to literary distraction. On the eve of the century, Sarah Orne
Jewett envisioned the quest for literary space as one that involved travel to the
more remote regions of geographical consciousness. In The Country of the
Pointed Firs (1896), a woman travels to Maine in order to find “all that mixture
of remoteness, and childish certainty of being the centre of civilization” (5) that
makes reading and writing possible. Hunting seclusion, she goes to Dunnet
Landing to escape the social world and find the privacy and certainty necessary
to artistic creation. However, when she arrives she becomes enmeshed in the
community through her landlady’s herb business and thus must struggle to cre
ate space for inattention:
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To have been patted kindly on the shoulder and called “darlin’,” to have
been offered a surprise of early mushrooms for supper, to have had all the
glory of making two dollars and twenty-seven cents in a single day, and
then to renounce it all and withdraw from these pleasant successes, needed
much resolution. Literary employments are so vexed with uncertainties at
best, and it was not until the voice of conscience sounded louder in my ears
than the sea on the nearest pebble beach that I said unkind words of with
drawal to Mrs. Todd. She only became more wistfully affectionate than
ever in her expressions, and looked as disappointed as I expected when I
frankly told her that I could no longer enjoy the pleasure of what we called
“seein folks." (8)

The act of committing oneself to literary employments is explicitly unkind: it
shows a willed lack of consideration for others and represents a breaking with
the social rewards that come from attentiveness. Reading past the predicament
of the writer in Jewett’s passage, past the entangling seductions of the immedi
ate world (being someone’s darlin, sharing supper, making $2.27), we find that
literary employments are made possible by renunciation, withdrawal, and reso
lution. Furthermore, these acts of unkindness and resolve are issued in order to
gain entry into a world of certainty (although a certainty precariously vexed by
uncertainty), and so naturally, it would seem, the recipients of these acts would
misconstrue them and suffer the kind of disappointment experienced by the
abandoned Mrs. Todd.
Reading past The Country of the Pointed Firs brings the reader to a descrip
tion of those forms of behavior produced by literary modes of thought. One
cannot plead human nature here, which seems to be social. On the contrary,
literary employments are located outside the natural inclinations of human
beings and within the proclivities of conscious effort. Literary employments
thus renounce natural connections, from the transcendent human identification
with such natural forces as the sea to the sensual pleasures of being loved, cared
for, and needed by someone else. To attend to the book, one must renounce the
world at hand for the “uncivil” world of the distracted mind. The impulse
places the imagination at the core of consciousness,
it was in childhood,
before knowledge made its inroads and adult provisionality replaced the child’s
sense of being securely centered. With creative energies at the core and not at
the fringe, the imagination is temporarily restored to a position of conscious
dominance while the book is read and contemplated. Freed from the recipro
cal obligations of sensual, interpersonal attentions, the imagination returns to
its primary function, which is to provide the self with its pleasured sense of
security and reality. When the “lover of Dunnet Landing returned to find the
unchanged shores of the pointed firs,” she returns like a reader to a book, and
discovers something constant about herself.
Still, the price of discovery is the act of unkindness that makes literary
employment possible. In Jewett’s novel, the narrator renounces her home in
New York for Dunnet Landing, and then must renounce Dunnet Landing for
a one-room schoolhouse, where she sets up her writing desk. The gradually
more severe renunciation signals the obstacles that the twentieth century would
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place before literary employments, as “Dunnet Landing” would become
increasingly more difficult to locate on the psychic landscape. The need to pay
attention — to broadcasts, motorists, and communication devices — exacts a
continuously rising price on imaginative impulses and foreshortens the amount
of time when the imagination rules consciousness. While childhood shrinks,
adolescence is lengthened, and this protracted period of powerless attentiveness
results in a range of anxieties, social disorders, and learning disabilities. Chron
ic inattentiveness is tolerated in childhood only, although what it represents to
the mind is necessary to all of us. Of course, reading is only one form, perhaps
the most difficult and most encompassing form, of distraction. Television,
magazines, sporting events, video games, the internet: these are all forms of
distraction in which the imagination is only partially ascendant, where atten
tion is divided but not obliterated, so as to allow the maintenance of social
obligations. Nonetheless, the popularity of such forms of partial inattention
indicates the limited satisfaction provided by continuously paying attention.
In a remarkable book devoted to the mysteries of attention, James Hans
explains the “psychic economy that depends on inattention”:

If we say that we need inattention because we require states of being that
take us away from the anxiety of living, we are conceding that the burdens
of being a self-aware creature are too great for us to bear for any length of
time. And if we see the ways that our desire for inattention has created a
series of social forms that are designed to take our minds off of our anxi
eties, then we can see how the two coalesce to provide us with a life that
inclines toward inattention rather than full awareness. (34)

The extraordinary burdens of self-awareness can be and are relieved in count
less ways, some of which are physically debilitating. Tremendous resources are
expended on forms of attention — education, preparation, development of
skills — but when it comes to inattention, most people are on their own or at
the mercy of entertainment industries, drug dealers, and liquor stores. The fact
is that educational institutions fail to attend systematically to modes of inat
tention because, like Cathers critics in the 1930s, they equate inattention with
escapism, and escapism with irresponsibility. The cliff-dwelling women need
ed to apply geometrical patterns to their earthenware just as, in Hans’s words,
we need inattention because we concede “that the burdens of being a self-aware
creature are too great for us to bear for any length of time.” And more than
that: we concede that if we are to go on toting water up the hill we are going
to have to get past the drudgery of attending to the task. We move with dis
traction past our predicament and turn inattention into art — we require inat
tention as a mode of survival. Distraction is more than a form of anxiety
release; it a crucial component of the solution to psychic dilemma old as
human recording. “Why are we here?” always, in part, answered by, “So we
do not have to be here.” The relation between the two heres is the province of
literature. Distraction, even coarse forms such as mass entertainment and alco
hol, is never mindless; on the contrary, it is an escape from frittering mindless
ness, mindful compensation for the dullness that enforced attentiveness pro
duces, achieved through pleasured inattention to its sources and causes.
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The heedlessness and negligence of inattention, and the departure from
social modes of courteous attention represented by literary endeavors, provide
the grounds upon which we may begin to defend what it we mean by the
value of literary study. Formalist criticism has long argued the capacity of lit
erature to defamiliarize the real, to make it strange, as a preparation for renewed
insight and greater understanding of reality. Social criticism values works of the
imagination as lenses into the complexities of race and gender, historical forces
and class structures. The two modes of analysis — formal and social — have
been pitted against each other through most of the twentieth century, although
both share a devotion to imaginative structures of knowledge. Distraction
floats past all of these categories of analysis, like the student whose gaze directs
his face outside, through the window in the schoolroom, although he
not
looking at anything and nothing has his attention. It is the teacher, not the stu
dent, who labels such inattentiveness discourtesy. Genuine inattention does not
signify the absence of interest or even the presence of disinterest; rather, what
we assign
inattention more likely signals an excessive intake, like sleeping
scholars in midnight library carrels. To dismiss such actions as forms of negli
gence is to burn the book, as it were, as an evil influence or inappropriate stim
ulant. The literary tradition in all of its evocations and critical paradigms is, at
base, the verbal manifestation of the human need for modes of distraction.
Labeled “escapist” by those with authoritarian agendas, the need to pay atten
tion where it yields the most pleasurable cognitive return is at the heart of the
literary experience. Distraction serious business, representing more than dis
courtesy. Our management experts, our social scientists of every stripe, would
like the world to be a courteous and heedful place where rules govern human
behavior — except for an occasional, structured retreat or brainstorming ses
sion. But the world is influenced more by its record of inattention than by its
commitment to any particular intellectual regime. According to the OED, dis
traction signals a change in direction:
distraction n.
LME. [(O)Fr., or L distractio(n-), f. as DISTRACT v.: see-ION.]

Diversion of the mind, attention, etc., from a particular object or course; the
fact of having ones attention or concentration disturbed by something;
amusement, relaxation. LME.
An instance or occasion of this; something that distracts or diverts the mind
or attention; distracting sounds, events, etc. E17.
The fact or condition of being physically or mentally drawn in different
directions by conflicting forces or emotions.

The best of what we read — and here we come upon core issues of canon
formation — specifically addresses our attention-paying capacities. The realm
of the imagination is contested space because all social reality flows from it, and
all social potentiality depends upon it. Unless one considers the world a par
adise and desires no changes, all distraction, including literary representation,
will be of signal importance. However, it is not mimesis that interests me but
the structure of distraction built into the text. The strong women-centered

Published by eGrove, 2020

121

Journal X, Vol. 2 [2020], No. 2, Art. 8

Joseph R. Urgo

249

community in Jewett’s novel does not, finally, gain the attention so much as the
equation of that community with remoteness and renunciation, suggesting the
ways in which the world of the writer has been defined as distracted, absent
ed, male world, closer to that of the sailor than that of his wife. Reading past
representation, we come upon the cognitive links of imaginative attention and
witness the recasting of the world that renunciation brings to the fore. Like a
lost vessel, drifting is a necessary prelude to the redefinition of ones sense of
direction. And there is no greater pleasure than the sense of floating above,
transcending physical and intellectual confinement, and starting or becoming
anew.
At one point in Willa Cather’s novel, My Ántonia, the narrator, Jim Bur
den, agrees to sleep where Ántonia Shimerda is house-sitting because she has
become fearful of Wick Cutter, the man who owns the house. She fears for her
physical safety. During the third night that Burden is sleeping in the Cutters’
house, the man returns, ostensibly to rape Ántonia. “A hand closed softly on
my shoulder,” Jim reports, “and at the same moment I felt something hairy and
cologne-scented brushing my face.” When Cutter discovers Jim has replaced
Ántonia, he enraged and begins choking and beating Jim. After the beating,
Jim runs back home and goes to sleep.

Grandmother found me there in the morning. Her cry of fright awakened
me. Truly, I was a battered object. As she helped me to my room, I caught
a glimpse of myself in the mirror. My lip was cut and stood out like a snout.
My nose looked like a big blue plum, and one eye was swollen shut and
hideously discolored. Grandmother said we must have the doctor at once,
but I implored her, as I never begged for anything before, not to send for
him. I could stand anything, I told her, so long as nobody saw me or knew
what happened to me. (189)

As for Ántonia, Jim testifies that he “hated her almost as much as I hated Cut
ter. She had let me in for all this disgustingness.” Properly explicated, this
scene read as a classic reversal of roles. Hence, we witness the education of
Jim Burden, as he learns about what he calls the disgustingness of the aftermath
of a rape — the quality of degenerated self-awareness that follows sexual
assault. Jim is thoroughly feminized by the experience, even to the point of
worrying “what the old men down at the drug-store” would say about it all.
To what extent can man take the place of a woman, have her experiences,
know the world as she knows it? These are not uncomplicated questions. My
Ántonia written from the perspective of Jim Burden, the male narrator and
substitute rape victim. And although Jim takes Willa Cather’s place in this
novel, critics have differed in their reactions to this literary device (see for
instance Donovan; Fetterly; and Lambert). Can a woman write through the
perspective of a male narrative voice, and if she does, is her male voice really a
female voice masquerading as male? The issue foregrounded in a brief intro
duction that forms part of the novel, where yet another narrator (frequently
understood as Cather herself) claims to have received the manuscript of “My
Ántonia” from Jim Burden. But Jim Burden is a fictional creation of Willa
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Cather, a product of her imagination. Readers encountering the novel for the
first time often wonder,
this really something that was given to Cather —
that is, did she not write this herself? The question is a good one. The novel
begs its readers to read past gender, past the facts of “herself,” and to pose the
question: If I had that body, and that set of experiences, what would the world
look like and feel like to me?
Jims response to his experience is heavily coded as female, as if he had been
made into a woman by the assault on his physical
The formal strategy
Cather employs in this novel, where the male narrative voice gives her the text,
and the text is informed by his voice, and the voice in turn becomes Cathers
text, must be read past in order to be comprehended fully. If a man could take
a womans place, in the logic of the Burden/Cutter scene, if he could experience
the world as she experiences it, he would act and react as she does. Further
more, the “if” easily removed from the previous statement when the man (or
the woman) willing to suspend his sense of himself and enter into the expe
rience of another, imaginatively. Our experiences author us, in other words,
including those experiences we have when we are inattentive to our daily lives.
These speculations are enforced by Cather’s own effort in the novel to read past
her female self and imagine, in the narrative, the male voice. The assault on Jim
is a restoration of the original reversal, where Cather becomes the male narra
tor, and then the male narrator becomes the female victim.
The costs incurred in not attending to who we are may be psychically
severe. As Stanley Aronowitz reminds us, “loyalty to the nation-state, conven
tionally tied to the meaning of citizenship itself, shifted to subculture or gen
der, often taken as subculture” (62). Literary study in today’s classroom does,
and always has done, the work of political culture, particularly by the process of
reading for recognition. Readers wish to see themselves — their sexuality, their
race, their people — reflected in what they read; and, if possible, they prefer to
see themselves as they would like to be: articulate, consequential, recognized.
If the course of study is American literature and I am an American, I (or some
one like me) ought to be recognizable on the syllabus. What Cather’s text does
to question this method of reading. Who recognizes Jim Burden, the male
or the female reader? The males will say, that’s not me because the female
author cannot know my experiences, even if she calls her narrator “Jim.” The
female reader will say, that’s not me because this particular female author must
mask herself as “Jim” and I am not so masked. But once the literary mode of
cognition abandons the ability to attend to matters outside its physical bound
aries, it has little left that exceeds confession.
As we come to accept, with increasingly less reflection, the social equation
of reading and recognition, we lose sight of the fundamental value of the liter
ary experience, which has only partially and pot always to do with recognition
of one’s own nonliterary existence. I do not mean that literature must decenter
us, or make the familiar strange, or expand our horizons, or make us more sen
sitive to others — well, I mean all of these formalist things, of course, but also
something more. My refrain: Literary study the study of how one reads past.
It is not the study of maleness, or the study of the female voice, or the study of
any particularly decentered representation or estranged reception of reality but
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the study of how one reads past every one of these phenomena to the structures
of cognition that produce and sustain them. In My Ántonia, Willa Cather
escaped the confines of gender as an unproblematic determinant of artistic pro
duction — that is, she enveloped the voice of the male and spoke it back.
Cathers escape, no matter how we assess it, brings the pleasurable prospect of
our own escape from confinement.
The most difficult thing for the human mind to envision is another mode
of thought, a mode of consciousness that will render its own thought processes
obsolete. And yet, historically, we know that such paradigm shifts have
occurred with epochal regularity. Today’s common sense evolves into the next
eras idiocy, when what we accept as articulate expression is reinterpreted as
bobbing, moaning, and slobbering. “Books that exceed our customary uses of
language can teach us not just new facts — something we did not already know
— but new forms of life: something we did not necessarily know we wanted or
needed to know (Carafiol 168). Peter Carafiol claims that such books “do not
change the world. They are changes in the world that prompt changes in the
reader.” My Ántonia is something of an intrusion, work of fiction whose fictionality includes not only the circumstances of its emergence but the assaults
it made upon the mind of its author. Reading past its narrative incidents and
details brings us to a realm where experience and essence cross. The relation
between Jim Burden and Willa Cather lies between the curling flower spaces of
our imaginative capacities, within the ellipses of consciousness, in the spaces
left out of the current configuration of human perception and articulation.
Dilsey says of the Compson landholdings, “We aint got the room we use to
have.” One must travel to far-off places, further than Dunnet Landing, for a
psychic landscape that has room for Benjamin Compson. As a result, Dilsey
says, Benjamin “cant stay out in the yard, crying where all the neighbors can see
him” (60). The closing in of private space (or the expansion of the public,
mediated community) and the increasingly insistent demands to pay attention,
make Benjamins voice intrusive on others who don’t want to attend to its wail.
The meaning of human speech changes with every shift in context, and what
a sympathetic plea in one set of circumstances becomes a pathetic annoyance in
another. Rodney King asks, “Why can’t we just get along?” after his beating by
Los Angeles police, and the utterance eventually becomes a trope for clueless
ness on the comedy club and morning radio circuit. What Benjamin Compson
says, what he has to say, is of no value to the neighbors, even if they were to be
told about all time and injustice and sorrow and all voiceless misery under the
sun. The neighbors just don’t want to know about it, don’t want their inatten
tion filled that way because, as we know, Benjy is pretty disgusting and the
change in the world represented by his voice not pleasant.
Literary texts, despite the private nature pf reading them, are public docu
ments, and they inspire and inform public discourse. The detail of the Comp
son neighbors not appreciating Benjamin’s wail signals an ethical issue to the
reader: should Benjamin be hidden away? The guidebooks make it clear that
at the very least, he must be explained away, so that the reader’s attention not
piqued to the point of exhaustion by the narrative’s formulaic uncertainty. The
neighbors are well within their rights to demand a quiet neighborhood; cer-
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tainly, readers of the text will demand the same from their own neighbors. The
ethical issue has nothing to do with the neighbors, finally, but with Benjamin
and his narrative. What is to be done with the man who is a completely aso
cial, noncomprehending, inarticulate, compulsively needy sibling, whose words
require that we read another book to make sense of them? Caddy hugs him but
leaves him; Quentin gets him drunk; Dilsey feeds him; Jason has him castrated
and committed. Each act, alone, and in certain combinations, represents a
social option, and each act mirrors a critical intervention. However, in order
truly to make room for Benjamin Compson, we need to resist every effort to
rationalize his discourse. We must renounce every hug, drink, and incision
available to us as readers; Benjamin cannot be absorbed, obliterated, or edited
to suit the structure of thought we bring to bear on his textual existence.
Literary encounters provoke intellectual restructuring. Martha Nussbaum
has found literary texts useful on law school reading lists because “[literature
focuses on the possible, inviting its readers to wonder about themselves” (5).
Nussbaum
not thinking about subject matter so much as the more formal
aspects of literary texts. “In their very mode of address to their imagined read
they convey the sense that there are links of possibility, at least on a very gen
eral level, between the characters and the reader.” As a result of these affinities,
the reader's speculative imagination piqued to envision alternative modes of
being: what would it be like to be Benjamin Compson, and in what ways are
we like him already? The imagination of alternatives vital to the practice of
law and to the health of a democracy in general, which is why Nussbaum brings
literary texts to the preprofessional legal curriculum. “The readers emotions
and imagination are very active as a result,” Nussbaum concludes, “and it is the
nature of this activity, and its relevance for public thinking” that merit critical
scrutiny. The capacity of literary study to lead the mind toward breaking
through barriers of thinking, to make more space where it seems “we aint got
the room,” is the pleasure of the well-flung harpoon, or the perfectly wrought
earthenware jug.
Faulkner’s novel is difficult to read and requires sustained attention; or,
more accurately, it requires periodic inattention. The reader must interrupt
reading the novel and consider what sort of sense to make of it. There comes
a point where “we aint got the room” and we, as thinking subjects, must divert
our attention from the spasmodic narrative. The Sound and the Fury seems
aware of the demands it makes on human attention because it structures dis
traction into its narrative. Consider the following passage, in which Quentin
Compson fighting (unsuccessfully) with his sister s lover:

I hit him my open hand beat the impulse to shut it to his face his hand
moved as fast as mine the cigarette went over the rail I swung with the
other hand he caught it too before the cigarette reached the water he held
both my wrists in the same hand his other hand flicked to his armpit under
his coat behind him the sun slanted and a bird singing somewhere beyond
the sun we looked at one another while the bird singing he turned my
hands loose (160)
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The bird evoked at the end of the passage signals a lack of room in Quentins
mind, and a need to think past his predicament. His sister Caddy is pregnant
by this man, Dalton Ames, and Quentin wants to run him out of town because
of it. However, Ames proves to be a considerate lover, asking about Caddy, and
for all we know he has no interest in deserting her. Furthermore, Quentin is
not up to the task of physically forcing the man to do anything, as seen in the
passage above. At the point when Quentin “caught” (with both wrists held
in one of Ames’s hands) his mind departs from the immediate situation and he
distracted by “a bird singing somewhere beyond the sun.” Hence, Quentin is
not paying attention to his immediate business with Dalton Ames. With the
bird in mind, Quentin has the potential to read past his predicament, realizing
what he must do to survive, if not prevail, in this circumstance. And so “we
looked at one another while the bird singing he turned my hands loose.”
Quentin doesn’t quite make it, by the way — he soon assaults Ames again and
is subdued, again gently, by the kind lover, who leaves quietly to save Quentin
embarrassment. This second time, however, the bird signals release from
Quentins mental impasse.

I leaned on the rail looking at the water I heard him untie the horse and
ride off and after a while I couldn’t hear anything but the water and then
the bird again I left the bridge and sat down with my back against the tree
and shut my eyes a patch of sun came through and fell across my eyes and
I moved a little further around the tree I heard the bird again and the water
and then everything sort of rolled away and I didnt feel anything at all I felt
almost good . . . after a while I knew that he hadnt hit me that he had lied
about that for her sake too and that I had just passed out like a girl but even
that didnt matter anymore (162; ellipsis added)
I would equate Quentin’s attention to the bird with the reader’s attention to lit
erature and with the potential for public thinking held by literary studies. In
bind, such finding out that the villain no blackguard, or trying to fight and
finding the opponent is not only more powerful than you but also does not con
sider you an enemy and has no interest in fighting, the mind has some options.
It can shut down in despair. It can go on fighting, insisting that the enemy
become an enemy (at one point Ames offers Quentin a pistol), making the fight
itself the point of contention, rather than the issue which gave rise to the con
frontation. Or the mind can depart, read past its predicament to something
else, another level of consciousness, through the fictional to a structure of con
sciousness capable of transcendence. In short, it may decide not to pay atten
tion for a while — to be distracted, that is, by its desire for pleasure even in the
midst of turmoil, secure in the knowledge that distraction (“diversion of the
mind, attention, etc., from particular object or course”) may in fact be the
solution.
The value of literary study is precisely in the function of reading past the
necessary and mechanical depictions of the real and providing room for readers
to do the same. The solution to an intellectual problem is seldom located in the
kind of thinking that produced the problem in the first place. Academic liter-
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ature programs maintain their place in higher education because, frankly, of
their irrelevance to the research and teaching objectives of preprofessional cur
ricula. Like Quentin’s bird, literary studies are there for the attention of those
who realize, finally, that the human mind is nurtured very much by what it does
not need to know. Reading past Tie Sound and the Fury, we find that when
faced with an incontrovertible fact, a barrier, an unresolvable problem, the
answer is to look elsewhere, past the immediate toward the irrelevant — per
haps to engage another sense, another source of pleasure. Literature distracts;
it directs our attention elsewhere, as a release from the confinements of yester
day’s insight, the hands of Dalton Ames, the body of Ántonia Shimerda. From
such constraints we crave the pleasures of distraction, to be “physically or men
tally drawn in different directions by conflicting forces or emotions,” to enter
the realm between the curling flower spaces of our expectations.
Then again, there some danger in this process. Quentin Compson, who
hears the song of the invisible bird, goes to Harvard, where he ultimately com
mits suicide. Is literary studies a parlor game, or do we face danger when we
ask minds to read past their predicament? In Sanctuary, Faulkner juxtaposes
the killer’s gun and reader’s book in the novel’s opening scene, where a man
with a gun and a man with a book engage in two-hour standoff.

That was about four oclock on an afternoon in May. They squatted so, fac
ing one another across the spring, for two hours. Now and then the bird
sang back in the swamp,
though it were worked by a clock; twice more
invisible automobiles passed along the highroad and died away. Again the
bird sang. (5)

It is impossible to accept the literal detail of the encounter, where the two men
face each from four until six p.m. The reader quite likely to ignore it. How
ever, if we readpast the duration, we have two unlikely details juxtaposed. First,
there is the two-hour encounter. But the second and even less credible repre
sented fact is that the one man’s gun is checked, or held in abeyance, by the
other man’s book. The incomprehensible nature of the encounter amounts to
an overloaded set of stimuli — there isn’t room in the mind to make sense of it
— and rather than attend to the encounter, we attend to the sound of the bird,
and note its clockishness. The province of literature is in the bird’s song, and
when we read, in attentive inattention, it
always a face-off, while the bird
singing, within someone else's powers of cognition. The particulars of repre
sentation, whether of Dunnet Landing or Yoknapatawpha County, are sec
ondary and often irrelevant to the processes of creation and escape embedded
in the modes of attention demanded by the text. In any case, it is always the
book versus the gun, the lure of distraction in a standoff against those stimuli
that demand our attention.
The result of attending to the song of this bird may lead to deaths of all
kinds — the death of certain ways of thinking, the death of solidly held con
victions, the death of impassable thoughts — not all of which are, by progres
sive standards, bad things. Like a bird sent into mineshaft, we look to it as a
harbinger of survival. However, there are no guarantees. Literary studies has
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no programmatic mission outside of making room in the mind. Hence, liter
ary politics are always chaotic, unsystematic, and volatile, while literary study
— the experience of making room in the mind — brings pleasure to those who
can read its language. It feels good to clear space, to engage those senses dulled
by attentiveness, to engage in studied distraction. However, once room is made,
what moves in is not predictable. Reading literary texts makes the mind vul
nerable to potential assault as well as to potential liberation. Unkind words may
and often do result from literary employments. Once we have imagined our
selves as someone else, as Jim Burden perhaps, or once we have let someone or
something else control our cognitive processes, we may find our moorings
revealed as whale lines, linked to monstrosities. A simple gesture, innocent as
the bird’s song, is thus revealed in the reading of it as participating in something
demonic, in the destruction of worlds. Quentin, at Harvard, managed to read
past his sense of himself as brother, to lover, and then to victim; he then, as
Quentin, ceased to exist. “So we die before our own eyes,” Jewett’s narrator
says,
she leaves Dunnet Landing; “so we see some chapters of our lives come
to their natural end” (100). Reading literature always a judgment on the real.
To choose the novel over the newspaper, over the book of nonfiction, or over
the television (which, even if fantasy, is punctuated regularly with commercial
calls to attention), is to say No to the actual and Yes (as it were) to the bird’s
song, beyond the sun. So we choose to die before our own eyes. But even if
nature will not suffice, our most durable myths tell us that from death comes
new life.
The habit of reading past can be taught, but only if literary pedagogy
remains distinct from most other forms of teaching, forms that rely upon the
importation of knowledge, and upon making clear what is to be known. Liter
ary study is often sabotaged by instructional methods that call upon students to
read texts as sociological or psychological cases, or
formalist or linguistic
puzzles. These methods barely read, let alone read past, their texts. As profes
sors of literature, we would serve our interests better if we claimed to teach
methods of distraction. The feeling of Friday afternoon to the nine-to-five
worker, the anticipation of the bell to the public school child, the embrace of
the infant after the absence of the parent, the lover’s eyes across crowded pub
lic spaces: these are the pleasures of welcomed distraction, promising escape
from here and access to another level of existence, where muted senses are
brought back to life. The purpose of literary study is to make room in the mind
now for such pleasures of renewal, so that it can read past what it knows, or
expected to know, and migrate to other cognitive structures of knowledge.
The title character of Bharati Mukherjee’s 1989 novel, Jasmine, narrates a
tale of immigration to the United States from India. Jasmine arrives in Flori
da and is raped by a degenerate figure called Half-Face, whom she kills. She
then flees to New York, becomes an au pair (and falls in love with Taylor, the
father in the family for whom she works), and finally moves again to Iowa,
where she lives with a paraplegic man named Bud. The novel culminates, on
its last page, in a scene where Taylor reappears with his daughter to take Jas
mine to California. This is the novel’s final paragraph:
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Then there is nothing I can do. Time will tell if I am a tornado, rubble
maker, arising from nowhere and disappearing into a cloud. I am out the
door and in the potholed and rutted driveway, scrambling ahead of Taylor,
greedy with wants and reckless from hope.

By its placement in the text, it would seem that the conclusion to the novel is
Jasmines decision to move again, to leave Bud for Taylor. The novel, however,
is not written in a linear fashion. Instead, its narrative proceeds kaleidoscopically, with scenes from India, Florida, New York, and Iowa interspersed, mak
ing a text that is “pitted, pocked, and broken up,” according to its epigraph.
Furthermore, at the end of the first chapter, the narrator explains, "I am twen
ty-four now, and I live in Baden County, Iowa” (3),
if the novel were about
to unfold from this particular perspective. However, if Jasmine twenty-four
and in Iowa “now,” at the novel’s writing, then where exactly the “now” of the
text’s conclusion? The last paragraph casts her "out the door” and “scrambling
ahead of Taylor,” off to a place that will not be Baden, Iowa. Hence, what fol
lows Iowa
the only perspective from which the entire novel, including the
conclusion, can be written. Otherwise, the “now” of the first chapter must be
ignored.
Reading past India, immigration, sexual politics, and American identities,
Mukherjees novel cogitates on what it ever means to say, “I am this old now
and I live here.” The text thus echoes Cathers Southwest Native American
women, whose now was filled with geometrical expressions of the aesthetics of
their duties as pot bearers. Jasmines sense of now overflows with greedy wants
and reckless hopes. Like Platos concept of becoming, the now of Mukherjee’s
novel is eternally and defiantly emergent, and “there
nothing [anyone] can
do” about it. To Mukherjee, one answer to the question, “why are we here now”
(living here; toting here; whaling here; listening to the birds song here)
always, “so we do not have to be here now.” The pleasure of escape is eternal
ly on the tip of human consciousness, and always the subject matter of literary
expression, for those who can read its language.
Literary modes of thought expand commonsense notions of the now, and
extend the content of now as cognitive space. The now of reading is always
elsewhere, else-when, distracted. If, in Jasmine, time will tell what the final
paragraph means, then the paragraph defies mimetic significance, as there no
time past the ending of any novel. The narrator says, “I am twenty-four now,
and I live in Baden, Iowa,” and the novel ends with the narrator no longer liv
ing there. Hence, the entire novel consists of a geometrically, or spatially
extended now, as if a moment of intense decision can encompass a lifetime. Jas
mine s decision to abandon Bud (made even more pivotal by the fact she
pregnant) is charted and prefigured by twenty-four years of abandonment,
reversal, and trauma. Reading past any moral or ethical reading of Jasmine’s
decision to leave the father of her unborn child (as if a fictional character could
exercise judgment worthy of anyone’s contemplation), Jasmine enriches our
sense of what we mean by now whenever we consider its meaning. Far from
being emptied, far from a blip between one’s sense of the future and one’s past,
between desire and memory, Mukherjee’s now
spatially resonant, “greedy
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with wants and reckless from hope.” A major decision is thus explained neither
ethically nor morally
in, "one does not desert ones lover”) but geometrical
ly, by placing the cognitive process on a chart of personal experiences — expe
riences which are always possessed as the defining characteristics of ones sense
of now.
Literary critics use the present tense when they discuss texts, because liter
ary enactment always exists in the present, in the now. Benjamin Compson
moans and slobbers eternally, and holds the jimson weed for comfort. In the
now, with Jasmine, are Benjamin Compson, Jim Burden and Ántonia Shimerda, the whale line, Dunnet Landing, Quentins bird, Popeye’s gun, and the curl
ing flower spaces. In a prolonged and extensive now where literary texts place
the minds of those who can read their language, not in the name of attending to
the present, but with the purpose of exploring underneath, beyond, and past it.
And what else is pleasure, but a heightened sense of ones existence, in the now?
Drugs and alcohol, for centuries, have aided human beings in their quest to
expand experience — and specific narcotics have influenced more than one lit
erary movement in history. Sexual pleasures awaken bodily sensations, held in
check by a cerebral civilization whose purposes are complicated by physicality.
Such distractions cannot be incorporated by demands for attention — don’t
drink and drive, and don’t read and drive — but neither can the pleasures they
represent be expunged from human impulses. Literary study cannot abandon
the pleasures of inattention without abdicating its essence
a tradition — not
as a canon but as a mode of thought. For once we read past historical fiction,
science fiction, comedy, tragedy, romanticism, and the rest, the single, universal
object of literary study is the present in all its limitlessness and expansion. Any
thing less trivializes our lives as literary scholars and trivializes the purpose of
literary study. Above all else, we read literature to extend the present, to fill the
now
fully as possible, paying no attention to the tendency of human institu
tions to trivialize the now by insisting that memory or management define it
essentially. In the literary now, between the curling flower spaces, time will
always tell what it is we get when we make room for the greedy wants and reck
less desires of literary employments. This is what feels right, feels good.
First comes Benjamin Compson, in other words, full of sound and fury, and
then comes puzzled attention, as when Caddy comes running with her book
satchel and listens to what Benjy has to say. The strength of such literary
encounters has always resided, ultimately, in the mode of thought resurrected
on the page.

“Did you come to meet Caddy.” she said, rubbing my hands. “What
it. What are you trying to tell Caddy.” Caddy smelled like trees and like
when she says we were asleep.
What are you moaning about, Luster said. You can watch them again when
we get back to the branch. Here. Here's you a jimson weed. He gave me the
flower. We went through thefence, into the lot. (6)
What do we want to say, what do we moan about, when we become so dis
tracted we read past the page? Literary recognition is not a matter of mirrored
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reflection but an abrupt encounter with something we thought we had lost,
some way of thinking possessed by someone else, in another place, at some
other time. In the text something survives, coarse and poisonous, like the jimson weed, or playfully welcomed, like the jouncing booksatchel, dogging us
through the fence and into the realm of public thinking. When we accustom
our minds to the patterns on the earthenware pots, we find ourselves reading
past the function of the jars, escaping into the realm of what tugs at the lines,
and, while the bird singing, finding what provides when we become heedless,
negligent, and inattentive.

Notes
1. Among the examples: Hahn and Kinney; Ross and Polk; Matthews;
Polk; Bloom; Kinney; Bleikasten; Meriwether; and Cowan.
2. This has become a problem in the workplace. See, for example, Breuer.
It is also an issue with the growing move to allow employees to work at home.
See Roha.
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